THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


GIFT  OF 


T^ 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM 


BT 


BOEDEN   P.  BOWNE 

PROFESSOR  OF   PHILOSOPHY   IN    BOSTON   UNIVERSITY 

AUTHOR  OF   "metaphysics"   "  INTEODrCTION  TO 
PSYCHOLOGICAL  THEORY"  ETC. 


NEW   YORK 
HARPER    &   BROTHERS,    FRANKLIN    SQUARE 

1887 


Copyright,  1887,  by  IIarper  &  Brothers. 


All  rights  reserved. 


BL 

aoo 


PREFACE. 


This  work  does  not  aim  to  say  everytMng 
about  theism.  I  liave  rather  sought  to  give  an 
outhne  of  the  essential  argument  which  might 
serve  as  a  text  for  teachers  and  as  a  somewhat 
critical  survey  of  the  subject  for  other  readers. 

Kant  pointed  out  that  the  ontological  argu- 
ment properly  proves  notliing,  and  that  the  cos- 
mological  and  the  design  argument  depend  on 
the  ontological.  The  argument,  then,  is  not 
demonstrative,  and  rests  finally  on  the  assumed 
existence  of  a  perfect  being.  In  a  different 
form  I  have  maintained  the  same  position ;  but 
so  far  from  concluding  that  theistic  faith  is 
baseless,  I  have  sought  to  show  that  essentially 
the  same  postulate  underlies  our  entire  mental 
Ufe.  There  is  an  element  of  faith  and  vohtion 
latent  in  all  our  theorizing.  Where  we  cannot 
prove,  we  beheve.  "Where  we  cannot  demon- 
strate, we  choose  sides.     This  element  of  faith 


iv  PREFACE. 

cannot  be  escaped  in  any  field  of  thought,  and 
without  it  the  mind  is  helpless  and  dumb. 
Oversight  of  this  fact  has  led  to  boundless  verb- 
al haggling  and  barren  logic-chopping,  in  which 
it  would  be  hard  to  say  whether  the  affirmative 
or  the  negative  be  the  more  confused.  Absurd 
demands  for  "proof"  have  been  met  with  ab- 
surd "  proofs."  The  argument  has  thus  been 
transferred  from  the  field  of  life  and  action, 
where  it  mainly  belongs,  to  the  arid  wastes  of 
formal  logic,  where  it  has  fared  scarcely  better 
than  the  man  who  journeyed  to  Jericho  from 
Jerusalem.  The  conclusion  is  that  theism  is 
the  fundamental  iDOstulate  of  our  total  life.  It 
cannot,  indeed,  be  demonstrated  without  assump- 
tion, but  it  cannot  be  denied  without  wi-ecking 
all  our  interests. 

This  claun  has  been  especially  emphasized  in 
considering  the  bearing  of  theism  upon  the  prob- 
lem of  knowledge.  I  have  sought  to  show  that 
our  cognitive  and  speculative  interests,  as  well 
as  our  moral  and  rehgious  interests,  are  so  bound 
up  with  theism  as  to  stand  or  fall  with  it.  If 
we  say,  then,  that  theism  is  strictly  proved  by 
nothing,  we  must  also  admit  that  it  is  imphcit  in 
eveiytliing.    Anti-theistic  schemes  are  generally 


PREFACE.  V 

in  the  instinctive  stage  of  thought,  where  knowl- 
edge constitutes  no  problem  and  is  taken  for 
granted.  In  tliis  stage  any  theory  whatever 
may  be  held,  however  seK  -  destructive  ;  and 
when  its  suicidal  imphcations  are  pointed  out, 
the  theorist  falls  back  on  unreasoned  common- 
sense,  and  repudiates,  not  his  own  theory,  which 
is  the  real  offender,  but  the  critic.  He  sets  up 
natural  selection  as  the  determining  principle  of 
belief,  and  then  repudiates  the  great  catholic 
convictions  of  the  race.  He  shows  how  the  sur- 
vival of  the  fittest  must  bring  thought  and  thing 
into  accord,  and  then  rejects  the  behefs  which 
survive.  He  defines  mind  as  an  adjustment  of 
inner  relations  to  outer  relations,  and  forthwith 
drifts  off  into  nescience.  He  presents  the  Un- 
known Cause  as  the  source  of  all  beliefs,  and 
then  rules  out  most  of  them  as  invalid,  and,  at 
times,  declares  them  all  worthless.  This  pitia- 
ble compound  of  instinct  and  reflection,  in  which 
each  destroys  the  other,  has  even  been  regarded 
as  the  final  philosophy.  Such  performances  are 
both  saddening  and  wearisome.  It  seems  clear 
that  whoever  will  reason  should  regard  the  con- 
ditions of  reason,  and  should  not  set  up  theories 
which  undermine  reason.     But  it  will  be  a  lonsj 


VI 


PREFACE. 


step  in  advance  when  this  simple  principle  is 
recognized.  Meanwhile  the  critic  must  possess 
his  tired  soul  in  patience  when  he  sees  suicidal 
theories  parading  as  science  and  supreme  wis- 
dom. The  greater  the  dearth  of  thought,  the 
greater  the  swarm  of  opinions. 

Yet  there  is  some  progress.  Except  in  phi- 
losophy and  theology,  there  is  coming  to  he  a  de- 
cided conviction  that  no  one  has  a  right  to  an 
opinion  who  has  not  studied  the  subject.  Off- 
hand decisions  of  unstudied  questions  receive 
very  little  consideration  nowadays  in  the  sci- 
ences. It  is  to  be  hoped  that  this  mental  seri- 
ousness may  yet  extend  to  philosophy  and  the- 
ology. At  present  it  is  not  so.  He  would  be  a 
rare  man  indeed  who  could  not  settle  questions 
in  theology  or  Biblical  criticism  without  previous 
study ;  while  the  small  men  who  could  dispose 
of  philosophy  and  philosoi^hers  in  one  after- 
noon are  legion.  Meanwhile  the  irrelevance, 
the  misunderstanding,  the  superficiality  are  so 
apparent  that  the  student  is  unavoidably  re- 
minded of  our  first  parents,  of  whom  it  is  said, 
They  were  naked  and  were  not  ashamed. 

That   nature  when  driven  out  with  a  fork 
always  comes  running  back  is  a  discovery  of 


PREFACE.  vii 

ancient  date.  We  have  an  excellent  illustration 
of  this  law  in  the  way  in  which  language  has 
avenged  the  attempt  to  discredit  the  teleological 
view  of  nature.  Teleology  has  taken  entire 
possession  of  the  language  of  botany  and  bi- 
ology, especially  when  expounded  in  terms  of 
evolution.  Even  plants  do  the  most  acute  and 
far-sighted  things  to  maintain  their  existence. 
They  specialize  themselves  with  a  view  to  cross- 
fertilization  and  make  nothing  of  changing  spe- 
cies or  genus  to  reach  their  ends.  A  supply  is 
often  regarded  as  fully  explained  when  the  need 
is  pointed  out ;  and  evolution  itself  is  not  infre- 
quently endowed  with  mental  attributes.  Such 
extraordinary  mythology  arises  from  the  mental 
necessity  for  recognizing  purpose  in  the  world; 
and  as  it  would  not  be  good  form  to  speak  of  a 
divine  purpose,  there  is  no  shift  but  to  attribute 
it  to  "Nature"  or  "Evolution  "  or  "  Law  "  or  some 
other  of  the  homemade  divinities  of  the  day. 

The  atheistic  gust  of  recent  years  has  about 
blown  over.  Atheism  is  dead  as  a  philosophy, 
and  remains  cliiefly  as  a  disposition.  But  the 
origin  and  history  of  the  late  atheistic  renas- 
cence are  not  without  both  interest  and  instruc- 
tion.    The  crude  popular  reahsm,  joined  with 


YjJJ^  PREFACE. 

the  notion  of  necessity,  fumislied  excellent  soil 
for  an  atheistic  growth.     Not  a  few  atheists 
found  a  disproof  of  theism  in  the  conservation 
of  energy,  and  not  a  few  theists  felt  that  all 
depended  on  discrediting  that  doctrine.     Both 
parties  ahke  agreed  in  the  principle,  the  more 
law,  the  less   God.      This  grotesque  inversion 
of  reason,  together  with  the  doctrine  of  evolu- 
tion in  biology,  brought  about  a  state  of  tri- 
umph on  the  one  side  and  of  panic  on  the  other 
which  is  unintelhgible  now  except  to  one  versed 
in  the  philosophy  of  error,  and  which  is  seen  to 
be  equally  baseless  in  both  cases.     The  naive 
disportings  of  the  speculators  of  that  period  are 
at  once  as  charming  and  as  embarrassing  to  the 
modest  critic  as  the  contemplation  of  a  state  of 
paradisaical  innocence.     Happily,  there  is  an  ad- 
vance towards  clothing  and  a  right  mind.     That 
terrible  necessity  which  left  no  room  for  God 
has  been  recognized  as  only  a  shadow  of  the 
mind's  own  thi'owing.      Even    evolution,  that 
monster  of  liideous  mien,  on  the  one  hand,  has 
been  discovered  not  to  be  so  potent  a  solvent 
of  philosophical  questions  as  was  once  fancied, 
and  on  the  other,  even  some  theists  have  plucked 
up  courage  enough,  not  only  to  endure,  but  also 


PREFACE.  ix 

to  embrace.  Fundamental  problems  are  seen  to 
remain  about  what  they  always  were  in  spite  of 
the  advent  of  the  "  New  Philosophy."  When 
that  philosophy  first  appeared  in  the  wilderness 
of  the  old  philosophy  and  theology,  announcing 
that  the  kingdom  of  science  was  at  hand,  high 
hopes  were  entertained  by  some,  and  gloomy 
forebodings  by  others,  as  to  what  the  end  would 
be.  But  as  the  attraction  of  novelty  and  denial 
wore  off,  it  became  clear  that  the  "New  Philoso- 
phy "  could  not  hit  it  off  with  criticism  any  more 
happily  than  the  old.  To  the  apostles,  this  was 
both  a  revelation  and  a  sore  disappointment. 
They  meant  well  and  were  gifted  wiiters,  but 
they  were  lacking  in  patient  reflection.  They 
took  more  heed  to  their  speculative  ways  and 
became  less  enthusiastic  but  wiser  men.  Some 
proof  of  this  is  found  in  the  fact  that  the  British 
Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Science  has 
not  favored  us  with  a  cosmological  manifesto  for 
the  last  dozen  years.  All  parties  have  learned 
wisdom.  Theists  have  gained  breadth  and  cour- 
age. Anti-theists  have  found  that  the  way 
of  anti-theism  is  hard.  The  critic  must  allow 
that  the  theistic  outlook  was  never  more  en- 
couraging.    The  only  exception  to  this  general 


X  PREFACE. 

growth  is  in  the  case  of  the  newspaper  and  mag- 
azine scientist — that  well  of  omniscience  nnde- 
filed.  Here,  as  ever,  one  finds  chiefly  words  and 
hearsay,  an  exploitation  of  what  the  writer  does 
not  know.  Boeden  P.  Bowne. 

Boston,  July,  1887. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTEB  FAOB 

Introduction 1 

I.  Unity  of  the  Wokld-Gkound 41 

II.  The  World-Ground  as  Intelligent    .     .     .     .     62 

III.  The  World-Ground  as  Personal 122 

IV.  The  Metaphysical  Attributes  of  the  World- 

Ground     139 

V.  God  and  the  World 171 

VI.  The  World-Ground  as  Ethical 211 

VII.  Theism  and  Life 241 

Conclusion 261 


PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 


INTRODUCTION. 

§  1.  Man  is  religious.  However  it  came  about, 
our  race,  at  least  as .  soon  as  it  emerged  from 
brutisliness,  possessed  religious  ideas  and  im- 
pulses. The  earth  is  full  of  rehgion;  and  hfe 
and  thought,  art  and  literature,  are  moulded 
by  it. 

Concerning  this  fact  three  questions  may  be 
asked.  These  concern  respectively,  (1)  the 
source  of  rehgion,  (2)  the  genesis  and  history 
of  rehgion,  and  (3)  the  rational  fomidation  or 
warrant  of  reherion. 

The  Source  of  Religion. 

§  2.  To  this  question  various  answers  are  given. 
Some  have  been  content  to  \aew  religion  as  a  de- 
vice of  state  and  priest  craft ;  but  this  view  has 
1 


2  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

long  been  obsolete.  The  impossibility  of  impos- 
ing purely  adventitious  and  fictitious  ideas  upon 
the  mind  by  external  authority  makes  it  neces- 
sary to  look  for  the  source  of  religion  within  the 
mind  itself.  Such  source  was  found  at  a  very 
early  date  in  fear.  Man  being  timid  and  help- 
less, feigns  gods  partly  to  help  himself  and  part- 
ly as  projections  of  his  fears.  This  view,  which 
finds  full  expression  by  Lucretius,  has  been  ex- 
tended by  Hume,  who  finds  the  source  of  re- 
ligious ideas  m  the  personifying  tendency  of  the 
mind.  Man  projects  his  own  life  into  all  his  ob- 
jects, and  thus  surrounds  himself  with  a  world  of 
invisible  beings.  Others  have  held  that  the  idea 
of  an  invisible  world  first  got  afloat  through 
dreams,  trances,  fits,  etc.,  and  once  afloat,  it  took 
possession  of  the  human  mind  in  general,  with 
the  exception  always  of  a  few  choice  spirits  of 
rare  insight ;  and  from  this  unseemly  origin  the 
whole  system  of  religious  thought  has  been 
developed.  Suggestions  of  this  land  are  num- 
berless. They  are  mainly  an  extension  of  the 
sensational  philosophy  into  the  realm  of  re- 
ligion. As  that  philosophy  seeks  to  reduce  the 
rational  factors  of  intellect  to  sensation,  and  eth- 
ical elements  to  non-ethical,  so  also  it  seeks  to 


INTRODUCTION-.  3 

reduce  the  religions  nature  to  something  non- 
rehgious.  But  in  all  of  these  attempts  it  suc- 
ceeds only  by  tacitly  begging  the  question.  If 
we  take  a  mind  whose  full  nature  is  expressed 
in  the  quality  A,  it  will  be  forever  impossible  to 
develop  anything  but  A  out  of  it.  In  order  to 
move  at  aU  A  must  be  more  than  A  ;  it  must  be 
A+X,  or  XA.  That  X  contains  the  ground  of 
the  movement.  A  being  whose  nature  is  ex- 
hausted in  sense  objects  can  never  transcend 
them.  Everything  must  be  to  him  what  it 
seems.  The  stick  must  be  a  stick,  not  a  fetich. 
The  sun  and  moon  must  be  lighted  disks  and  not 
gods.  To  get  such  a  being  beyond  the  sense 
object  to  a  rehgious  object  we  must  endow  him 
with  more  than  the  A  of  sensation,  or  the  B  of 
animal  fear.  The  cattle  have  both;  but  only 
some  very  hopeful  evolutionists  have  discovered 
any  traces  of  rehgion  among  them;  and  if  it 
should  turn  out  that  these  traces  are  not  mis- 
leading, it  would  not  prove  that  simple  sensa- 
tions can  become  religious  ideas,  but  that  the 
animal  mind  is  more  and  better  than  we  have 
been  accustomed  to  think. 

Another  view  has  been  suggested,  that  religious 
ideas  are  the  product  of  reflective  thought.    This 


4  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

view  is  disproved  by  experience.  Man  was  re- 
ligious before  lie  became  a  philosopher.  Specu- 
lative thought  has  had  the  function  of  criticis- 
ing and  clarifying  religious  ideas,  but  never  of 
originating  them;  and  often  they  have  been 
much  more  confidently  held  without  its  aid  than 
with  it.  On  this  account  many  have  viewed 
speculation  in  its  religious  efforts  as  a  kind  of 
inverted  Jacob's  ladder. 

Hence  many  have  held  that  religious  ideas  are 
innate.  This  could  only  mean  that  the  human 
mind  is  such  as  to  develop  rehgious  sentiments 
and  ideas  under  the  stimulus  of  our  total  experi- 
ence ;  and  experience  shows  such  difference  of 
religious  thought  that  the  content  of  this  re- 
hgious intuition  could  hardly  be  more  than  a 
vague  apprehension  of  an  invisible  and  super- 
natural existence.  The  phrase,  innate  ideas,  has 
so  many  misleading  connotations  that  it  had 
better  be  avoided. 

In  the  same  hue  it  has  been  suggested  that 
the  soul  has  a  special  organ  or  faculty  for  the  re- 
ception of  rehgious  truth ;  and  the  state  of  this 
faculty  has  even  been  made  a  ground  for  impor- 
tant theological  distinctions.  Sometimes  it  has 
been  called  faith,  sometimes  feeling,  and  some- 


LNTRODUCTION.  5 

times  the  "  God-consciousness."  But  psychology 
long  ago  discovered  that  nothing  is  explained  by 
reference  to  a  faculty ;  since  the  faculty  itself  is 
always  and  only  an  abstraction  from  the  facts 
for  whose  explanation  it  is  invoked  or  invented. 
There  is  probably  no  question  more  utterly  arid 
and  barren  than  the  search  for  the  "faculty" 
from  which  rehgion  springs. 

The  conclusion  is  this  :  No  external  action  can 
develop  an  empty  mind  which  has  no  law,  nature, 
or  direction  into  anything.  This  would  be  to 
act  upon  the  void.  Hence  it  is  hopeless  to  look 
for  the  source  of  rehgious  ideas  in  external  ex- 
perience alone.  We  must  assume  a  germ  of  re- 
ligious impulse  in  the  soul  in  order  to  make  re- 
hgious development  possible.  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  this  germ  is  not  self-sufficient.  It  develops 
only  under  the  stimulus  of  outer  and  inner  ex- 
perience, and  unless  under  the  criticism  and  re- 
straint of  intellect  and  conscience  it  develops  into 
grotesque  or  terrible  forms.  The  stimulus  may 
be  manifold.  It  may  lie  in  our  sense  of  depend- 
ence, in  the  needs  of  the  intellect,  in  the  de- 
mands and  forebodings  of  conscience,  in  the 
cravings  of  the  affections,  in  the  words  of  rev- 
elation, and  in  some  direct  influence  of  Grod 


6  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

upon  the  soul.  WMcli  of  these  it  may  be,  or 
whether  all  of  them  enter  into  actual  religious 
development,  is  a  question  for  separate  study. 

Tlie  History  of  Religion. 

§  3.  This  question  does  not  concern  us.  It  is 
referred  to  (1)  because  it  is  a  separate  question, 
and  (2)  because  there  is  a  fancy  that  the  truth 
of  rehgion  can  be  determined  by  studying  its  de- 
velopment either  in  the  individual  or  in  the  his- 
tory of  the  raoe.  But  a  httle  reflection  shows 
that  the  psychological  genesis  of  an  idea  is  not 
to  be  confounded  with  its  philosophical  worth. 
"Wlien  the  latter  question  is  up  the  former  is  en- 
tirely irrelevant,  unless  it  be  shown  that  philo- 
sophical value  is  compatible  with  only  one  form 
of  psychological  genesis.  This  showing  has 
never  been  attempted.  Meanwhile  the  rational 
value  of  a  proposition  can  be  determined  only 
by  considermg  its  content  and  the  reasons 
which  are  offered  for  it. 

The  Grounds  of  Religion. 

§  4.  But  our  present  concern  is  with  neither  of 
the  first  two  questions,  but  rather  with  the  third, 
the  rational  foundation  of  religion,  and  more  par- 


INTRODUCTION.  7 

ticularly  vath  the  rational  foundation  of  the 
theistic  idea,  which  is  the  central  conception  of 
rehgion.  We  set  aside,  therefore,  all  inquiry  into 
the  origin  and  development  of  rehgious  ideas, 
and  inquire  rather  whether  they  have  any  ra- 
tional warrant  now  that  they  are  here.  We  take,* 
then,  what  we  may  call  the  theistic  consciousness 
of  the  race  as  the  text  for  a  critical  exegesis  with 
the  aim  of  fixing  its  content  and  philosophical 
worth.  We  do  not  aim  at  a  philosophical  deduc- 
tion or  speculative  construction  of  rehgion,  nor 
yet  at  a  genetic  unfolding  of  religion;  we  aim 
only  to  analyze  and  understand  the  data  of  the 
religious  consciousness. 

The  outcome  of  this  inquiry  might  conceiv- 
ably be  threefold.  The  theistic  idea  might  be 
found  to  be  (1)  contradictory  or  absurd,  (2)  an 
implication  of  the  religious  sentiment  only,  and 
without  any  significance  for  pure  intellect,  and 
(3)  a  demand  of  om^  entire  nature,  intellectual, 
moral,  aesthetic,  and  rehgious.  In  the  first  case  it 
would  have  to  be  abandoned.  In  the  second  it 
would  be  a  fact  of  which  no  further  account 
could  be  given,  but  which  need  not,  on  that  ac- 
count, be  rejected.  In  the  last  case  theism  would 
appear  as  the  imphcation  of  aU  our  faculties,  and 


8  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISil. 

would  have  the  warrant  of  tlie  entire  sonl.   How 
this  may  be  the  course  of  oiir  study  must  show. 

§  5.  The  function  of  the  theistic  idea  in  human 
thought  as  a  whole  is  very  complex.  Fu^st,  the- 
ism may  be  advanced  as  an  hypothesis  for  the 
explanation  of  phenomena.  As  such  it  has  no 
rehgious  function  at  all,  but  solely  a  logical  and 
metaphysical  one.  The  question  is  considered 
under  the  law  of  the  sufficient  reason ;  and  the 
aim  is  to  find  an  adequate  explanation  of  phe- 
nomena, especially  those  of  the  external  world. 
Most  theistic  argument  has  been  carried  on  on 
this  basis.  The  facts  of  the  outer  world  have 
been  appealed  to,  especially  those  which  show 
adaptation  and  adjustment  to  ends;  and  the 
claim  has  been  set  up  that  only  intelhgence  could 
account  for  them.  These  facts  have  been  sup- 
plemented with  various  metaphysical  considera- 
tions concerning  the  absolute  and  the  relative, 
the  infinite  and  the  finite,  the  necessary  and  the 
contingent,  the  self -moving  and  the  moved  ;  and 
the  work  was  done.  How  far  this  comes  from 
satisfying  the  rehgious  nature  is  evident. 

Second,  theism  may  be  held  as  the  implication 
and  satisfaction  of  our  entire  nature,  intellectual, 


INTRODUCTION.  9 

emotional,  aesthetic,  ethical,  and  religious.  These 
elements  reach  out  after  Grocl  so  natui'ally  and, 
when  developed,  ahnost  so  necessarily,  that  they 
have  always  constituted  the  chief  actual  grounds 
of  theistic  behef.  Accordingly  the  human  mind 
has  always  adjusted  its  conception  of  God  with 
reference  less  to  external  nature  than  to  its  own 
internal  needs  and  aspirations.  It  has  gathered 
its  ideals  of  truth  and  beauty  and  goodness,  and 
united  them  into  the  thought  of  the  one  Per- 
fect Beinsc,  the  ideal  of  ideals,  God  over  all  and  -r  , 
blessed  forever.  A  purely  setiological  contempla- 
tion of  the  world  and  life  with  the  sole  aim  of  find- 
ing an  adequate  cause  according  to  the  law  of  the 
sufficient  reason  would  give  us  an  altogether  dif- 
ferent idea  of  God  from  that  which  we  possess. 

Hence  it  has  been  a  frequent  claim,  even  among  \ 
theologians,  that  arguments  for  theism  are  worth-  ' 
less.     They  may  jDroduce  some  assent  but  no 
hving  conviction;  and  when  they  are  strictly 
logical  they  reach   only  barren  results   which  \ 
are  religiously  worthless.     These  sterihties  are 
transformed  into  fruitfuhiess  only  by  imphcitly 
falling  back  on  the  h^dng  rehgious  conscious- 
ness ;  and  this  might  as  weU  be  done  openly  and 
at  the  start. 


10  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

This  claim  is  partly  true  and  partly  false.  It 
is  true  that  purely  setiological  arguments,  hke 
that  from  design,  are  inadequate,  but  they  may  be 
good  as  far  as  they  go.  It  is  also  true  that  pui-e- 
ly  metaphysical  arguments  concerning  the  abso- 
lute, or  unconditioned,  do  not  bring  us  in  sight 
of  ]iYmg  rehgious  sentiment,  but  they  have  their 
value  nevertheless.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  a 
grave  oversight  to  suppose  that  such  considera- 
tions alone  can  give  the  full  rehgious  conception 
of  God.  The  actual  grounds  of  theistic  behef 
are  manifold,  being  inteUectual,  emotional,  88S- 
thetic,  and  ethical ;  and  no  one  can  understand 
the  history  of  the  behef  without  taking  aU  of 
these  into  account. 

But  here  the  very  grave  doubt  meets  us  wheth- 
er most  of  these  elements  are  proper  grounds 
of  behef,  and  whether  theistic  argument  does 
not  confessedly  proceed  by  a  much  looser  logic 
than  ol^tains  in  our  mental  procedure  elsewhere. 
This  compels  us  to  take  a  short  survey  of  mental 
method  in  general. 

§  6.  It  is  a  traditional  superstition  of  intellect 
that  notliing  is  to  be  accepted  which  is  not  either 
seK-evident  or  demonstrated.     The  correspond- 


INTRODUCTION.  H 

ing  conception  of  method  is  this :  Let  lis  first 
find  some  in\dncible  fact  or  principle,  something 
which  cannot  be  doubted  or  denied  without  ab- 
surdity, and  from  this  let  us  deduce  by  cogent 
logic  whatever  may  be  got  out  of  it.  ^Yhen  we 
reach  the  end  of  our  logic  let  us  stop.  In  other 
words,  admit  nothing  that  can  be  doubted.  Make 
no  assmnptions,  and  take  no  step  which  is  not 
compelled  by  rigorous  logic.  And,  above  all,  let 
no  feehng  or  sentiment  or  desire  have  any  voice 
in  determining  behef .  If  we  foUow  this  rule  we 
shaU  never  be  confounded,  and  knowledge  will 
progi'ess. 

Opposed  to  this  conception  of  method  is  an- 
other, as  f oUows :  Instead  of  doubting  everything 
that  can  be  doubted,  let  us  rather  doubt  nothing 
until  we  are  compelled  to  doubt.  Let  us  assume 
that  everything  is  what  it  reports  itself  until 
some  reasons  for  doubt  appear.  In  society  we 
get  on  better  by  assuming  that  men  are  truthfid, 
and  by  doubting  only  for  special  reasons,  than 
we  should  if  we  assumed  that  all  men  are  hars, 
and  beheved  them  only  when  compelled.  So  in 
aU  investigation  we  make  more  progress  if  we  as- 
sume the  timthfulness  of  the  universe  and  of  our 
own  nature  than  we  should  if  we  doubted  both. 


12  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISil. 

Sucli  are  the  two  metliocls.  The  former  as- 
sumes eyeiything  to  be  false  until  proved  true ; 
the  latter  assumes  everything  to  be  true  until 
proved  false.  All  fruitful  work  proceeds  upon 
the  latter  method;  most  speculative  criticism 
and  closet-philosophy  proceed  upon  the  former. 
Hence  their  perennial  barrenness. 

§  7.  The  fii'st  method  seems  the  more  rigorous, 
but  it  can  be  applied  only  to  mathematics,  which 
is  purely  a  subjective  science.  ^Yhen  we  come  to 
deal  with  reahty  the  method  brings  thought  to  a 
standstill.  At  the  beginning  of  the  modern  era, 
Descartes  pretended  to  doubt  everything,  and 
found  only  one  unshakable  fact — I  think ;  there- 
fore, I  am.  But  from  this  he  could  deduce  noth- 
ing. The  bare  fact,  "  I  think,"  is  philosopliical- 
ly  insignificant.  What  I  think,  or  how  I  think, 
whether  rightly  or  wrongly,  is  the  important 
matter.  But  from  the  bare  "  I  think  "  Descartes 
could  reach  neither  the  world  of  things,  nor  the 
world  of  persons,  nor  the  world  of  laws.  The 
method  was  so  rigorous  as  to  leave  thought  "wdth- 
out  an  object.  And  in  general,  if  we  should  begin 
by  doubting  everything  that  can  be  doubted,  and 
by  setthng  all  questions  in  advance,  we  should 


INTRODUCTION.  13 

never  get  under  way.  There  are  questions  in 
logical  theory,  in  the  theory  of  knowledge,  and 
in  metaphysics,  which  even  yet  are  keenly  de- 
bated. The  sceptic  and  agnostic  and  ideahst 
are  still  abroad. 

§  8.  If,  then,  man  were  only  an  abstract  specu- 
lator, this  method  of  doubting  everything  which 
cannot  be  demonstrated  would  condemn  the 
mind  to  a  barren  subjectivity.  But  man  is  not 
only,  or  chiefly,  an  abstract  speculator,  he  is  also 
a  living  being,  with  practical  interests  and  neces- 
sities, to  which  he  must  adjust  himself  in  order 
to  hve  at  all.  It  has  been  one  of  the  perennial 
shortcomings  of  intellectuahsm  that  man  has 
been  considered  solely  as  an  intellect  or  under- 
standing; whereas,  he  is  a  great  deal  more. 
Man  is  wiU,  conscience,  emotion,  aspiration ;  and 
these  are  far  more  powerful  factors  than  the 
logical  intellect.  Hence,  in  its  practical  unfold- 
ing the  mind  makes  a  great  variety  of  practical 
postulates  and  assmnptions  which  are  not  log- 
ical deductions  or  speculative  necessities,  but  a 
kind  of  modus  vivendi  with  the  universe.  They 
represent  the  conditions  of  our  fullest  hf e ;  and 
are  at  bottom  expressions  of  our  practical  and 


14  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

ideal  interests  or  necessities.  And  these  are 
reached  as  articulate  principles,  not  by  specula- 
tive construction,  but  by  analysis  of  practical 
life.  Life  is  richer  and  deeper  than  speculation, 
and  contains  implicitly  the  principles  by  which 
we  hve.  The  law  the  logician  lays  down  is  this  : 
Nothing  may  be  beheved  which  is  not  proved. 
The  law  the  mind  actually  follows  is  this : 
Whatever  the  mind  demands  for  the  satisfaction 
of  its  subjective  interests  and  tendencies  may 
be  assumed  as  real  in  default  of  positive  dis- 
proof. We  propose  to  trace  this  principle  in 
the  realm  of  cognition  as  being  the  realm  which 
is  commonly  supposed  to  be  free  from  all  sub- 
I  jective  elements. 

§  9.  As  cognitive  beings  we  desire  to  know. 
But  reahty  as  it  is  given  to  lis  in  immediate 
experience  is  not  adapted  to  the  needs  of  our 
inteUigence,  and  we  proceed  to  work  it  over  so 
as  to  make  it  amenable  to  our  mental  necessi- 
ties. This  working  over  constitutes  what  we 
call  theoretical  science.  To  do  it  we  tacitly  as- 
sume that  the  vast  collection  of  things  and 
events  fall  into  fixed  classes,  are  subject  to  fixed 
laws,  and  are  bound  up  into  a  rational  system. 


INTRODUCTION.  15 

We  assume,  further,  the  essential  truthfulness  of 
nature,  so  that  the  indications  of  all  clearly  de- 
termined facts  can  be  trusted.  We  assume,  once 
more,  that  nature  is  not  only  essentially  compre- 
hensible, but  that  it  is  comprehensible  by  us ;  so 
that  what  our  nature  calls  for  to  make  the  facts 
intelhgible  to  us  is  necessary  to  the  facts  them- 
selves. For,  after  all,  our  explanation  of  facts 
always  consists  in  saying  that  if  we  may  assume 
certain  facts  we  can  understand  the  actual  facts. 
Thus  back  of  the  real  universe  of  experience  we 
construct  an  ideal  universe  of  the  intellect,  and 
we  understand  the  former  through  the  latter. 
In  this  way  we  reach  two  entirely  different  con- 
ceptions of  things.  One  is  furnished  by  the 
senses;  the  other  is  reached  by  thought.  The 
former  represents  reahty  as  it  reports  itself ;  the 
latter  represents  reahty  as  made  over  by  the 
mind. 

And  this  is  not  all.  For  soon  the  ideal  uni- 
verse passes  for  the  real,  while  the  real  universe 
of  experience  is  degraded  into  a  phenomenon  or 
appearance.  Nothing  is  allowed  to  be  what  it 
reports  itself.  All  the  senses  are  flouted.  The 
reports  of  the  unsophisticated  consciousness  are 
derided.     Numberless  worlds  are  invented;  a 


16  PHILOSOPHY   OF   THEISM. 

whole  family  of  ethers  is  generated;  and  the 
oddest  things  are  said  about  eveiything,  as  if  our 
aim  were  to  give  the  lie  direct  to  every  sponta- 
neous conviction  of  common -sense.  The  doc- 
trines of  astronomy,  and  the  current  theories  of 
heat,  hght,  sound,  and  matter  are  examples.  All 
of  these  things  are,  without  exception,  a  series 
of  ideal  constructions  by  which  we  seek  to  in- 
terpret the  reahty  of  experience  and  make  it 
amenable  to  our  intelligence. 

If  now  we  ask  for  the  source  and  warrant  of 
this  theoretic  activity  we  must  finally  find  it  in 
the  living  interests  of  our  cognitive  nature.  The 
facts  themselves  are  indifferent  alike  to  comj^re- 
hension  and  non-comprehension.  But  we  seek 
to  comprehend  as  a  matter  of  course,  and  take 
for  granted  that  we  have  a  right  to  comprehend, 
that  the  universe  is  comprehensible,  and  that  we 
are  able  to  comprehend  it.  The  assumptions 
we  make  are  so  natural  that  they  even  seem 
necessary  truths  at  times ;  but  in  fact  they  are 
primarily  but  projections  upon  reality  of  om.' 
mental  nature  and  our  subjective  interests.  That 
conception  of  a  crystalhne  system  of  law  is 
purely  a  subjective  ideal  and  is  not  known  to  be 
an  objective  fact.    The  comprehensible  universe 


INTRODUCTION.  17 

is  as  pure  an  assumption  as  tlie  religious  and 
moral  universe.  Moreover,  the  actual  universe, 
that  is  the  universe  as  given  in  experience,  is 
not  intelligible;  it  is  that  other  assumed  ideal 
universe,  which  we  have  put  behind  the  real 
universe,  which  is  intelhgible.  From  a  strictly 
logical  and  critical  standpoint  the  intelhgible 
universe  is  purely  an  idol  of  the  human  tribe ; 
nevertheless  we  insist  upon  its  reahty  because 
the  admission  of  an  essentially  irrational  and 
incogitable  world  violates  our  cognitive  instincts, 
throws  the  mind  back  upon  itself  mthout  an 
object  and  without  meaning,  and  leaves  it  a 
prey  to  scepticism  and  despair. 

§  10.  The  existence  of  this  assumptive  element 
may  be  further  shown  by  adopting  a  suggestion 
of  Arthur  Balfour  in  his  "Defence  of  Philo- 
sophic Doubt,"  and  constructing  a  refutation  of 
science  on  the  model  of  the  famihar  refutation 
of  rehgion.  We  need  only  demand  that  the  sci- 
entist prove  his  postulates  and  demonstrate  his 
assumptions  to  put  him  in  a  sad  phght.  (1.)  Let 
him  settle  with  the  philosophic  sceptic.  (2.)  Let 
him  rout  the  agnostic.  (3.)  Let  him  put  the 
idealist  to  flight.     (4.)  Let  him  prove  that  a  sys- 


IS  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

tern  of  law  exists  in  objective  fact.  (5.)  Let 
liim  show  that  what  he  needs  to  comprehend 
the  facts  is  necessary  to  the  facts  themselves. 
(6.)  Let  him  clear  up  the  difficulties  in  his  own 
metaphysics.  Action  at  a  distance,  the  natiu'e 
of  the  ether,  and  the  relations  of  matter  and 
force  would  be  good  points  to  begin  with.  (7.) 
Let  hun  show  that  our  desire  to  have  the  uni- 
verse comprehensible  proves  that  it  is  so,  or  that 
our  unmllingness  to  admit  an  irrational  reahty 
is  any  argument  against  it.  (8.)  Let  him  re- 
member that  the  scientific  interest  which  is  so 
strong  in  him  is  very  hmited  indeed,  so  that  it 
must  seem  like  extreme  arrogance  on  liis  part 
to  seek  to  impose  the  tenets  of  his  little  sect 
upon  the  universe  as  necessary  laws  of  the  same. 
When  all  these  demands  have  been  met  there 
can  be  some  talk  about  science,  but  not  before. 
As  long  as  the  sceptic  and  agnostic  are  abroad 
there  is  no  security  that  science  is  not  sheer 
fiction.  As  long  as  the  idealist  is  not  silenced, 
it  is  doubtful  whether  even  the  objects  of  sci- 
ence exist.  If  the  system  of  law  is  not  proved 
to  exist,  the  deductions  from  it  are  worthless. 
Until  we  i^rove  that  what  we  need  to  under- 
stand the  facts  is  necessary  to  the  facts  them- 


INTRODUCTION".  19 

selves,  our  theorizing  may  be  only  a  projection 
upon  tlie  outer  world  of  our  mental  nature,  and 
in  no  way  an  apprehension  of  objective  reality. 
As  to  the  metaphysics  of  science,  it  is  well 
known  to  contain  difficulties  equal  to  any  in 
theology.  So  far  from  answering  these  ques- 
tions the  average  scientist  has  never  heard  of 
them,  and  yet  they  seem  to  concern  the  life  of 
science  itself.  The  truth  is,  we  meet  here  the 
opposition  of  method  to  wliich  we  referred  at 
the  start.  The  critic  affects  to  doubt  whatever 
cannot  be  proved,  while  the  scientist  takes  for 
granted  what  every  one  admits. 

§  11.  The  sum  is  this :  The  mind  is  not  a  dis- 
interested logic-machine,  but  a  hving  organism, 
with  manifold  interests  and  tendencies.  These 
outline  its  development,  and  furnish  the  driving 
power.  The  implicit  aim  in  mental  develop- 
ment is  to  recognize  these  interests,  and  make 
room  for  them,  so  that  each  shall  have  its  proper 
field  and  object.  In  this  way  a  series  of  ideals 
arise  in  oiu'  mental  life.  As  cognitive,  we  as- 
sume that  the  universe  is  rational.  Many  of  its 
elements  are  opaque,  and  utterly  unmanageable, 
by  us  at  present,  but  we  assume  spontaneously 


20  PIIILOSOPnY  OF  THEISM. 

and  unconsciously  that  at  the  centre  all  is  order, 
and  that  there  all  is  crystalline  and  transparent 
to  intelligence.  Thus  there  arises  in  our  thought 
the  conception  of  a  system  in  which  all  is  light, 
a  system  whose  foundations  are  laid  in  har- 
mony, and  whose  structure  is  rational  law,  a 
system  every  part  of  which  is  produced  and 
maintained  and  illumined  by  the  majestic  and 
eternal  Reason.  But  this  is  only  a  cognitive 
ideal,  to  which  experience  yields  but  little  sup- 
l)ort.  But  we  hold  fast  the  ideal  and  set  aside 
the  facts  which  make  against  it  as  something 
not  yet  comprehended. 

But  we  are  moral  beings  also,  and  our  moral 
interests  must  be  recognized.  Hence  arises  a 
moral  ideal,  which  we  join  to  the  cognitive.  The 
universe  must  be  not  only  rational,  but  right- 
eous at  its  root.  Here  too  we  set  aside  the  facts 
which  make  against  our  faith  as  something  not 
yet  understood.  This  is  especially  the  case  in 
deahng  with  the  problem  of  evil.  Here  we  are 
never  content  with  finding  a  cause  for  the  good 
and  evil  in  experience;  we  insist  upon  an  ex- 
planation which  shall  save  the  assumed  good- 
ness at  the  heart  of  things. 

Finally,  we  are  rehgious,  and  our  entire  nat- 


INTRODUCTION.  21 

ure  works  together  to  construct  the  rehgious 
ideal.  The  intellect  brings  its  ideal;  and  the 
conscience  brings  its  ideal;  and  the  affections 
bring  their  ideal ;  and  these,  together  with  what- 
ever other  thought  of  perfection  we  may  have, 
are  united  into  the  thought  of  the  one  Perfect 
Being,  the  ideal  of  ideals,  the  supreme  and  com- 
plete, to  whom  heart,  will,  conscience,  and  intel- 
lect ahke  may  come  and  say,  "  Thy  kingdom 
come ;  thy  will  be  done."  Here,  as  in  the  pre- 
vious cases,  we  do  not  ignore  the  facts  which 
make  against  the  view,  but  we  set  them  aside  as 
things  to  be  explained,  but  which  must  not  in 
any  way  be  allowed  to  weaken  our  faith. 

All  of  these  ideals  are,  primarily,  alike  subjec- 
tive. They  are  x>roduced,  indeed,  under  the 
stress  of  experience,  but  they  are  not  transcripts 
of  any  possible  experience.  That  transparent 
universe  of  the  reason  is  as  purely  a  mental 
product  as  that  righteous  universe  of  the  con- 
science, or  as  the  supreme  perfection  of  rehgion. 
In  each  of  these  cases  the  mind  appears  with  its 
subjective  ideals,  and  demands  that  reality  shall 
recognize  them;  and  in  all  ahke  reality  recog- 
nizes them  only  imperfectly.  To  some  extent 
the  imiverse  is  intelligible.     To  some  extent  the 


22  PniLOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

IDOwer  not  ourselves  makes  for  rigliteousness. 
To  some  extent  God  is  revealed.  But  in  all 
these  cases  a  purely  logical  and  objective  con- 
templation of  the  known  facts  would  leave  us 
in  great  uncertainty.  The  assured  conviction 
we  have  rests  upon  no  logical  deduction  from 
experience,  but  upon  the  optimistic  assumiotion 
that  the  mind  has  a  right  to  itself,  and  is  at 
home  in  the  universe.  The  mind  will  not  con- 
sent to  abandon  its  nature  and  resign  itself  to 
utter  mental  and  moral  confusion.  This  is,  to 
be  sure,  an  act  of  pure  faith,  but  it  is  an  act 
upon  which  our  entire  mental  life  depends.  A 
purely  speculative  knowledge  of  reahty,  which 
shall  be  strictly  deductive  and  free  from  as- 
sumption, is  impossible. 

This  result  is  nothing  novel.  In  principle  it 
coincides  with  the  claim  of  many  of  the  scholas- 
tic theologians,  that  faith  precedes  knowledge. 
The  faith-philosophy  of  Jacobi,  the  primacy  of 
the  practical  reason  in  the  Kantian  system,  and 
the  "pectoral  theology"  of  Schleiermacher  are 
other  illustrations  of  the  same  view. 

§  12.  What,  then,  of  scepticism  ?  Nothing. 
Specific  scepticism,  founded  on  specific  reasons, 


INTRODUCTION".  23 

is  always  respectable,  and  is  but  a  case  of  ration- 
al criticism ;  but  professional  scepticism,  based 
on  tlie  bare  possibility  of  doubting,  is  at  once 
barren  and  contemptible.  It  is  largely  the  out- 
come of  mental  indolence,  and  results  in  mental 
impotence.  This  impotent  inability  to  reach  a 
conclusion,  so  far  from  being  a  mark  of  mental 
acuteness,  is  distinctly  pathologic.  It  is  not  ra- 
tional, but  rather  the  abdication  of  reason.  As 
such  it  is  not  amenable  to  reason.  It  may  do 
indi^i-duals  damage  who  are  mentally  debilitated, 
but  in  the  development  of  the  race  it  is  of  no 
importance.  Universal  scepticism  is  none;  for 
being  impartially  distributed  over  the  entire 
mind,  it  leaves  everything  just  where  it  was 
before.  Besides,  such  scepticism  is  never  more 
than  a  pretence.  But  partial  scepticism,  on  a 
foundation  of  universal  scepticism,  is  pure  arbi- 
trariness, and  is  at  once  irrational  and  unright- 
eous. To  doubt  such  things  as  we  personally 
dishke  is  caprice ;  to  doubt  everything  is  false- 
hood and  pretense. 

The  fundamental  interests  of  the  mind  have 
always  secured  their  recognition.  From  the  be- 
ginning the  philosophic  sceptics  have  raged  and 
have   imagined   many  bright,  and   more   vain, 


24:  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

things ;  but  the  burden  of  their  cry  has  always 
been,  "You  cannot  prove  that  you  have  a  right 
to  do  what  you  are  doing."  But  this  barren 
doubt  has  been  ignored,  practically  by  common 
sense,  and  theoretically  by  earnest  thinkers,  who, 
having  once  admitted  that  it  is  always  abstract- 
ly possible,  and  having  seen  that  it  is  eternally 
empty,  imitate  priest  and  Levite,  and  pass  by  on 
the  other  side.  The  mind  is  sure  to  conceive 
the  universe  so  as  to  provide  for  its  own  inter- 
ests. So  long  as  any  fundamental  interest  is 
overlooked  or  ignored,  there  can  be  no  peace. 
Sometimes  the  intellect  has  taken  things  too 
easy,  and  has  satisfied  itseK  with  simple  and 
compendious  explanations,  which  left  no  place 
for  heart  and  conscience,  and  ran  off  into  dry 
and  barren  atheisms  and  materiahsms.  But  be- 
fore long  the  rising  tides  of  life  and  feehng 
compelled  it  to  try  again.  On  the  other  hand 
religion  has  often  made  the  mistake  of  denying 
intellect  and  conscience  then"  full  rights ;  and 
forthwith  they  began  their  crusade  for  recogni- 
tion. Conscience  alone  has  proved  a  sturdy  dis- 
turber in  theological  systems,  and  one  great 
source  and  spring  of  theological  progress  has 
been  the  need  of  finding  a  conception  of  God 


INTRODUCTION.  25 

which  the  moral  nature  could  accept.  As  the 
inner  life  has  grown  more  complex  in  manifes- 
tation, and  richer  in  content,  the  system  of  con- 
ceptions has  progressed  to  correspond.  It  is  by 
this  contact  with  life  and  reality  that  thought 
grows,  and  not  by  a  barren  logic-chopping  or 
verbal  hagghng  about  proof.  Thus  science,  eth- 
ics, and  religion  grow ;  and  the  mind,  in  its  in- 
creasing sense  of  self-possession  and  of  harmony 
with  the  reahty  of  things,  becomes  more  and 
more  indifferent  to  the  objections  of  the  scep- 
tic, and  works  with  ever-growing  faith  to  build 
up  the  temple  of  science,  of  conscience,  and  of 
God. 

§  13.  To  adjust  ourselves  to  the  universe,  and 
the  universe  to  ourselves,  so  that  each  shall  cor- 
respond to  the  other,  we  have  said,  is  the  im- 
phcit  aim  of  mental  development ;  and  the  law 
which  the  mind  implicitly  follows  is  this  :  What- 
ever our  total  nature  calls  for  may  be  assumed 
as  real  in  default  of  positive  disproof.  This 
gives  rise,  we  have  seen,  to  a  variety  of  practical 
postulates,  which  are  born  of  life  and  not  of 
speculation. 

What,  now,  is  the  function  of  logic  with  re- 


26  PniLOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

garcl  to  these  postulates.  Plainly  not  to  prove 
tliem,  but  to  bring  tliem  and  their  implications 
out  into  clear  consciousness,  and  to  kee^D  them 
from  losing  their  way.  These  postulates  them- 
selves are  not  primarily  known  as  such,  but  ex- 
ist rather  as  imphcit  tendencies  than  as  clearly 
defined  principles.  In  this  state  they  readily 
miss  their  proper  aim.  Thus  the  scientific  or 
cognitive  consciousness  is  a  comparatively  re- 
cent development ;  and  its  imphcations  are  very 
imperfectly  understood.  What  is  involved  in 
the  assumed  possibihty  of  objectively  vahd 
knowledge  is  a  question  rarely  asked,  and  still 
more  rarely  answered.  Hence,  by  the  grace  of 
ignorance,  many  a  theory  hves  along  in  good 
and  regular  speculative  standing  which,  if  un- 
derstood, would  be  seen  to  destroy  knowledge 
altogether.  The  farce  in  such  cases  is  as  if  one 
should  regard  himself  as  the  only  existence,  and 
should  insist  on  proving  it  to  his  neighbors; 
but,  thanks  to  logical  dulness  and  flabbiness,  it 
is  not  perceived.  The  ethical  consciousness,  in 
hke  manner,  is  rarely  in  full  possession  of  itseK, 
and  consequently  many  ethical  theories  acquire 
currency,  which,  if  developed  into  their  conse- 
quences, would  prove  fatal  to  all  ethics.    The  re- 


IXTRODUCTION.  27 

ligious  nature  also  is  developed  into  self-posses- 
sion only  by  a  long  mental  labor  and  experience 
extending  over  centuries.  Left  to  itseK  it  may 
fail  utterly  of  comprehending  its  OAvn  implica- 
tions, and  may  even  lose  itself  in  irreligious  as- 
sumptions. In  all  of  these  fields,  therefore,  there 
is  need  of  a  critical  procedure  which  shall  aim 
to  secure  consistency  in  the  development  of  our 
postulates,  and  to  adjust  their  mutual  relations. 
If  we  assume  a  rational  and  righteous  universe, 
we  must  make  no  assumptions  incompatible 
therewith.  In  particular,  such  a  critical  pro- 
cedure is  needed  to  restrain  the  fanaticism  and 
insolence  of  the  intellect.  This  faculty,  unless 
restrained  by  criticism,  tends  to  become  impa- 
tient and  overbearing.  In  its  determination  to 
have  a  theory  it  often  ignores  facts  or  distorts 
them.  In  this  way  rationalism  has  become  a 
synonym  for  all  that  is  most  superficial  and 
purblind  in  speculation.  Here,  then,  is  a  field 
for  logic;  and  here  logic  has  its  inahenable 
rights.  And  in  this  process  of  inner  develop- 
ment, adjustment,  and  rectification,  logic  is 
equally  the  servant  of  cognition,  of  ethics,  and 
of  religion;  wMle  aU  ahke  are,  fundamentally, 
the  outgrowths  and  expressions  of  om'  subjec- 


28  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

tive  needs  and  tendencies  as  evoked  by  our  total 
experience. 

It  would,  then,  be  a  complete  misunderstand- 
ing of  our  aim  to  suppose  that  we  are  engaging 
in  a  polemic  against  logic  and  metaphysics. 
That  they  are  not  positively  sufficient  to  give 
us  the  principles  of  practical  hfe  is  clear,  but 
they  do  not  forbid  us  to  make  practical  postu- 
lates, provided  we  recognize  them  in  their  prac- 
tical character,  and  do  not  proclaim  them  as 
demonstrated.  But  nothing  can  warrant  us  in 
contradicting  logic  and  metaphysics,  and  no 
such  contradiction  can  escape  final  destruction. 
The  lack  of  proof  may  be  atoned  for  by  practical 
necessity,  but  disproof  can  never  be  ignored  or 
set  aside  by  any  sentiment.  Such  a  difficulty 
arises  in  the  field  of  the  logical  understanding, 
and  there  only  can  it  be  met.  The  failure  to 
distinguish  the  lack  of  proof  from  disproof  has 
led  to  many  unwise  utterances  on  the  part  of 
some  religious  teachers.  They  have  proclaimed 
an  independence  of  both  logic  and  metaphysics, 
and  a  complete  indifference  to  their  conclusions. 
Sometimes  they  have  even  proclaimed  a  contra- 
diction between  speculation  and  rehgion,  appar- 
ently to  show  the  strength  of  their  own  faith. 


INTRODUCTION.  29 

Such  a  view  must  lead  either  to  complete  spec- 
ulative scepticism,  or  to  a  civil  war  among  the 
faculties  of  the  soul;  and  in  either  case  the 
result  would  not  he  rehgiously  desirahle.  In 
other  words  a  mental  inventory  reveals  several 
classes  of  propositions :  First,  some  which  we 
must  heheve ;  second,  some  which  we  must  not 
beheve ;  and  third,  some  which  we  may  heheve 
or  assume.  Wliatever  conflicts  with  the  first 
two  classes  must  he  abandoned,  and  sooner  or 
later  will  be.  It  is  only  in  the  third  class  that 
our  interests  or  desires  can  have  any  vote ;  but 
this  class  contains  most  of  what  is  valuable  in 
life  and  conduct. 

Let  us  further  admit,  or  rather  affirm,  that 
the  necessity  of  passing  over  difficulties,  and 
taking  so  much  for  granted,  is  not  the  ideal 
order  of  hfe.  The  cognitive  ideal  no  doubt  in- 
volves the  speculative  solution  of  all  problems, 
so  that  our  entire  thought-system  may  be  per- 
fectly transparent  to  intelligence.  But  this  ideal 
is  unattainable  at  present,  owing  to  our  hmita- 
tions.  In  every  department  our  knowledge  is 
patchwork,  and  rests  on  assumption.  And,  since 
this  is  so,  it  is  well  to  recognize  it  in  order  that 
we  may  not  delude  ourselves  with  a  false  show 


30  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

of  logical  rigor,  or  do  injustice  to  the  demands 
of  practical  life. 

§  14.  These  facts  in  the  natural  history  of  be- 
Hef  must  be  borne  in  mind  if  we  would  under- 
stand our  mental  procedure  and  development. 
They  explain  how  it  is  that  we  have  many  be- 
hef s  which  are  not  held  because  we  have  proved 
them,  but  which  we  try  to  prove  because  we 
hold  them.  They  also  explain  the  barrenness 
of  purely  logical  criticism.  Fm'ther,  they  throw 
hght  on  the  pecuhar  variations  of  behef  to 
which  all  are  subject.  Since  the  roots  of  behef 
often  lie  in  the  sub-logical  realm  of  emotion, 
sentiment,  aspiration,  our  conviction  will  vary 
as  the  tides  of  life  and  feehng  rise  and  fall.  A 
quickening  of  conscience,  a  kindling  of  affection, 
the  loss  of  a  friend,  may  do  more  for  conviction 
than  volumes  of  speculation. 

Further,  it  is  plain  that  all  thought  of  strict 
demonstration  must  be  given  up.  Demonstra- 
tion is  necessarily  confined  to  the  subjective  and 
logical  relations  of  ideas,  and  can  never  attach 
to  reahty  without  some  element  of  assumption. 
But  this  is  as  true  for  physical  science  as  it  is 
for  rehgion.     And,  in  any  case,  there  is  no  such 


INTRODUCTION.  31 

tiling  as  an  objective  and  self-sufficient  demon- 
stration. Truth,  as  such,  is  not  dependent  on 
demonstration,  but  exists  eternally  in  its  own 
right.  Demonstration  is  only  a  makeshift  for 
helping  ignorance  to  insight.  It  is  a  stimulus 
to  the  mind  of  the  learner  to  think  in  certain 
ways  which  shah  lead  him,  at  last,  to  see  the 
truth  iDroposed.  But  such  demonstration  is  con- 
ditioned not  only  by  the  nature  of  the  stimulus, 
but  also  and  especially  by  the  development  of 
the  mind  to  which  it  is  addressed.  And  when 
we  come  to  an  argument  in  which  the  whole 
nature  is  addi^essed,  the  argu.ment  must  seem 
weak  or  strong  according  as  the  nature  is  feebly, 
or  fully,  developed.  The  moral  argument  for 
theism  cannot  seem  strong  to  one  without  a 
conscience.  The  argument  from  cognitive  in- 
terests will  be  empty  when  there  is  no  cognitive 
interest.  Little  souls  find  very  httle  that  calls 
for  explanation  or  that  excites  siu"prise ;  and 
they  are  satisfied  with  a  correspondingly  small 
view  of  life  and  existence.  In  such  a  case  we 
cannot  hope  for  universal  agreement.  We  can 
only  proclaim  the  faith  that  is  in  us,  and  the 
reasons  for  it,  in  the  hope  that  reahty  may  not 
utterly  reject  it,  and  that  the  faith  in  question 


32  rniLosopiiY  of  theism. 

may  not  be  without  some  response  in  other 
minds  and  hearts.  Faith  and  unfaith  ahke  can 
do  no  more  ;  and  the  survival  of  the  fittest  must 
decide  between  them. 

This  renunciation  of  demonstration  has  been 
distasteful  to  many,  but  needlessly.  In  any  case 
it  has  to  be  made.  We  cannot  make  an  argu- 
ment a  demonstration  by  calling  it  such ;  and, 
besides,  the  force  of  an  argument  in  no  way  de- 
pends on  its  name,  but  on  its  logic.  But  the 
chief  ground  of  trouble  seems  to  he  in  a  psycho- 
logical oversight.  If  a  proposition  is  not  dem- 
onstrated, then  it  is  at  best  only  probable,  and, 
if  probable,  then  uncertain.  Hence,  to  renounce 
demonstration  is  to  hand  the  subject  over  to 
uncertainty,  and  who  can  hve  on  uncertainties  ? 
The  next  thing  is  to  call  God  a  "perhaps,"  and 
the  shortcomings  of  natm^al  theology  stand  re- 
vealed. But  such  utterances  tacitly  assume 
that  belief  is  always  the  product  of  logic.  But 
life  abounds  in  practical  certainties  for  which 
no  very  cogent  reasons  can  be  given,  but  which 
are  nevertheless  the  foundation  of  daily  hfe. 
Our  practical  trust  in  the  uniformity  of  nature, 
in  one  another,  in  the  affection  of  friends,  in  the 
senses,  etc.,  are  examples.    Numberless  logical 


INTRODUCTION.  33 

objections  could  be  raised  which  reduce  all  of 
these  to  matters  of  probability;  but  none  of 
these  things  move  us.  The  things  which  we 
hold,  or  rather  which  hold  us,  with  deepest  con- 
viction are,  not  the  certainties  of  logic,  but  of 
hfe. 

§  15.  Theistic  discussion  has  been  largely  con- 
fined to  the  one  question  of  the  divine  intelli- 
gence. The  narrowness  of  such  a  view  and  its 
sure  failure  to  reach  a  properly  rehgious  con- 
ception are  already  apparent.  This  hmitation 
of  the  argument  has  several  grounds ; 

(1.)  The  question  of  intelhgence  is  basal ;  and 
everything  else  stands  or  falls  with  it.  Hence, 
the  question  between  theism  and  atheism  has 
been  generally  conceived  as  a  question  between 
intelhgence  and  non-intelhgence  as  the  ground 
of  the  universe. 

(2.)  This  question  can  be  debated  largely  on 
the  basis  of  objective  facts.  It  seems,  therefore, 
to  involve  fewer  subjective  elements,  such  as 
appeals  to  conscience  and  feehng,  and  hence  it 
furnishes  more  common  ground  for  the  dispu- 
tants than  the  other  arguments. 

(3.)  The  argument  has  seemed  rehgiously  ade- 
3 


34  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

quate,  because  the  theist  has  generally  had  the 
Christian  conception  of  God  in  his  mind;  and 
hence  when  some  degree  of  skill  and  contrivance 
was  shown  in  the  world  about  us,  this  concep- 
tion, together  with  the  ideal  tendency  of  the 
soul,  at  once  came  in  to  expand  this  poor  result 
into  the  ideal  rehgious  form. 

§  16.  But,  in  spite  of  the  previous  strictures, 
most  of  our  time  will  be  devoted  to  discussing 
the  question  of  intelligence  versus  non-inteUi- 
gence.  The  idea  of  God  may  be  treated  from  a 
double  standpoint,  metaphysical  and  religious. 
In  the  former,  God  appears  as  the  principle  of 
knowing  and  explanation.  In  the  latter,  he  is 
the  implication  of  the  rehgious  consciousness, 
or  that  without  which  that  consciousness  would 
fall  into  discord  with  itseK.  The  former  view 
does  not  attain  to  any  distinctly  rehgious  con- 
ception, but  it  furnishes  elements  which  must 
enter  into  every  rehgious  conception.  Hence, 
in  any  study  of  the  subject,  it  can  never  be 
needless,  though  it  may  be  incomplete.  Op- 
posing errors  are  traditional  here.  On  the  one 
hand,  mere  reasoning  has  been  made  all-suffi- 
cient, and  a  very  dry  and  barren  rationahsm  has 


INTRODUCTION,  35 

been  the  result.  On  the  other  hand,  feehng  has 
been  made  supreme,  and  the  just  claims  of  in- 
tellect have  been  ignored.  This  has  often  gone 
to  the  extent  of  basing  religion  on  speculative 
scepticism;  but  though  the  lion  and  the  lamb 
have  been  induced  to  lie  together  for  a  while,  it 
has  always  ended  in  the  hon's  making  way  with 
the  lamb.  On  a  subject  of  such  importance  we 
cannot  have  too  many  allies.  It  does  not  weak- 
en the  argument  from  feehng  and  aspu-ation  to 
show  that  the  pure  intellect  also  demands  and 
implies  God.  Our  prehminary  work  will  deal 
chiefly  with  the  intellectual  aspects  of  the  ques- 
tion, though  we  reserve  the  right  to  appeal  to 
the  emotional  nature  upon  occasion. 

From  the  side  of  pm-e  intellect,  also,  the  the- 
istic  question  can  take  on  two  forms.  We  can 
seek  to  show  (1)  that  the  order  of  the  world 
cannot  be  understood  without  intelhgence  as  its 
cause,  and  (2)  that  reason  itseK  falls  into  discord 
and  despair  without  God.  In  the  former  case 
God  appears  as  a  necessary  hypothesis  for  the 
understanding  of  the  facts;  in  the  latter  case 
God  appears  as  a  necessary  imphcation  of  the 
rational  hfe.  Of  course  such  an  aim  imphes 
that  the  laws  of  thought  are  objectively  vahd ; 


36  ruiLosoPUY  of  theism. 

that  over  against  the  subjective  necessities  of 
thought  are  corresponding  objective  necessities 
of  being;  but  this  assumption  underUes  the 
whole  system  of  objective  knowledge,  and  is  not 
pecuhar  to  theism.  The  only  rational  aim  must 
be  to  show  that  the  mind  being  as  it  is,  and 
experience  being  as  it  is,  the  beUef  in  Grod  is 
a  necessary  implication  of  both.  If  this  aim 
should  be  attained,  then  every  one  would  have 
to  decide  for  himself  whether  to  accept  his 
nature  with  its  imphcations  and  indications,  or 
to  abandon  it  arbitrarily  and  capriciously.  If, 
however,  any  one  does  choose  the  part  of  the 
irrationahst,  it  is  hoped  that  he  will  consistent- 
ly retire  into  silence,  and  not  mortify  earnest 
thinkers  by  the  assumption  of  superior  insight, 
nor  weary  them  by  his  dreary  and  monotonous 
outcry. 

§  17.  Finally,  a  word  of  a  pedagogical  character 
must  be  allowed.  Owing  to  certain  instinctive 
prejudices  of  common-sense,  theism  is  often  un- 
fairly dealt  with.  In  particular  it  is  often  tac- 
itly assumed  that  matter  and  force,  and  with 
them  atheism,  have  the  field,  and  must  be  al- 
lowed to  remain  in  possession  until  they  are 


INTRODUCTION.  37 

driven  off.  Thus  theism  is  branded  as  an  hy- 
pothesis, and  is  called  upon  to  prove  a  negative ; 
while  atheism  is  supposed  to  express  the  fact 
of  experience,  and  to  need  no  further  iDroof. 
Hence  the  failure  of  theism  to  demonstrate  its 
position  is  oddly  enough  regarded  as  establishing 
atheism.  Every  one  acquainted  with  atheistic 
treatises  mil  recognize  that  their  chief  force 
has  been  in  picking  flaws  in  the  theistic  argu- 
ment. There  has  been  comparatively  httle  effort 
to  show  any  positive  sufficiency  of  atheism  to 
give  any  rational  account  of  the  facts. 

Such  a  position  is  infantile  in  the  extreme ;  it 
properly  belongs  to  the  palaeontological  period  of 
speculation.  The  nature  of  reahty  is  a  thought- 
problem  ;  and  our  thought  of  reahty  is  the  so- 
lution of  that  fjroblem.  "VYhether  we  think  of 
it  as  one  or  many,  material  or  immaterial,  the 
theory  is  equally  speculative  in  each  case;  its 
value  must  be  decided  by  its  adequacy  to  the 
facts.  If  theism  is  an  hypothesis,  atheism  is  no 
less  so.  If  theism  is  a  theory  or  speculation, 
atheism  is  equally  so.  The  candid  mind  must 
seek  to  judge  between  them.  This  can  be  done 
only  as  we  put  both  views  alongside  of  the  facts 
and  of  each  other,  and  choose  the  simpler  and 


38  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISIT. 

more  rational.  No  theory  can  be  judged  by  its 
ability  to  make  grimaces  at  opposing  views,  but 
only  by  its  own  positive  adequacy  to  the  facts. 
The  theistic  theory,  with  all  its  difficulties,  must 
be  put  alongside  of  the  atheistic  theory  with  all 
its  difficulties.  When  this  is  done  the  theist 
will  have  httle  cause  to  blush  for  his  creduhty, 
or  to  be  ashamed  of  his  faith. 

Another  common  error  must  be  noted.  ^Yhen 
we  come  to  the  deepest  questions  of  thought 
we  always  come  upon  impenetrable  mystery. 
We  have  to  affirm  facts  whose  possibihty  we 
cannot  construe.  We  have  to  make  admissions 
which  we  cannot  further  deduce  nor  compre- 
hend. In  unclear  and  untaught  minds  this  is 
often  made  a  stumbhng- block;  and  the  fancy 
gets  abroad  that  theism  is  an  especially  difficult 
doctrine.  In  truth,  all  science  and  all  thought 
are  full  of  what  has  been  called  hmit-notions ; 
that  is,  notions  which  the  facts  force  upon  us, 
and  which  are  perfectly  clear  from  the  side  of 
the  facts,  but  w^hich  from  the  farther  side  are 
lost  in  difficulty  and  mystery.  They  express 
an  ultimate  affirmation  along  a  given  hne  of 
thought,  and  can  never  be  grasped  from  the  far- 
ther side.    When  taken  out  of  their  relations, 


INTRODUCTION.  39 

or  wlien  we  seek  to  compreliend  them  witliout 
remembering  the  law  of  their  formation,  noth- 
ing is  easier  than  to  make  them  seem  contradic- 
tory or  absurd.  But  theism  must  not  be  held 
responsible  for  all  the  difficulties  of  metaphysics; 
and  in  particular  we  must  be  careful  in  escaping 
one  difficulty  that  we  do  not  fall  into  a  greater. 
The  notion  of  an  eternal  i3erson,  an  unbegun 
consciousness,  is  at  least  no  more  difficult  than 
the  alternative  notion  of  eternal  matter  and  un- 
begun motion.  It  is  not  the  mark  of  a  high 
grade  of  intelligence  to  take  offence  at  the  dif- 
ficulties of  a  given  view,  and  end  by  adopting 
another  still  more  obnoxious  to  criticism. 

We  do  not  propose,  then,  to  prove  the  divine 
existence,  but  rather  to  x>ropose  a  solution  of 
the  problem  which  the  world  and  life  force  upon 
us.  We  have  no  expectation  of  clearing  up  all 
the  puzzles  of  metaphysics.  We  simply  hope 
to  show  that  without  a  theistic  faith  we  must 
stand  as  dumb  and  helpless  before  the  deeper 
questions  of  thought  and  life  as  a  Papuan  or 
Patagonian  before  an  echpse. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE  UNITY  OF   THE  WOKLD-GEOUND. 

§  18.  Kant  has  grouped  tlie  leading  theistic 
arguments  into  tkree  :  ontological,  cosmological, 
and  pliysico-theological,  and  has  made  each  the 
subject  of  a  special  criticism.  In  this,  along 
with  much  that  is  incisive  and  final,  there  is  also 
much  that  is  arbitrary  and  verbal.  His  discus- 
sion, as  a  whole,  is  somewhat  antiquated,  and  is 
conducted  throughout  on  Kantian  principles. 
The  argument  from  design  fails  to  reach  the 
full  idea  of  God ;  and  the  notion  of  a  necessary 
and  perfect  being  upon  which  the  other  argu- 
ments depend  is  a  subjective  ideal  of  the  reason. 
His  criticism  rests  on  two  pillars :  (1)  the  tra- 
ditional prejudice  of  intellectuahsm  that  dem- 
onstration is  necessary  to  belief,  and  (2)  the 
Kantian  principle  that  the  forms  and  ideals  of 
the  reason  have  no  objective  significance.  Both 
of  these  views  are  outgrown.  Nowadays  only 
belated  minds  expect  demonstration  in  any  de- 


42  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

partment  of  objective  knowledge.  It  is  evident, 
also,  that  all  thinking,  and  hence  all  knowing, 
must  be  conditioned  by  our  mental  nature.  In 
no  way  can  the  mind  get  outside  of  itself  and 
grasp  things  otherwise  than  through  the  con- 
ceptions which  its  nature  allows  it  to  form. 
But  tliis  necessary  subjectivity  of  all  knowledge 
is  compatible  with  the  view  that  there  is  a  har- 
mony between  the  nature  of  thought  and  the 
nature  of  things.  Such  harmony  cannot,  indeed, 
be  demonstrated;  but  no  one  can  help  practi- 
cally assuming  it  to  some  extent.  It  is  dreary 
and  profitless  labor,  therefore,  to  dwell  upon  the 
subjectivity  of  knowledge.  The  mind  has  always 
insisted  on  attributing  objective  vahdity  or  uni- 
versahty  to  some  of  its  subjective  factors ;  and 
fruitful  criticism  must  be  restricted  to  inquiring 
which  subjective  elements  have  objective  value. 
No  one  has  insisted  more  strongly  than  Kant 
on  the  necessity  of  theism  as  an  implication  of 
reason;  but  the  exigencies  of  his  system  led 
him  to  deny  this  fact  any  further  significance. 

§  19.  Since  in  discussing  the  question  our  aim 
must  be  to  produce  conviction,  it  is  important 
(1)  to  find  some  admitted  fact  or  principle  as  a 


THE  UXITY  OF  THE  WORLD-GROUND.         43 

point  of  departure,  and  (2)  not  to  attempt  to 
do  too  mncli  at  once.  Such  a  point  is  not  fur- 
nished by  either  the  ontological  or  the  design 
argument. 

The  ontological  argument  in  its  common  form 
rests  on  the  notion  of  the  perfect  being.  But 
the  idea  of  the  perfect  necessarily  includes  the 
idea  of  existence,  and  would  be  a  contradiction 
without  it.  Hence  it  has  been  concluded  that 
the  perfect  exists.  But  there  is  not  a  shadow 
of  cogency  in  this  reasoning.  It  only  points 
out  that  the  idea  of  the  perfect  must  include 
the  idea  of  existence ;  but  there  is  nothing  to 
show  that  the  self-consistent  idea  represents  an 
objective  reahty.  Hence  Descartes  sought  to 
supplement  the  argument  by  showing  that  only 
the  perfect  can  be  the  source  of  the  idea.  In 
fact  the  argument  is  nothing  but  the  expres- 
sion of  the  aesthetic  and  ethical  conviction  that 
the  true,  the  beautiful,  and  the  good,  which  alone 
have  value  in  the  n.niverse,  cannot  be  foreign  to 
the  universe.  The  mind  will  not  consent  to 
abandon  its  ideals.  The  ontological  argument 
owes  aU  its  force  to  this  immediate  faith  in  the 
ideal.  Its  technical  expression  is  due  to  the 
deshe  to  give  this  faith  a  demonstrative  logical 


4:4:  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

form.      The  result  is  to  weaken  rather  than 
strengthen  it. 

The  teleological  or  design  argument  is  based 
upon  the  purpose -hke  adaj^tatioiis  vfhich  are 
found,  especially  in  the  organic  world.  This 
has  always  been  a  favorite  with  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  mind ;  and  Kant  mentions  it  with  great 
respect.  Whatever  its  logical  faults  and  specu- 
lative shortcomings,  it  is  better  adapted  to  con- 
vince common-sense  than  the  more  speculative 
arguments.  Still,  when  taken  strictly,  it  is  open 
to  so  many  critical  objections,  and  the  af&rmed 
design  in  nature  is  so  much  in  dispute,  that,  in 
the  present  state  of  thought,  it  does  not  offer 
the  best  starting-point  for  the  discussion.  Thus 
the  great  mass  of  natural  products  look  more 
like  effects  than  purposes.  In  the  various  dis- 
position of  natural  agents,  of  land  and  water,  of 
mountain  and  plain,  etc.,  there  may  be  purpose ; 
but  to  observation  they  seem  to  be  simple  facts 
from  which  certain  results  follow.  Again,  in  the 
relation  of  the  organic  and  the  inorganic,  there 
may  be  purpose ;  but  the  fact  of  observation 
is  that  the  latter  is  usable  by  the  former,  not 
that  it  was  made  for  it.  If  the  inteUigence  of 
the  world-ground  were  otherwise  and  elsewhere 


THE  UNITY  OF  THE  WORLD-GROUND.  45 

demonstrated,  there  is  much  in  the  relation  of 
these  two  worlds  which  would  illustrate  that 
intelhgence ;  but  there  is  not  much  that  can  be 
used  as  original  proof.  It  is  in  the  organic 
world  that  we  find  unambiguous  marks  of  adap- 
tation ;  but  here,  unfortunately,  the  most  of  the 
ends  reahzed  do  not  seem  worth  reahzing.  They 
have  no  manifest  value  or  reason,  but  are  just 
such  meaningless  things  as  we  should  expect  if 
an  irrational  power  were  at  work.  Had  not 
our  idea  of  God  been  otherwise  determined, 
these  things  would  prove  less  a  help  than  an 
embarrassment.  Again,  allowing  the  existence 
of  design  in  nature,  this  argument  by  no  means 
justifies  us  in  affirming  a  single  cause  of  the 
world,.  A  polytheistic  conception  remains  pos- 
sible; and,  considering  the  antitheses  of  good 
and  evil,  of  sense  and  nonsense  in  nature,  such 
a  view  would  accord  only  too  well  with  experi- 
ence. Christianity  has  accustomed  us  to  mono- 
theism, but  in  strict  logic  the  design  argument, 
on  the  basis  of  experience,  would  have  difficulty 
in  making  it  out.  The  argument  seems  suffi- 
cient because,  in  its  common  use,  it  is  not  a 
deduction  of  the  theistic  idea,  but  only  an  illus- 
tration of  the  theistic  faith  which  we  already 


46  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

possess.  It  seems  well,  therefore,  to  look  for 
some  other  starting  -  point ;  and  this  must  be 
sought  in  some  form  of  the  cosmological  argu- 
ment. 

This  argument  has  had  a  fixed  aim  rather 
than  a  constant  form.  The  aim  is  to  pass  from 
the  cosmos  as  a  contingent  and  conditioned  ex- 
istence to  the  affirmation  of  a  necessary  and 
unconditioned  existence.  The  form  of  the  ar- 
gument has  been  various.  Sometimes  the  ar- 
gument has  been  from  motion  to  an  unmoved 
prime  mover ;  sometimes  from  secondary  causes 
to  an  uncaused  first  cause ;  sometimes  from  con- 
tingent existence  to  necessary  existence,  or  from 
dependent  existence  to  independent  existence. 
In  its  traditional  forms  the  argument  is  open  to 
many  objections.  We  shall  do  better,  therefore, 
to  change  the  form  and  to  lower  the  aim.  In- 
stead, then,  of  seeking  to  estabhsh  the  full  rehg- 
ious  conception  of  God  at  once,  we  content  our- 
selves with  the  humbler  aun  of  showing  that  the 
ground  of  all  reality,  or  the  fundamental  reahty, 
or  the  world-ground,  must  be  one  and  not  many. 

§20.  In  this  claim  we  are  in  harmony  with 
the  great  majority  of  thinkers,  both  of  ancient 


THE  UNITY  OF  THE  WORLD-GROUND.         47 

and  modern  times.  Even  tlieistic  and  non-the- 
istic  thinkers  have  agreed  in  rejecting  a  funda- 
mental pluralism  in  favor  of  a  basal  monism. 
The  most  pronounced  non-theistic  and  atheistic . 
schemes  of  our  time  label  themselves  monism, 
although  not  always  showing  the  clearest  appre- 
ciation of  what  true  monism  means  and  requires. 
Even  Kant,  who  will  not  allow  any  objective 
validity  to  knowledge,  insists  that  monism  is 
the  deepest  demand  of  the  reason. 

But  while  there  is  agreement  in  the  fact,  there 
is  much  diversity  in  the  modes  of  reaching  it. 
And  here  it  is  that  we  need  to  find  the  best 
point  of  departure,  and  one  which  will  command 
universal  assent.  Leibnitz  and  Lotze  have  found 
this  in  the  fact  of  interaction.  This  fact,  when 
unfolded,  is  seen  to  imply  the  unity  of  the 
world-ground.  We  shall  do  better,  perhaps,  to 
make  the  postulates  of  objective  cognition  our 
starting-point;  but  of  these  interaction  is  one 
of  the  chief.  The  view  may  be  expounded  as 
follows : 

AU  investigation  of  the  world  of  reahty  rests 
upon  certain  postulates,  and  is  absurd  without 
them.  These  are  interaction,  law,  and  system. 
The  first  imphes  that  things  mutually  affect  or 


48  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

determine  one  another.  Without  this  assump- 
tion any  event  would  be  an  absolute  and  unre- 
lated beginning.  The  universe  would  fall  asun- 
der into  disconnected  and  uncaused  units,  and 
the  individual  consciousness  would  be  shut  up 
within  itself.  Again,  it  implies  that  all  things 
interact;  for  if  there  were  anything  out  of  all 
relations  of  causation,  it  would  be  for  us  a  fig- 
ment of  the  imagination. 

But  interaction  alone  would  not  suffice ;  for 
there  might  be  irregular  interaction.  There  is 
no  law  of  reason  which  assures  us  that  all  be- 
ing and  action  must  be  absolutely  determined. 
Such  irregular  action  would  meet  the  demands 
of  causation,  but  not  of  cognition;  hence  we 
must  next  add  the  idea  of  uniformity,  or  that 
under  the  same  circumstances  the  same  thing 
will  always  occur. 

But  this  implies,  further,  a  universal  adjust- 
ment of  everything  to  every  other,  such  that  for 
a  given  state  of  one  there  can  be  only  a  given 
state  of  the  rest  fixed  both  in  kind  and  degree. 
Without  this  assumption  unhke  causes  would 
have  like  effects,  and  Hke  causes  would  have 
unhke  effects,  and  there  could  be  no  thought 
of  theoretical  cognition.     There  must  be,  then, 


THE  UNITY  OF   THE  WORLD-GROUND.  49 

interaction  and  law  among  things ;  and  these 
things  cannot  be  and  do  what  they  choose,  bnt 
all  mnst  be  bound  np  in  a  common  scheme ; 
that  is,  there  mnst  be  system. 

These  postulates  command  universal  assent 
as  the  basis  of  all  objective  cognition.  They 
are  not  doubted  like  the  assumption  of  design, 
but  are  imphed  in  the  very  structure  of  knowl- 
edge. The  specific  nature  of  the  laws  and  the 
system  is,  indeed,  a  problem  for  solution ;  but 
the  existence  of  rational  law  and  system  is  im- 
phcitly  assumed. 

Our  starting-point,  then,  is  the  conception  of 
things  interacting  according  to  law,  and  form- 
ing an  intelligible  system.  The  advantage,  how- 
ever, hes  in  its  general  acceptance,  and  not  in 
its  being  speculatively  demonstrated.  Critically 
considered,  the  universe,  or  nature,  as  system  is 
an  ideal  of  the  cognitive  nature  as  God  is  an 
ideal  of  the  rehgious  nature,  while  neither  ad- 
mits of  proper  demonstration.  But  for  one  rea- 
son or  another  cognitive  ideals  are  more  easily 
accepted  than  religious  ideals,  and  hence  we 
start  with  the  former,  and  proceed  to  develop 
their  imphcations. 
4 


60  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

§  21.  In  a  complete  discussion  of  interaction 
many  points  would  have  to  be  dwelt  upon  wMcli 
we  pass  over  here.  Our  present  concern  is  to 
show  that  such  a  system  of  interacting  members 
cannot  be  construed  by  thought  without  the 
assumption  of  a  unitary  being,  which  is  the 
fundamental  reahty  of  the  system.  How  is  a 
unitary  system  of  interacting  members  possible? 
This  is  the  problem.  Only  through  a  unitary 
being  which  posits  and  maintains  them  in  their 
mutual  relations.     This  is  the  solution. 

Spontaneous  thought  posits  all  its  objects 
as  real,  and  finds  no  reason  for  not  thinking 
them  mutually  independent.  They  all  seem  to 
exist  together  in  space,  and  no  one  seems  to  im- 
ply any  other.  In  this  stage  of  thought  it  is 
easy  to  beheve  that  things  are  mutually  indif- 
ferent and  independent,  so  that  any  one  would 
continue  to  exist  if  aU  the  rest  should  faU  away. 
But  this  fancy  is  banished  by  the  rise  of  re- 
flective thought.  Physical  science  has  made  us 
famihar  with  the  relativity  of  all  physical  ex- 
istence. The  elements  have  not  their  properties 
or  forces  absolutely  and  in  themselves,  but  only 
in  their  relations  or  as  members  of  the  system. 
They  are  aU  conditioned  in  their  activities,  and 


THE  UNITY  OF  THE  WORLD-GROUND.  51 

hence  conditioned  in  their  being;  for  meta- 
physics shows  that  conditioned  activity  imphes 
conditioned  being.  In  practice  we  get  over  the 
difficulty  by  treating  of  the  laws  of  the  ele- 
ments, which  always  imply  relations  and  condi- 
tions. The  ontological  question  is  ignored.  In 
this  way  we  practically  recognize  the  condi- 
tioned nature  of  things,  while  the  spontaneous 
fancy  of  a  self-sufficient  being  in  all  things  hves 
along  undistui'bed  in  the  background  of  our 
thought. 

The  attempts  to  explain  interaction  are  man- 
ifold, but  they  aU  fail  as  long  as  the  things 
are  left  independent.  Most  attempts,  indeed, 
are  only  figures  of  speech.  Thus  an  influence 
is  said  to  pass ;  but  this  only  describes  the  fact, 
for  an  influence  is  nothing  which  can  exist  apart 
from  its  subject.  The  physicists,  again,  speak 
of  forces  which  play  between  things ;  but  this 
returns  to  the  previous  view.  For  forces  are 
only  abstractions  from  the  activities  of  things, 
and  hence  cannot  pass  between  things.  The  fact 
of  observation  is  simply  that  mutual  changes 
are  observed  among  things.  To  explain  these 
we  say  that  things  act  upon  or  determine  one 
another.     To  explain  this  fact  we  next  posit 


52  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

forces  in  tlie  things;  and  this  is  either  to  re- 
name the  problem  or  else  to  fall  back  into  the 
notion  of  influence.  Finally,  some  have  sought 
to  dispense  with  these  forces,  and  explain  all 
interaction  as  the  result  of  impact,  thinking  that 
action  at  a  distance  is  the  great  difficulty.  This 
view  limits  the  problem  to  the  physical  field, 
and  is  a  double  failure  even  there. 

First,  the  theory  of  impact  cannot  be  carried 
through  in  physical  science ;  and  second,  action 
by  impact  is  no  more  intelligible  between  inde- 
pendent things  than  action  at  a  distance.  The 
separation  in  space  does  not  make  the  difficulty, 
but  only  enables  the  imagination  to  grasp  it. 
But  if  things  be  independent,  that  is,  be  what 
they  are  without  reference  to  anything  else, 
there  is  no  reason  why  one  thing  should  in  any 
way  be  affected  by  any  other.  Such  beings,  if 
in  space,  would  be  as  indifferent  when  in  the 
same  point  as  when  separated  by  the  infinite 
void. 

The  notion  of  interaction  imphes  that  a  thing 
is  determined  by  others,  and  hence  that  it  can- 
not be  all  that  it  is  apart  from  all  others.  If 
all  its  activities  and  properties  are  conditioned, 
it  implies  that  the  thing  cannot  exist  at  all  out 


THE  UNITY  OF  THE  WORLD-GROUND.  53 

of  its  relations.  Its  existence  is  involved  in  its 
relations,  and  would  vanish,  with  them.  The 
notion  of  independence,  on  the  other  hand,  im- 
phes  that  the  thing  is  not  determined  by  others, 
but  has  the  ground  of  all  its  determinations  in 
itseK.  These  two  notions  are  distinct  contra- 
dictions. No  passage  of  influences  or  forces  will 
avail  to  bridge  the  guK  as  long  as  the  things  are 
regarded  as  independent.  There  is  no  escape 
from  denying  either  the  independence  or  the  in- 
teraction. 

Let  us  affirm  the  independence.  Then  we 
have  the  conception  of  an  indefinite  plurality  of 
things,  each  of  which  is  self -existent  and  seK- 
sufficient,  but  which  perpetually  changes,  how- 
ever, in  accordance  with  corresponding  changes 
in  every  other.  These  mutual  changes  form, 
apparently,  a  system  of  interaction  according  to 
law;  and  yet  it  has  no  ground  in  the  mutual 
relations  of  things,  but  smiply  is.  Applied  to 
perception,  it  would  imply  that  each  mind  de- 
velops its  world  of  things  and  persons  out  of 
itself,  and  without  any  stimulus  from  reahty 
beyond  itself. 

This  view  no  one  has  ever  ventured  to  hold. 
The  developed  mind  will  never  consent  to  be- 


64  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

lieve  that  absolute  and  essentially  unrelated  ex- 
istences can  fit  into  and  form  a  system.  The 
harmony  itself  is  a  problem  for  wliich  the  mind 
insists  on  demanding  a  solution.  The  farthest 
thought  can  go  in  affirming  the  independence  of 
these  apparently  interacting  things  is  to  make 
them  mutually  independent,  while  all  alike  de- 
pend on  a  higher  reality,  which  is  the  ground 
both  of  their  existence  and  of  their  harmony. 
This  is  the  view  of  Liebnitz  as  expressed  in  his 
monadology  and  pre-estabhshed  harmony.  Con- 
cerning the  truth  of  this  view  we  need  pro- 
nounce no  opinion.  It  suffices  to  have  shown 
that  it  must  have  recourse  to  a  unitary  world- 
ground. 

Let  us  next  try  the  opposite  view,  that  things 
do  really  interact  or  mutually  determine  one 
another.  We  have  already  seen  that  the  popu- 
lar view,  in  which  things  exist  in  a  hard  and 
fast  seK  -  identity  and  self  -  sufficiency,  must  be 
given  up.  All  these  things  must  be  reduced 
to  a  relative  and  dependent  existence.  Where, 
then,  is  the  absolute  and  independent  existence  ^ 
At  first  we  are  tempted  to  say  that  the  system 
itself  is  that  existence;  but  the  system  itseK, 
apart  from  its  conditioned  members,  is  nothing. 


THE  UNITY  OF  THE  WORLD-GROUND.  55 

By  hypothesis  these  members,  A,  B^  (7,  etc.,  are 
the  only  ontological  reahties ;  and  the  system  is 
only  our  conception  of  their  relations.  But  we 
cannot  rest  in  them,  for  A  refers  us  to  5,  and  B 
to  C,  and  we  reach  no  resting-place.  We  cannot 
rest  in  the  members  taken  singly,  for  each  refers 
us  to  all  the  others.  We  cannot  rest  in  the 
sum  of  the  members,  for  a  sum,  as  such,  is  only 
a  mental  product ;  and  we  get  no  hint  of  what 
it  is  in  reality  which  is  able  to  add  a  series 
of  dependent  units  in  so  potent  a  fashion  as  to 
bring  out  an  independent  sum.  For  the  same 
reason  we  cannot  rest  in  the  system;  for  the 
system  is  only  a  conception.  To  rest  in  the 
system  we  must  make  it  the  ontological  reality, 
and  regard  the  members  only  as  its  imphcations 
or  phases.  Instead  of  constructing  the  system 
from  the  members  as  ontological  units,  we  must 
rather  construct  the  members  from  the  system. 

Here  Kant  may  tell  us  that  we  are  pursuing 
a  shadow  of  our  own  reason.  We  reply  that 
the  only  question  which  can  rationally  be  raised 
in  this  field  is,  How  must  we  think  about  the 
fundamental  reahty?  And  we  hold  that  the 
mind  cannot  rest  in  the  thought  of  a  funda- 
mental plurahsm.     Only  two   conceptions  are 


56  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

possible.  We  may  tliink  ot  A,  B,  C,  etc.,  as  de- 
pendent on  some  one  being,  3f,  distinct  from 
them  wMch  co-ordinates  them  and  mediates 
their  interaction.  Or  we  may  think  of  them,  not 
as  dependent  on  something  outside  of  them,  but 
on  some  one  being  in  them  which  is  their  reahty, 
and  of  which  they  are  in  some  sense  but  phases 
or  modifications.  Things,  in  the  common  use 
of  the  term,  would  have  but  derived  or  phenom- 
enal reality,  and  would  have  even  this  existence 
only  in  and  through  the  one  fundamental  reality. 
The  decision  between  these  two  views  must  be 
left  for  future  study ;  but  both  ahke  compel  the 
denial  of  the  seK-sufficiency  of  things  and  the 
affirmation  of  a  unitary  world-ground.  And  to 
this  being  we  give  the  name  of  infinite  and  ab- 
solute. This  does  not  imply  that  it  is  the  all, 
but  only  that  it  is  the  independent  ground  of 
the  finite.  No  more  does  it  imply  that  it  is  out 
of  all  relations,  but  only  that  it  is  out  of  all 
restrictive  relations  to  anything  beyond  itseK, 
and  is  the  independent  source  of  the  finite  and 
all  its  relations. 

§22.  The  argument  thus  outlined  is  open  to 
many  scruples,  but,  I  believe,  to  no  valid  objec- 


THE  UNITY  OF  THE  WORLD-GROUND.  57 

tions.  The  scruples  are  largely  born  of  onr 
general  bondage  to  the  senses.  For  one  who 
supposes  that  the  senses  give  hnmediate  and 
final  metaphysical  insight  the  argument  will 
have  no  force.  But  we  have  no  desire  to  con- 
vince such  a  one.  Even  wisdom  is  justified 
only  of  her  children.  It  is  possible  to  come  to 
any  argument  with  so  undeveloped  a  mental 
retina  as  to  make  vision  impossible.  But  I  am 
persuaded  that,  apart  from  these  pathological 
cases,  when  we  become  familiar  with  the  terms 
and  their  meaning,  and  also  with  the  inner 
structure  of  reason,  we  shall  see  that  the  mind 
can  rest  in  no  other  conclusion. 

We  replace,  then,  the  pluralism  of  spontaneous 
thought  by  a  basal  monism.  Of  course  this 
view  does  not  remove  all  difficulties,  nor  answer 
all  questions.  On  the  contrary,  it  leaves  the 
mystery  of  being  as  dark  and  opaque  as  ever. 
Its  only  value  hes  in  giving  expression  to  the 
mind's  demand  for  ultimate  unity,  and  in  re- 
moving the  contradiction  which  hes  in  the  as- 
sumption of  interaction  between  independent 
things.  But  we  cannot  pretend  to  picture  to 
ourselves  the  relations  of  the  infinite  and  the 
finite,  nor  to  construe  the  possibihty  of  the  in- 


58  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

finite.  We  come  here  to  a  necessity  which 
meets  ns  everywhere  when  we  touch  the  fron- 
tiers of  knowledge  —  namely,  the  necessity  of 
admitting  facts  which,  while  they  must  be  rec- 
ognized and  admitted,  cannot  he  deduced  or 
comprehended. 

Of  the  nature  of  the  infinite  as  yet  we  know 
only  that  it  is  one,  and  metaphysics  compels  us 
to  regard  it  also  as  active.  But  this  is  so  far 
from  being  the  complete  idea  of  God  that  both 
atheism  and  pantheism  might  accept  it.  Still 
we  have  made  some  progress.  We  have  reached 
a  pomt  to  which  the  design  argument  alone 
could  not  bring  us.  It  is  plain  that  polytheism 
is  untenable ;  and  that  if  any  kind  of  theism  is 
to  be  affirmed  it  must  be  monotheism.  We  at- 
tempt, now,  some  further  determinations  of  our 
thought  of  this  fundamental  being.  We  hope, 
at  least,  to  be  allowed,  if  not  comj)elled,  to  iden- 
tify the  One  of  speculation  with  the  God  of  re- 
hgion. 

But  before  passing  to  this  inquiry  a  word 
must  be  devoted  to  a  traditional  verbahsm.  Is 
this  One,  it  will  be  asked,  immanent  or  trans- 
cendent ?  and  we  might  even  be  instructed  that 
thought  can  never  transcend  the  universe.     We 


THE  UNITY  OF   THE  WORLD-GROUND.  '  59 

might  reply  by  asking  for  a  definition  of  the 
terms.  It  would  be  absurd  to  take  them  spa- 
tially, as  if  immanent  meant  inside  and  trans- 
cendent outside ;  a  fancy,  however,  which  seems 
to  underlie  not  a  few  utterances  on  this  subject. 
The  One  cannot  be  conceived  as  the  sum  of  the 
many,  nor  as  the  stuff  out  of  which  the  many 
are  made,  neither  does  it  depend  on  the  many ; 
but,  conversely,  the  many  depend  on  it.  In  this 
sense  the  One  is  transcendent.  Again,  the  many 
are  not  spatially  outside  of  the  One,  nor  a  pen- 
dulous appendage  of  the  One;  but  the  One  is 
the  ever-present  power  in  and  through  which 
the  many  exist.  In  this  sense  the  One  is  imma- 
nent. In  any  other  sense  the  terms  are  words 
without  any  meaning. 

The  alleged  impossibihty  of  transcending  the 
universe  is  another  form  of  the  same  verbahsm. 
In  the  sense  defined  we  must  transcend  it;  in 
any  other  sense  there  is  no  need  of  transcending 
it.  In  modern  thought  substantiahty  has  been 
replaced  or  defined  by  causahty.  A  world-sub- 
stance, as  distinguished  from  a  world-cause,  is 
a  product  of  the  imagination  which  vanishes 
before  criticism.  For  the  explanation  of  the 
system  we   need  a   cause   which  shaU  not  be 


60  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

this,  that,  or  the  other  thing,  but  an  omnipresent 
agent  by  which  all  things  exist.  This  agent 
may  be  called  anything,  first  cause,  absolute,  in- 
finite, world-ground,  or  even  universe,  if  only  we 
keep  the  meaning  in  mind ;  and  the  meaning  is 
that  power  not  ourselves,  nor  any  other  finite 
thing,  by  which  all  things  exist.  If  we  choose 
we  may  unite  this  agent  and  all  its  cosmic 
products  into  the  one  thought  of  the  universe ; 
and  we  may  then  loudly  proclaim  the  impossi- 
bility of  transcending  the  universe ;  but  this 
procedure  will  hardly  tend  to  clearness,  as  the 
term  universe  is  generally  restricted  to  mean 
the  system  of  finite  things  and  manifestations. 
Still,  if  any  one  finds  pleasure  in  teaching  that 
thought  is  hmited  to  the  universe  when  the  uni- 
verse is  taken  as  the  totality  of  being,  it  would 
be  hard-hearted,  indeed,  to  deny  him  this  cheap 
satisfaction. 

Perhaps,  however,  this  severity  ought  to  be  a 
httle  mitigated,  for  there  is  a  back-lying  thought 
which  may  be  hinted  at  by  this  antithesis  of 
immanence  and  transcendence,  although  it  is 
not  expressed  by  it.  This  concerns  the  ques- 
tion whether  the  world -ground  be  fully  ex- 
pressed and  exhausted  in  the  world,  or  whether, 


THE  UNITY  OF   THE  WORLD-GROUND.  61 

apart  from  the  real  world,  there  are  infinite 
possibihties  in  the  nature  of  the  fundamental 
reality.  At  bottom  this  question  turns  upon 
the  freedom  or  necessity  of  the  world-ground, 
and  must  be  postponed  for  the  present. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE  WORLD-GEOUND  AS  INTELLIGENT. 

Many  questions  migM  fitly  be  raised  at  this 
point,  but  we  postpone  tliem  for  the  central 
question  of  theism  —  the  intelhgence  of  the 
world-ground.  We  premise,  however,  a  pair  of 
principles  from  metaphysics. 

1.  This  world-ground,  by  its  independent  po- 
sition, is  the  source  of  the  finite  and  of  all  its 
determinations.  Whether  we  view  it  as  bhnd 
or  seeing,  necessitated  or  free,  none  the  less  must 
we  hold  that  no  finite  thing  has  any  ground  of 
existence  in  itself,  but  that  it  owes  its  existence, 
nature,  and  history,  entirely  to  the  demands 
which  the  world-ground  makes  upon  it.  If  not 
in  the  plan,  then  in  the  nature  of  this  funda- 
mental reality  we  must  seek  the  conditioning 
ground  of  things. 

2.  This  world -ground  is  not  to  be  regarded 
as  stuff  or  raw  material,  but  as  cause  or  agent. 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT.         63 

The  stuff -notion  is  a  product  of  the  imagination, 
and  vanishes  before  criticism. 

The  human  mind  has  only  two  principles  of 
causal  explanation  :  (1)  necessary  or  mechanical 
agency,  which  is  driven  from  behind,  and  (2) 
seK  -  directing  intelligent  agency,  which  is  led 
from  before.  Verbal  phrases  can  be  constructed 
to  represent  other  principles,  which  are  neither 
free  nor  necessary,  neither  bhnd  nor  seeing ;  but 
there  is  no  corresponding  thought.  The  ques- 
tion then  becomes.  Which  of  the  two  principles 
mentioned  offers  the  best  ultimate  explanation 
of  the  universe,  man  being  included  ? 

Here  we  might  inquire  into  the  relative  meta- 
physical difficulty  of  the  two  conceptions.  It 
is  commonly  supposed  that  the  notion  of  a  seK- 
directing  agent  has  in  it  very  grave,  if  not  insu- 
perable, metaphysical  difficulties ;  but  we  should 
find  this  conception  at  least  no  more  difficult 
than  the  opposite  one  of  an  all-embracing  ne- 
cessity. In  fact  there  is  nothing  positive  in 
the  latter  notion,  and  the  more  we  examine  it 
the  more  elusive  and  unmanageable  it  becomes. 
But  we  shaU  do  weU  to  avoid  these  abysses  of 
metaphysics  for  the  present,  and  take  a  more 
familiar  road. 


Q^  pniLOSopnY  OF  theism. 

The  believer  in  self-directing,  seK-possessing 
reason  as  the  only  acleqviate  ground  of  things, 
offers  various  reasons  for  his  faith.  They  are 
drawn  from  (1)  the  order  and  intelhgibility  of  the 
universe,  (2)  the  myriad  indications  of  design 
in  things,  (3)  inteUigence  in  man,  and  (4)  the 
overthrow  of  reason  and  cognition  involved  in 
any  atheistic  and  necessitarian  scheme.  These 
reasons  we  now  have  to  expound  and  consider. 

The  Argitment  from  Order  and  InteTllgibility. 

§  24.  This  argument  is  drawn  chiefly  from  the 
physical  system.  In  the  previous  chapter  we 
pointed  out  that  all  study  of  objective  reahty 
assumes  the  fact  of  law  and  system,  or  a  imi- 
versal  adjustment  of  each  to  all  in  a  common 
scheme  of  order.  Here  we  next  point  out  that 
all  study  assumes  that  this  system  is  an  intelli- 
gible or  rational  one.  A  rational  cosmos  is  the 
imphcit  assumption  of  objective  cognition.  But 
we  have  already  pointed  out,  what  psychology 
abundantly  demonstrates,  that  we  reach  this 
system,  not  by  a  passive  reception  of  ready- 
made  knowledge,  but  by  constructing  from  the 
data  of  experience  a  series  of  rational  concep- 
tions, and  objectifying  them  as  real.     The  true 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT.  65 

system  is  not  immediately  given  in  appearances ; 
our  knowledge  of  it  arises  only  as  the  mind 
works  over  the  appearances,  and  projects  the 
resulting  conceptions  under  the  form  of  space, 
time,  substance,  causality,  and  the  other  cate- 
gories of  thought.  But  if  the  knowledge  is  to 
have  any  vahdity,  the  laws  of  thought  must  be 
laws  of  the  universe  itself.  Things  wliich  are 
to  be  kno^\Ti  must  exist  in  intelhgible,  that  is 
rational,  order  and  relations,  and  also  in  pro- 
found adjustment  to  the  nature  of  the  mind  it- 
self. The  problem  of  human  knowledge,  then, 
involves  (1)  a  knowable,  that  is- a  rational,  uni- 
verse ;  (2)  a  knowing  human  mind ;  (3)  the  iden- 
tity of  the  categories  of  human  thought  with 
the  principles  of  cosmic  being;  (4)  such  an 
adjustment  of  the  outer  to  the  inner  that  the 
mind,  reacting  according  to  its  own  nature 
against  external  stimulus,  shall  produce  in  itself 
thoughts  which  shall  truly  reproduce  the  objec- 
tive fact,  and  (5)  an  identity  of  rational  nature 
in  human  beings.  If  human  reason  were  many, 
and  not  one,  there  would  be  an  end  to  thought. 
These  implications  are  so  involved  in  the  very 
structure  of  knowledge  that  we  take  them  for 
granted  without  thought  of  their  significance; 


QQ  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

whereas  they  are  the  perennial  wonder  of  ex- 
istence. 

If,  then,  knowledge  be  possible,  we  must  de- 
clare that  the  world-ground  proceeds  according 
to  thought -laws  and  principles,  that  it  has  es- 
tablished all  things  in  rational  relations,  and 
balanced  their  interaction  in  quantitative  and 
quahtative  proportion,  and  measured  this  pro- 
portion by  number.  "  God  geometrizes,"  says 
Plato.  "  Number  is  the  essence  of  reality,"  says 
Pythagoras.  And  to  this  agree  all  the  conclu- 
sions of  scientific  thought.  The  heavens  are 
crystallized  mathematics.  All  the  laws  of  force 
are  numerical.  The  interchange  of  energy  and 
chemical  combination  are  equally  so.  Crystals 
are  solid  geometry.  Many  organic  products 
show  similar  mathematical  laws.  Indeed,  the 
claim  is  often  made  that  science  never  reaches 
its  final  form  until  it  becomes  mathematical. 
But  simple  existence  in  space  does  not  imply 
motion  in  mathematical  relations,  or  existence 
in  mathematical  forms.  Space  is  only  the  form- 
less ground  of  form,  and  is  quite  compatible 
with  the  irregular  and  amorphous.  It  is  equally 
compatible  with  the  absence  of  numerical  law. 
The  truly  mathematical  is  the  work  of  the  spirit. 


THE  WORLD-GROUND   AS  INTELLIGENT.  67 

Hence  the  wonder  that  mathematical  principles 
should  be  so  pervasive,  that  so  many  forms  and 
processes  in  the  system  represent  definite  math- 
ematical conceptions,  and  that  they  should  be 
so  accurately  weighed  and  measured  by  number. 
If  the  cosmos  were  a  resting  existence,  we 
might  possibly  content  ourselves  by  saying  that 
things  exist  in  such  relations  once  for  all,  and 
that  there  is  no  going  behind  this  fact.  But 
the  cosmos  is  no  such  rigid  monotony  of  being ; 
it  is,  rather,  a  process  according  to  intelhgible 
rules ;  aud  in  this  process  the  rational  order  is 
perpetually  maintained  or  restored.  The  weigh- 
ing and  measuring  continually  goes  on.  In  each 
chemical  change  just  so  much  of  one  element  is 
combined  with  just  so  much  of  another.  In 
each  change  of  place  the  intensities  of  attrac- 
tion and  repulsion  are  instantaneously  adjusted 
to  correspond.  Apart  from  any  question  of  de- 
sign, the  simple  fact  of  qualitative  and  quanti- 
tative adjustment  of  aU  things,  according  to 
fixed  law,  is  a  fact  of  the  utmost  significance. 
The  world -ground  works  at  a  multitude  of 
points,  or  in  multitude  of  things  throughout  the 
system,  and  works  in  each  with  exact  reference 
to  its  activities  in  all  the  rest.     The  displace- 


68  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

ment  of  an  atom  by  a  hair's-breadtli  demands  a 
corresponding  readjustment  in  every  other  with- 
in the  grip  of  gravitation.  But  all  are  in  con- 
stant movement,  and  hence  readjustment  is  con- 
tinuous and  instantaneous.  The  single  law  of 
gravitation  contains  a  problem  of  such  dizzy 
vastness  that  our  minds  faint  in  the  attempt  to 
grasp  it ;  but  when  the  other  laws  of  force  are 
added  the  complexity  defies  all  understanding. 
In  addition  we  might  refer  to  the  building  proc- 
esses in  organic  forms,  whereby  countless  struct- 
ures are  constantly  produced  or  maintained,  and 
always  with  regard  to  the  typical  form  in  ques- 
tion. But  there  is  no  need  to  dwell  upon  this 
point. 

Here,  then,  is  a  problem,  and  we  have  only 
the  two  principles  of  intelhgence  and  non-intel- 
hgence,  of  self -directing  reason  and  bhnd  neces- 
sity, for  its  solution.  The  former  is  adequate, 
and  is  not  far-fetched  and  violent.  It  assimilates 
the  facts  to  our  own  experience,  and  offers  the 
only  ground  of  order  of  which  that  experience 
furnishes  any  suggestion.  If  we  adopt  this  view 
all  the  facts  become  luminous  and  consequent. 

If  we  take  the  other  view,  then  we  have  to 
assume  a  power  which  produces  the  intelligible 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT.        69 

and  rational,  without  being  itself  intelligent  and 
rational.  It  works  in  all  things,  and  in  each 
with  exact  reference  to  all,  yet  without  knowing 
anything  of  itself  or  of  the  rules  it  follows,  or 
of  the  order  it  founds,  or  of  the  myi'iad  products 
compact  of  seeming  purpose  which  it  incessant- 
ly produces  and  maintains.  If  we  ask  why  it 
does  tliis,  we  must  answer,  Because  it  must.  If 
we  ask  how  we  know  that  it  must,  the  answer 
must  be.  By  hypothesis.  But  this  reduces  to 
saying  that  things  are  as  they  are  because  they 
must  be.  That  is,  the  problem  is  abandoned 
altogether.  The  facts  are  referred  to  an  opaque 
hypothetical  necessity,  and  tliis  turns  out,  upon 
inquiry,  to  be  the  problem  itseK  in  another 
form.  There  is  no  proper  explanation  except  in 
theism. 

§  25.  Two  causes  serve  to  conceal  the  weak- 
ness of  the  atheistic  explanation : 

1.  We  fancy  that  we  see  causes,  and  especially 
that  we  see  matter  to  be  a  real  cause.  Spmt, 
on  the  other  hand,  is  a  purely  hypothetical 
cause,  and  is  assumed  only  to  explain  that  which 
the  undoubted  cause,  matter,  cannot  account  for. 
Hence  theism  is  presented  as  maintaining  a  hy- 


70  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THEISM. 

potlietical  cause,  God,  against  a  real  cause,  mat- 
ter; and  as  matter  is  daily  found  to  explain 
more  and  more,  there  is  less  and  less  need  of 
God.  Here,  then,  necessity  and  non-intelligence 
are  manifestly  united  in  most  effective  causation ; 
and  who  can  set  bounds  to  their  possibilities '? 

This  thought  has  been  a  leading  factor  in  the 
atheistic  renascence  of  recent  years.  The  an- 
swer must  be  that  it  is  an  echo  of  an  obsolete 
theory  of  knowledge.  We  know  directly  noth- 
ing of  causes.  We  experience  certain  effects, 
which  we  refer  to  causes ;  and  the  nature  of  the 
causes  is  learned  by  inference  from  the  effects. 
Matter  is  not  seen  to  cause  anything;  nor  is 
spuit  seen  to  cause  anything.  The  cause  of 
cosmic  phenomena  is  hidden  from  observation ; 
and  the  only  question  possible  is.  How  must  we 
think  of  that  cause?  Our  answer  is  equally 
speculative  and  metaphysical  in  every  case.  The 
theist,  observing  the  law  and  order  among  the 
phenomena,  refers  them  ultimately  to  a  power 
which  knows  itseK  and  what  it  is  doing.  The 
atheist  refers  them  to  a  power  which  knows 
nothing  of  itself  or  of  what  it  is  doing. 

2.  The  second  cause  which  conceals  the  weak- 
ness of  this  position  is  found  in  the  notion  of 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT.  71 

law.  The  human  mind  is  especially  prone  to 
hypostasize  abstractions,  and  subject  things  to 
them.  The  reign  of  law  is  a  phrase  which  has 
thus  acquired  a  purely  factitious  significance. 
Law  appears  as  something  apart  from  things, 
which  rules  over  them  and  determines  all  their 
doings.  Thus  the  law  of  gravity  is  conceived 
of  as  something  separate  from  things,  and  to 
which  things  are  subject;  and  the  mystery  of 
gravitation  is  removed  by  calling  it  a  law.  The 
mistake  is  palpable.  Laws  have  no  thing -like 
existence,  but  are  simply  general  expressions 
either  of  fact  or  of  the  rule  according  to  which 
some  agent  proceeds.  Things  do  not  attract 
one  another  because  the  law  of  gravitation  calls 
for  it ;  but  they  attract,  and  from  a  comparison 
of  many  cases  we  find  that  the  intensity  of  this 
attraction  varies  according  to  a  certain  rule. 
But  this  rule  does  not  found  the  fact ;  it  only 
expresses  it.  The  same  is  true  for  all  the  other 
laws  of  nature.  They  neither  found  nor  compel 
the  facts,  but  simply  express  them.  Yet,  misled 
by  our  persistent  tendency  to  mistake  abstrac- 
tions for  things,  we  first  give  a  kind  of  substan- 
tive character  to  the  laws,  and  then  we  carry 
them  behind  the  things  as  pre-existent  necessi- 


Y2  piiiLosornY  of  theism. 

ties,  which  explain  everything,  but  which  them- 
selves are  in  no  more  need  of  explanation  than 
the  seK-sufficient  and  eternal  truths  of  the  rea- 
son. The  untaught  mind  tends  to  think  under 
the  form  of  necessity ;  and  this  necessity,  which 
is  but  the  mind's  own  shadow,  forthwith  passes 
for  an  explanation.  Thus  we  reach  the  gro- 
tesque inversion  of  reason  which  makes  the  very 
fact  of  rational  order  a  ground  for  denying  a 
controlling  reason. 

In  fact,  however,  the  laws  form  a  large  part 
of  the  problem.  When  we  have  said  that  the 
world-ground  co-ordinates  things  by  fixed  rules 
of  quantity  and  quality,  and  with  perfect  adap- 
tation and  numerical  adjustment,  we  have  but 
stated  the  problem,  not  solved  it.  That  the  ad- 
justment takes  place  with  consciousness  is  not 
seen ;  that  it  takes  place  by  necessity  is  also  not 
seen.  Both  the  consciousness  and  the  necessity 
are  added  to  the  observation.  Change  according 
to  rule  is  all  that  is  given.  If  we  ask  how  this 
can  be,  we  can  only  appeal  either  to  intelligence 
or  non- intelligence.  Comte  says  that  it  is  a 
mark  of  immaturity  to  raise  this  question ;  but 
if  we  will  raise  it,  theism  is  the  only  answer. 
The  atheist  he  pronounces  to  be  the  most  in- 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT.         ^3 

consequent  of  theologians,  since  he  raises  theo- 
logical questions  and  rejects  the  only  possible 
way  of  deahng  with  them. 

§  26.  The  only  thing  which  could  justify  us 
in  adopting  non-intelhgence  as  the  ground  of 
the  cosmic  order,  would  he  to  show  that  the 
system,  with  all  its  laws  and  members,  are  ra- 
tional necessities,  or  implications  of  the  basal 
reahty.  The  truths  of  mathematics  are  imph- 
cations  of  our  intuitions  of  space  and  number ; 
and  for  these  truths  we  ask  no  ground,  they 
being  able  to  stand  alone.  It  is  conceivable  that 
in  hke  manner  the  cosmos,  in  all  its  features, 
should  be  shown  to  be  an  implication  of  the 
independent  reahty  which  underhes  all. 

This  was  once  a  dream  of  speculation,  and  the 
attempt  was  made  to  reahze  it.  Of  course  it 
failed.  No  reflection  on  the  bare  notion  of  in- 
dependent being  gives  any  insight  into  the  act- 
ual order.  The  basal  distinction  of  matter  and 
spuit  we  discover,  not  deduce.  The  modes  of 
cosmic  activity  are  of  the  same  kind.  Any  of 
the  cosmic  laws,  from  gravitation  on,  might 
conceivably  have  been  lacking  or  altogether  dif- 
ferent.     And,  allowing  the  laws,  their  outcome 


74  pniLOSOPnY  of  theism. 

might  have  been  in  all  respects  different.  For 
the  laws  alone  do  not  determine  the  result,  but 
only  when  taken  with  the  conditions  under 
which  they  work.  Had  the  conditions  been  dif- 
ferent, the  same  laws  would  have  produced 
other  results.  But  these  conditions  are  all  con- 
tmgent.  No  trace  of  necessity  can  be  found  in 
the  cosmos  or  its  laws.  They  are  simply  facts 
which  we  recognize  without  pretending  to  de- 
duce. Metaphysics  might  also  try  to  show  that 
this  notion  of  necessity,  when  pushed  to  its  re- 
sults, would  cancel  the  unity  of  the  basal  One, 
and,  instead  of  landing  us  on  the  sohd  rock, 
would  leave  us  in  the  abysses.  But  we  rest  the 
argument.  Here  is  a  power  which  works  intel- 
hgibly  and  according  to  law,  in  which  every- 
thing is  adjusted  to  everything  else  vnth.  nicest 
balance  and  adaptation,  and  in  which  this  bal- 
ance is  incessantly  reproduced.  The  theist  con- 
cludes that  this  power  is  intelligent,  the  atheist 
concludes  that  it  is  not.  The  theist  holds  that 
the  rational  and  intelligible  work  point  to  rea- 
son and  intelligence.  The  atheist  concludes  that 
the  rational  and  intelligible  work  point  to  un- 
reason and  non-intelligence.  Between  these  two 
views  each  must  decide  for  himseK. 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT.        T5 

In  leaving  this  argument  a  single  vulgar  ob- 
jection must  be  warded  off.  It  has  been  said 
that  we  cannot  conceive  that  the  cosmic  proc- 
esses are  carried  on  by  intelligence.  This  is 
true  enough  if  it  means  that  we  cannot  picture 
the  process  in  detail.  We  certainly  cannot  con- 
ceive how  a  mind  could  conduct  the  ceaseless 
and  infinitely  complex  processes  of  nature  with- 
out weariness  or  confusion.  To  conceive  how 
it  could  do  it  we  must  ourselves  be  equal  to  the  i 
task.  But  if  it  be  hard  to  see  how  intelhgence 
could  do  it,  it  is  at  least  equally  so  to  see  how 
non- intelhgence  could  do  it.  The  alternative 
hes  between  the  two,  with  the  advantage  always 
in  favor  of  the  former.  For  when  we  ascribe  to 
the  world-ground  omnipotence  and  omniscience, 
we  make  at  least  a  formal  provision  for  the 
case.  We  can  see  that  such  a  being  would  be 
adequate  to  the  task,  and  we  are  under  no  obli- 
gation to  tell  how  he  would  get  on  with  it. 
That  is  liis  own  affair.  But  with  the  assertion 
of  the  world-ground  as  non-intelligent,  we  fail 
to  make  even  this  formal  provision,  and  the 
facts  remain  opaque  and  unintelligible.  Our 
total  conclusion  from  the  facts  of  order,  law, 
and  system  is  that  if  they  are  to  be  explained. 


76  PniLOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

it  can  be  only  on  a  theistic  basis.  Atheism  does 
not  explain  them,  but  only  asserts  that  they  are 
facts  which  are  because  they  must  be ;  and  we 
know  that  they  must  be  by  hypothesis. 

§  27.  We  have  said  that  the  world-ground  must 
be  intelhgent  or  non-intelligent.  This  has  been 
disputed  on  the  ground  that  intelhgence  and 
non-intelligence  do  not  form  a  complete  disjunc- 
tion, so  that  there  may  be  a  third  something 
higher  than  either,  and  transcendental  to  both. 
In  our  o^vn  time,  which  has  a  craze  for  seK- 
sophistication,  this  claim  has  been  paraded  as 
something  especially  profound,  and  as  vacating 
both  theism  and  atheism.  The  true  explanation 
of  the  cosmos  is  to  be  found  in  neither  intelh- 
gence nor  non-intelhgence,  but  in  the  inscrutable 
transcendental.  This  doctrine  has  a  sweUing 
sound,  but  is  empty  of  the  shghtest  substance. 
The  speculative  fancy  has  been  unspeakably 
prolific  in  the  production  of  words  for  its  ex- 
pression, but  they  are  purely  logical  sound  and 
fury,  signifying  nothing.  This  transcendental 
X  is  not  a  thought,  but  a  phrase.  It  exists  sole- 
ly by  the  grace  of  language,  which  has  the  un- 
fortunate property  of  making  it  possible  to  talk 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT  77 

long  and  learnedly  without  saying  anything. 
To  appeal  to  this  X  is  not  to  explain,  but  to 
abandon  explanation.  Explanation  must  always 
be  in  intelligible  terms;  and  as  in  our  thought 
the  intelhgent  and  the  non-intelhgent  comprise 
all  existence,  any  true  explanation  must  be  in 
terms  of  one  or  the  other.  X  Y  Z  may  be  a 
very  .profound  truth  in  the  realm  of  the  inscru- 
table, but  in  the  reahn  of  intelligence  it  is  only 
a  meaningless  group  of  letters. 

In  one  case,  however,  we  can  speak  of  some- 
thing higher  than  intelhgence.  Our  thought 
contains  two  elements ;  a  certain  rational  con- 
tent or  insight,  and  a  variety  of  processes  by 
which  this  insight  is  reached.  The  former  is 
the  universal  and  objective  element  of  thought, 
the  latter  may  be  formal  and  relative  to  us.  If, 
now,  by  intelligence  we  mean  our  methods  of 
procedure,  the  devices  of  our  discursive  reason, 
there  may  well  be  something  higher  than  intel- 
hgence. Indeed,  theism  has  always  maintained 
that  the  Supreme  Reason  must  be  intuitive,  in 
distinction  from  the  discursiveness  of  human 
reason.  The  community  and  universahty  of 
intelligence,  or  of  reason,  does  not  consist  in 
methods  or  processes,  but  in  the  rational  con- 


78  PHiLOSornY  of  theism. 

tents.  But  this  conception  does  not  give  us 
something  above  inteUigence,  but  only  above 
the  human  hmitations  of  inteUigence. 

§  28.  The  argument  from  the  order  of  the  uni- 
verse sometimes  takes  a  higher  form  in  the 
claim  that  the  intelligible  universe  not  only  de- 
mands intelligence  as  its  cause,  but  is  meaning- 
less and  non-existent  except  in  reference  to  in- 
telligence. This  argument  takes  us  into  the 
depths  of  the  theory  of  knowledge.  The  claim 
is  made  that  the  universe,  as  we  conceive  it,  de- 
monstrably demands  intelhgence  as  the  condi- 
tion of  its  existence.  As  light  or  sound,  in  the 
psychological  sense,  has  neither  meaning  nor 
existence  apart  from  the  sensibility,  so  the  uni- 
verse itself  is  an  absurdity  and  impossibility 
apart  from  conscious  intelhgence. 

This  argument  does  not  commend  itself  to 
the  natural  man,  nor  even  to  the  natural  theist. 
Both  alike  are  sure  that  the  world  of  facts 
which  they  perceive  is  independent  of  their  own 
inteUigence,  and  of  their  neighbors'  intelligence. 
This  world  did  not  begin  when  they  first  be- 
came aware  of  it,  nor  did  it  grow  with  their 
growing  knowledge,  nor  will  it  vanish  with  theu' 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  IXTELLIGEXT.         ^C^ 

consciousness  of  it.  This  fact,  which  is  admit- 
ted by  all  except  some  lively  person  who  takes 
pleasure  in  airing  conceits  and  paradoxes,  is 
supposed  by  the  natural  man  to  show  that  the 
universe  which  exists  apart  from  our  intelli- 
gence exists  apart  from  all  intelhgence.  The 
natural  theist,  of  course,  would  insist  that  the 
universe  began  in  intelligence,  but  he  would  also 
insist  that  it  now  exists  external  to  all  intelli- 
gence. The  atheist  would  claim  that  the  uni- 
verse is  now,  and  always  has  been,  external  to 
intelhgence.  Both  ahke  would  be  sure  that  the 
meaning  of  this  externahty  is  sun -clear,  and 
that  its  reality  is  seK-evident. 

The  question  thus  raised  opens  out  into  the 
debate  between  crude  realism  and  rational  ideal- 
ism, and  cannot  be  thoroughly  discussed  with- 
out a  long  metaphysical  analysis  of  our  funda- 
mental notions.  This  cannot  be  undertaken 
here.  We  borrow,  however,  from  metaphysics 
the  conviction  that  relations  can  exist  only  in 
and  for  intelligence.  But  the  universe  as  we 
know  it  is  essentially  a  vast  system  of  relations 
under  the  various  categories  of  the  intellect; 
and  such  a  universe  would  have  neither  mean- 
ing nor  existence  apart  from  intelhgence.     It 


80  PniLOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

does  not  avail  against  this  conclusion  to  say 
that,  besides  the  relations,  there  are  real  things 
in  relations ;  for  these  things  themselves  are  de- 
fined and  constituted  by  their  relations,  so  that 
their  existence  apart  from  a  constitutive  intelh- 
gence  becomes  an  absurdity.  If,  with  Locke, 
we  declare  that  relations  are  the  work  of  the 
mind,  and  then  attempt  to  find  some  unrelated 
reality  in  the  object  which  can  exist  apart  from 
mind,  our  quest  is  soon  seen  to  be  bootless  and 
hopeless.  In  that  case  we  should  have  to  admit 
that  the  real  in  itself  is  imknowable,  and  that 
the  real  as  known  exists  only  in  and  for  intelli- 
gence. But  as  this  intelligence  in  and  for  which 
the  universe  exists  is  not  ours,  there  must  be  a 
cosmic  intelligence  as  its  abiding  condition,  and 
in  reference  to  which  alone  the  affirmation  of  a 
universe  has  any  meaning. 

But  this  argument  is  highly  abstract,  and  can 
never  find  favor  except  in  speculative  circles. 
It  is  valuable  as  showing  theism,  or  a  cosmic 
inteUigenco,  to  be  a  necessary  implication  of  the 
essential  structure  of  thought  and  knowledge. 
From  this  standpoint  atheism  would  appear  as 
the  crude  misunderstanding  of  a  mind  not  yet 
in  full  possession  of  itseK,  but  rather  in  hope- 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT.  81 

less  bondage  to  the  senses  and  their  spontane- 
ous prejudices.  We  return  to  a  more  famihar 
line  of  thought. 

The  Argument  from  Design. 

The  argument  from  order  and  intelligibility 
is  cosmic ;  it  concerns  the  structure  of  the  uni- 
verse in  itseK,  and  in  its  relation  to  the  know- 
ing mind.  But  the  laws  of  the  system  bear 
no  certain  marks  of  purpose.  If  we  ask  how 
they  can  be,  we  are  referred  to  intelligence  as 
their  explanation.  If  we  ask  what  they  are  for, 
the  answer  must  be  that  we  do  not  clearly  see 
that  they  are  for  anything.  But  this  uncer- 
tainty vanishes  when  we  come  to  the  organic 
world.  Here  we  find  activity  according  to  a 
plan,  and  results  which  are  not  merely  prod- 
ucts, but  which  have  all  the  marks  of  j^urpose. 
Here  there  are  adjustments  which  look  hke  con- 
trivance, and  combinations  for  manifest  ends. 
These  facts  are  the  data  of  the  design  argument. 

These  two  arguments  do  not  admit  of  sharp 
separation;  and  perhaps  a  perfect  knowledge 
might  find  them  one.  Kant  attempted  to  dis- 
tinguish between  the  teleology  of  the  organism 
and  the  mere  usableness  of  the  inorganic  world ; 
6 


82  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

but  this  distinction  cannot  be  rigorously  main- 
tained. Still,  we  find  the  most  striking  marks 
of  design  and  contrivance  in  the  organic  world, 
and  the  reign  of  law,  as  such,  does  not  imply 
purpose-like  products.  The  reign  of  law  is  as 
absolute  in  the  amorphous  rock  as  in  the  crystal 
or  in  the  hving  form.  It  is  as  absolute  in  the 
baiTcn  desert  as  in  the  fertile  plain.  But  the 
results  differ  greatly  in  their  power  of  suggest- 
ing intelligence.  Finally,  the  argument  from 
order  has  even  been  opposed  to  that  from  de- 
sign, many  fancying  that  the  existence  of  fixed 
laws  excludes  the  possibility  of  specific  and  de- 
tailed purposes.  We  may,  then,  consider  the  ar- 
gument separately. 

What  has  just  been  said  may  be  restated  in 
another  form.  The  system  of  objective  experi- 
ence contains  three  factors  which  we  are  not  at 
present  able  to  connect  by  any  logical  deduction. 
The  fii'st  and  fundamental  one  is  what  is  called 
the  necessary  truths  of  reason,  or  the  system  of 
rational  categories.  These  are  vahd  ahke  for 
the  world  of  thought  and  the  world  of  reahty. 
They  are  the  bond  of  union  between  the  two, 
and  found  the  possibility  of  knowledge.  But 
there  is  no  way  of  deducing  the  actual  world 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS   INTELLIGENT.  §3 

from  these  categories  of  tlie  reason.  The  second 
factor,  the  system  of  general  laws,  is  indeed  a 
specification  under  those  categories,  but  is  no 
necessary  implication  of  them.  And  both  the 
categories  and  the  laws  admit  of  manifold  ap- 
phcations.  The  same  set  of  laws  could  produce 
results  altogether  different  from  those  of  the 
actual  system.  Hence,  neither  the  categories  of 
the  reason  nor  the  general  laws  of  the  system 
explain  the  specific  facts  and  combinations  of 
the  system.  These,  in  turn,  have  to  be  admit- 
ted as  opaque  facts,  or  referred  to  purpose  as 
<<  their  final  ground.  This  is  the  third  factor 
necessary  for  a  complete  comprehension  of  the 
system. 

§  29.  The  design  argument  has  had  varying 
fortunes.  Verbal  inaccuracies  of  statement  have 
made  room  for  floods  of  verbal  criticism ;  and  it 
has  at  times  fallen  into  complete  speculative 
disfavor.  Nevertheless  it  wiU  always  be  a  great 
favorite  with  common-sense.  Kant  speaks  of  it 
with  respect;  and  J.  S.  Mill  regards  it  as  the 
only  theistic  argument  of  any  force  whatever. 
It  has  been  over  and  under  estimated.  It  does 
not  give  us  the  full  idea  of  God;  but  with  the 


84  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

practical  mind  it  will  always  be  the  main  argu- 
ment for  the  intelligence  of  the  First  Cause. 

In  studying  this  argument  the  following 
points  are  to  be  noted  : 

1.  The  argument  is  not :  Design  proves  a  de- 
signer. Here  is  design.  Hence  these  things 
have  had  a  designer.  This  would,  fonnally  at 
least,  beg  the  question ;  for  the  very  point  is  to 
know  whether  the  minor  premise  be  true.  No 
one  ever  doubted  that  design  imphes  a  designer ; 
but  many  have  questioned  whether  the  facts  re- 
ferred to  design  really  justify  this  reference. 
The  argument  rather  runs :  Here  are  facts  which 
have  such  marks  of  design  and  contrivance  that 
we  cannot  explain  them  without  referring  them 
to  purpose.  The  point  is  to  solve  the  problem 
contamed  in  the  purpose -hke  adaptations  and 
combinations  found  in  the  system ;  and  the  the- 
ist  refers  them  to  design  or  purpose  as  the  only 
adequate  solution.  And  whatever  the  verbal  fail- 
ings of  the  exposition  may  have  been,  this  has 
always  been  the  real  meaning  of  the  argument. 

2.  The  design  argument  need  assume  nothmg 
as  to  the  way  in  which  effects  are  produced.  It 
claims  only  that  adaptation  in  a  complex  prod- 
uct to  an  ideal  end  points  to  design  somewhere. 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT.  85 

3.  Design  is  never  causal.  It  is  only  an  ideal 
conception,  and  demands  some  efficient  cause,  or 
system  of  efficient  causes,  for  its  realization.  If 
the  stomach  is  not  to  digest  itself,  there  must 
be  some  provision  for  protecting  it  against  the 
gastric  juice.  If  ice  is  not  to  sink  and  freeze 
out  life,  there  must  be  some  molecular  structure 
which  shall  make  its  bulk  greater  than  that  of 
an  equal  weight  of  water.  If,  then,  efficient 
causes  were  commissioned  to  realize  design,  or, 
rather,  if  an  ideal  conception  were  impressed 
upon  a  system  of  efficient  causes,  so  that  the  lat- 
ter should  work  in  accordance  with  the  former, 
and  realize  the  former,  we  should  expect  to  see 
the  products  resulting  with  necessity  from  the 
nature  of  the  agents  at  work.  Watches  pro- 
duced by  seK-regulating  machinery  would  point 
as  certainly  to  intelligence  as  do  watches  pro- 
duced by  hand.  In  such  a  case  we  should  have 
mechanical  necessity  itself  working  as  the  ser- 
vant of  purpose,  and  in  forms  prescribed  by 
purpose. 

4.  Hence  the  study  of  efficient  causes  can 
never  logically  conflict  with  the  belief  in  final 
causes.  The  former  tells  us  how  an  effect  has 
been  brought  about,  and  leaves  us  as  free  as 


85  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

ever  to  believe  that  there  was  purpose  in  tlie 
doing.  We  can  understand  the  grouping  of  effi- 
cient causes  only  by  reference  to  final  causes; 
and  the  final  cause  is  realized  only  through  the 
efficient  cause. 

5.  Historically,  the  study  of  efficient  causes 
has  often  tended  to  weaken  the  behef  in  final 
causes.     This  fact  has  several  grounds : 

A.  The  design  argument  has  been  supposed  to 
teach  an  external  making,  and  not  an  immanent 
guiding.  Human  designs  are  external  to  the 
material  on  which  they  are  impressed ;  but  this 
externality  is  in  no  way  essential  to  the  design. 
If  the  human  maker,  instead  of  adapting  his 
plan  to  given  material,  could  create  his  material 
outright  and  impress  his  plan  upon  its  very  be- 
ing, the  design  would  be  quite  as  real  and  quite 
as  apparent  as  it  is  now. 

Under  the  influence  of  this  fancy,  the  design 
argument  has  been  much  belabored.  It  has 
been  called  the  carpenter  theory  —  a  phrase 
which,  while  missing  the  true  nature  of  the  ar- 
gument, does  most  happily  reveal  the  wooden 
nature  of  the  criticism.  But  the  argument  itself 
is  quite  compatible  with  immanent  design,  with 
design  legislated  into  the  constitution  of  things. 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT.  87 

SO  that  in  their  fixed  order  of  unfolding  they 
shall  reahze  a  predetermined  plan  or  purpose. 

B.  The  result  of  this  blunder  is  a  second, 
namely,  the  fancy  that  whatever  can  be  ex- 
plained by  physical  laws  and  agents  is  thereby 
rescued  from  the  control  of  mind.  Not  even 
Kant  is  free  from  this  confusion.  In  the  "  Cri- 
tique of  the  Judgment"  he  suggests  that  the 
notion  of  purpose  may  have  only  a  regulative 
value ;  and  that  possibly  everything  may  have 
a  mechanical  explanation.  Here  he  falls  into 
the  confusion  of  making  design  a  cause  among 
causes,  and  seems  to  think  that  we  must  not 
know  how  effects  are  produced  if  we  are  to  be- 
lieve them  intended.  Many  have  openly  es- 
poused this  notion.  The  discovery  that  the 
stomach  does  not  digest  itseK,  because  its  walls 
secrete  a  fluid  impervious  to  the  gastric  juice, 
has  often  been  held  to  disprove  the  existence 
of  purpose  as  the  ground  of  the  arrangement. 
This  fancy,  which  recognizes  purpose  only  where 
causation  cannot  be  traced,  had  great  influence 
in  the  late  revival  of  atheism.  Wherever  natu- 
ral laws  could  be  traced,  purpose  was  ruled  out. 
This  view  flrst  assumes  that  design  is  a  cause, 
and  then  attributes  self-sufficiency  to  the  ele- 


88  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

ments  and  laws  of  nature.  If  we  knew  nature 
to  be  at  once  self-sufficient  and  unintelligent, 
we  might  insist  that  the  realms  of  mind  and  of 
nature  are  mutually  exclusive.  But  in  fact  the 
system  of  things  represents  no  seK-sufficient  ex- 
istence, but  only  the  way  in  which  the  world- 
ground  proceeds.  Whether  there  be  any  pur- 
pose in  the  proceeding  can  be  known  only  by 
studying  the  outcome. 

6.  The  chief  ground  for  distinguishing  be- 
tween the  system  of  law  and  specific  design  hes 
in  what  appears  as  the  contrivances  of  nature. 
Here  we  have  combinations  of  laws  for  the  pro- 
duction of  effects,  which  the  laws  taken  singly 
do  not  involve.  In  organic  forms  especially  we 
have  a  union  of  natural  processes  which,  taken 
singly,  would  destroy  the  organism,  but  which 
together  work  for  the  maintenance  of  the  whole. 
This  class  of  facts  has  led  many  to  think  of  de- 
sign as  something  interjected  into,  or  superin- 
duced upon,  a  system  essentially  unrelated  to  it. 
But  this  fancy  is  reached  by  unlawful  abstrac- 
tion. It  is  indeed  conceivable  that  there  should 
be  a  system  in  which  the  elementary  physical 
and  chemical  process  should  go  on  without  any 
purpose-like  products ;  but  in  the  actual  system 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT.         89 

they  are  not  thus  resultless.  When,  then,  we 
make  the  law  into  an  abstract  rule  and  separate 
it  from  its  actual  working  and  product,  we 
merely  analyze  the  complex  reahty  into  several 
factors  for  the  convenience  of  our  understand- 
ing; but  which  we  need  not  regard  as  in  any 
way  representing  the  constituent  factors  from 
which  the  reality  was  produced.  But  this  ques- 
tion goes  too  deeply  into  the  question  of  the 
formal,  and  the  objective  signification  of  logical 
method,  to  be  discussed  to  advantage  here. 

§  30.  The  positive  argument  for  design  begins 
by  showing  that  many  processes  in  nature  are 
determined  by  ends.  The  aim  of  the  eye  is 
vision,  that  of  the  ear  is  hearing,  that  of  the 
lungs  is  the  oxygenation  of  the  blood,  that  of 
the  manifold  generative  mechanisms  is  the  re- 
production of  life.  In  all  of  these  cases  there 
is  concurrence  of  many  factors  in  a  common 
result ;  and  this  result,  towards  which  they  all 
tend,  is  viewed  as  the  final  cause  of  then'  con- 
currence. Here,  then,  is  action  for  an  end.  But 
an  end,  as  such,  cannot  act  except  as  a  concep- 
tion in  the  consciousness  of  some  agent  which 
wills  that  end.     The  end,  as  result,  is  effect, 


90  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

not  cause.  Hence  activity  for  ends  demands  a 
preconceiving  intelligence  as  its  necessary  im- 
plication or  condition.  Of  course  the  standing 
answer  to  this  argument  is  the  claim  that  the 
apparent  aims  are  not  real  ones ;  that  they  re- 
sult from  their  antecedents  by  necessity  and 
were  never  intended.  Eyes  were  not  made  for 
seeing;  but  we  have  eyes,  and  see  in  conse- 
quence. The  propagation  of  life  was  never  pur- 
posed; but  reproductive  processes  and  mech- 
anisms exist,  and  life  is  propagated.  This  view, 
in  this  naked  form,  has  always  scandahzed  the 
unsophisticated  mind  as  a  pettifogging  affront 
to  good  sense. 

There  is  no  need  to  adduce  instances  of  ap- 
parent purpose.  They  may  be  found  in  endless 
profusion  in  the  various  w^orks  on  the  subject. 
Besides,  all  admit  that  in  the  organic  world  the 
W'Orld  -  ground  proceeds  as  if  it  had  plans  and 
purposes.  The  theistic  conclusion  is  disputed 
on  the  following  grounds  : 

1.  The  mechanism  of  nature  explains  the  fact, 
and  we  need  not  go  behind  it. 

2.  The  fact  that  the  world-ground  works  as  if 
it  had  plans  does  not  prove  that  it  has  them. 

3.  There  is  no  analogy  between  human  activ- 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT.  91 

ity  and  cosmic  activity.  We  know  tliat  pui'pose 
rules  in  human  action,  but  we  have  no  experi- 
ence of  world-making,  and  can  conclude  nothing 
concerning  cosmic  action.  The  distance  is  too 
great,  and  knowledge  is  too  scant  to  allow  any 
inference. 

All  atheistic  objections  fall  under  some  one 
of  these  heads.  We  consider  them  in  their 
order. 

§  31.  On  the  first  point  we  observe  that  mech- 
anism, and  systems  of  necessity  in  general,  can 
never  explain  teleological  problems.  These  can 
find  a  final  explanation  only  in  a  seK-directing 
intelhgence.  All  other  explanations  are  either 
tautologies,  or  they  imphcitly  abandon  the  prob- 
lem. We  have  already  pointed  out  that  the 
general  laws  of  the  system  explain  no  si)ecific 
effect.  Like  the  laws  of  motion,  they  apply  to 
all  cases,  but  account  for  none.  The  specific 
effect  is  always  due  to  the  pecuhar  circum- 
stances  under  which  the  laws  work.  Hence,  in 
order  to  explain  the  effect,  we  must  account  for 
not  only  the  general  laws,  but  also  the  special 
circumstances  which  form  the  arbitrary  con- 
stants of  the  equation.     But  these  cannot  be 


92  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

explained  by  any  and  every  antecedent,  but  only 
by  such,  as  contain  implicitly  tbe  effect.  In 
that  case  we  do  not  explain  the  peculiar  nature 
of  the  effect,  but  only  remove  it  one  step  further 
back.  By  the  law  of  the  sufficient  reason,  when 
we  pass  from  effects  to  causes,  we  have  to  at- 
tribute them,  not  to  any  and  every  cause,  but  to 
causes  which  implicitly  contain  all  the  mystery 
and  pecuharity  of  the  effects.  Thus  the  prob- 
lem ever  precedes  us.  We  refer  a  to  —a,  and 
—  a  is  referred  to  —2a,  and  so  on  to  —na.  If 
—na  is  given,  then  in  the  course  of  time  a  will 
appear;  but  at  the  farthest  point,  —  nr/,  we  have 
a  impHcitly  and  necessarily  given.  In  such  a 
system  we  reach  no  resting-place  and  no  true 
explanation.  A  given  fact,  a,  is  because  —  a  was ; 
and  —a  was  because  —2a  went  before;  and  so 
on  in  endless  regress.  But  as  all  later  orders 
and  collocations  were  implicit  in  —na^  it  follows 
that  we  deduce  the  present  fact,  a,  from  its  an- 
tecedents by  constructing  our  thought  of  those 
antecedents  so  as  to  contain  the  fact  to  be  de- 
duced. Of  course  it  does  not  follow  that  a  was 
given  as  a,  but  only  in  those  antecedents  which 
must  lead  to  it;  so  that  whoever  could  have 
read  the  system  at  any  point  in  the  past  would 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT.  93 

have  seen  a  as  a  necessary  implication.  In  a 
system  of  necessity  there  can  be  no  new  de- 
partm^es,  no  interjection  of  new  features,  but 
only  an  unfolding  of  the  necessary  imphcations. 
If  we  make  a  cross-section  of  such  a  system  at 
any  point,  we  find  everything  given  either  actu- 
ally or  potentially,  and  when  an  apparently  new 
fact  appears,  it  is  not  something  chanced  upon, 
but  something  which  always  must  have  been. 
In  such  a  scheme  we  do  not  come  to  the  thought 
of  a  beginning,  but  of  a  self-centred  system,  or 
world -order,  which  rolls  on  forever,  infolding 
and  unfolding  all.  This  view  might  involve  us 
in  sundry  very  grave  metaphysical  difficulties, 
but  we  pass  them  over.  The  point  to  be  noticed 
is  that  this  view  does  not  solve,  but  only  post- 
pones, the  teleological  problem.  If  the  facts 
themselves  call  for  explanation,  just  as  much  do 
these  hypothetical  grounds  demand  it,  for  we 
have  simply  carried  the  facts  in  principle  into 
them.  But  we  conceal  the  fact  from  ourselves 
by  casting  the  shadow  of  necessity  over  the 
whole,  and  this  stifles  further  inquiry.  Refer- 
ence has  already  been  made  to  the  grotesque 
inversion  of  reason  which  finds  in  the  rational 
order  a  ground  for  denying  a  basal  reason ;  the 


94:  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

same  thing  meets  us  here.  We  construct  our 
thought  of  the  cosmic  mechanism  by  an  inverted 
teleology.  The  mechanism  is  simply  teleology 
read  backwards.  But  the  notion  of  necessity 
so  bhnds  us  that  the  cosmic  mechanism,  which 
is  but  an  incarnation  of  all  cosmic  products, 
is  made  the  ground  for  denying  purpose  therein. 
One  reason  for  our  failure  to  see  that  a  neces- 
sary system  must  always  implicitly  contain  all 
that  comes  out  of  it,  is  our  failure  to  see  that 
definite  and  specific  effects  can  have  only  defi- 
nite and  specific  causes.  If  anything  could  pro- 
duce everything,  there  would  be  an  end  of  all 
reasoning;  for  this  proceeds  according  to  the 
principle  of  the  sufficient  reason.  But  we  trace 
the  outlines  of  our  system  to  some  state  of  ap- 
parent homogeneity,  say  a  nebula;  and  then 
conclude  that  any  vague  and  formless  matter 
must  develop  into  fixed  and  definite  purpose-like 
products.  In  our  regress  we  forget  the  definite 
outcome,  and  thus  we  seem  to  reach  the  indefi- 
nite and  meaningless.  Then  in  our  progress  we 
remember  the  definite  outcome  again,  and  this 
passes  for  a  deduction.  Hence  the  nebular  the- 
oiy  and  that  of  natural  selection  have  been 
often  adduced  as  showing  how,  by  a  kind  of 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT.  95 

mechanical  necessity  in  a  system  of  trial  and 
rejection,  purpose  must  result  from  non- pur- 
posive action.  But  here  we  fail  entu-ely  to  be 
true  to  the  principle  of  the  sufficient  reason,  and 
mistake  indefiniteness  for  the  senses  for  indefi- 
niteness  for  the  reason.  Indeed,  there  has  al- 
ways been  at  this  point  a  curious  oscillation  in 
atheistic  reasoning  between  chance  and  necessi- 
ty. At  times  everything  is  absolutely  deter- 
mined ;  but  when  the  design  question  is  up,  an 
element  of  indeterminateness  appears.  Some 
chaos,  which  contained  nothing  worth  mention- 
ing, or  some  raw  beginnings  of  existence,  which 
were  so  low  as  to  make  no  demand  for  an  intel- 
hgent  cause,  begins  to  shuffle  into  the  argument. 
Being  so  abject,  it  excites  no  question  or  sur- 
prise. Being  indeterminate,  it  does  not  seem 
to  beg  the  question  against  teleology  by  implic- 
itly assuming  the  problem ;  and  then,  by  waving 
the  magic  wand  of  necessity,  together  with  a 
happy  forgetfulness  of  the  laws  of  mental  pro- 
cedure, the  nothing  is  transformed  into  an  all- 
explaining  something.  We  find  the  same  fancy 
underlying  the  argument  from  the  "conditions 
of  existence,"  and  the  earher  whim  that,  as  in 
infinite  time  all  possible  combinations  must  be 


96  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

exhausted,  the  actual  order  must  be  hit  upon. 
The  superficial  and  wooden  nature  of  these  no- 
tions need  not  be  dwelt  upon,  as  the  very  nature 
of  scientific  method  has  rendered  them  obsolete. 
They  must  be  looked  upon  as  survivals  of  a  pe- 
riod when  thought  was  groping  bhndly  without 
any  knowledge  of  its  own  aims  and  methods. 
In  a  necessary  system  there  is  no  possible  be- 
yond the  actual  and  its  necessary  imphcations. 
All  else  is  the  impossible.  There  never  was, 
then,  a  period  of  indefiniteness  out  of  which  the 
present  order  emerged  by  a  happy  chance.  This 
feature  of  all  necessary  systems  vacates  also  the 
theistic  argument  from  probabilities.  If  there 
ever  had  been  a  time  when  all  was  indefinite 
and  undetermined,  it  is  higlily  improbable  that 
any  rational  order  would  have  been  hit  upon. 
But  we  cannot  urge  this  against  atheism,  for 
atheism  which  understands  itself  recognizes  no 
such  period. 

The  mechanical  explanation  of  a  fact,  then, 
turns  out  to  consist  in  assuming  a  cause  or 
causes  of  such  a  kind,  and  in  such  relations,  that 
they  must  produce  that  fact  to  the  exclusion  of 
every  other.  But  such  an  explanation  is  a  pure 
tautology,  teleologically  considered.     It  has  to 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT.  97 

frame  the  mechanism  to  fit  the  effects;  and 
then  the  explanation  of  the  effects  is  merely 
drawing  ont  what  was  put  in.  The  theist's 
point  is  missed  entirely.  He  does  not  ask  how 
effects  are  produced.  He  beheves  as  well  as  the 
atheist  that  their  efficient  causes  were  adequate 
to  their  production.  He  contends  only  that  an 
arrangement  of  efficient  causes  for  the  produc- 
tion of  purpose-like  effects  points  to  mind  and 
purpose  as  the  ground  of  the  arrangement.  To 
this,  which  is  the  real  point  in  dispute,  there  is 
only  the  well-worn  answer  that  the  arrangement 
is  because  it  must  be,  and  that  there  is  no  go- 
ing behind  it.  The  argument  from  mechanism 
against  teleology  is  simply  a  long  irrelevance; 
for  after  we  have  referred  everything  to  the 
mechanism,  we  find  ourselves  compelled  to  de- 
mand some  unitary  ground  for  the  mechanism 
and  its  intelligible  interaction. 

§  32.  Throughout  this  argument  against  the- 
ism an  assumption  and  an  oversight  are  to  be 
noticed.  The  assumption  is  that  already  re- 
ferred to,  namely,  that  we  directly  know  the 
proximate  causes  of  phenomena,  and  know  them 
to  be  material  and  unintelligent.  As  we  know 
7 


98  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

the  proximate  causes,  and  find  tlieni  daily  ex- 
plaining more  and  more,  when  we  come  to  any 
new  manifestation,  instead  of  going  outside  of 
them  for  a  cause  apart,  we  need  only  enlarge 
our  notion  of  these  causes  themselves.  Be  it 
far  from  us  to  tell  what  matter  can  or  cannot 
do.  How  can  we  learn  what  it  can  do  except 
by  observing  what  it  does?  The  illusion  here 
is  double.  We  assume  (1)  that  we  know  causes 
in  immediate  perception,  and  (2)  that  their  nat- 
ure is  at  once  mysterious  and  known.  Myste- 
rious, because  we  are  going  to  determine  it  by 
studying  what  they  do ;  and  known,  because  the 
term  matter  carries  with  it  certain  implications 
which  exclude  intelligence.  Thus,  in  great  hu- 
mility and  self-renunciation,  and  with  an  air  of 
extreme  logical  rigor,  we  build  up  a  scheme  of 
thought  around  a  materialistic  core,  and  fail  to 
notice  the  transparent  trick  we  are  playing  upon 
ourselves. 

This  assumption  that  the  causes  of  phenom- 
ena are  immediately  given  we  have  seen  to  be 
false.  Causes  are  not  seen.  Their  nature  is  a 
matter  of  speculative  inference.  Again,  we  have 
seen  that  even  if  we  should  find  the  proximate 
cause  in  material  elements,  we   cannot  regard 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT.  99 

them  as  independent,  but  must  view  them  as 
dependent  for  all  their  laws  and  properties  on 
an  absolute  world  -  ground.  We  cannot  rest, 
then,  in  a  system  of  things  interacting  according 
to  mechanical  laws,  but  must  go  behind  the  sys- 
tem to  something  which  acts  through  it.  The 
mechanical  system  is  not  ultimate  and  self-suf- 
ficient. It  represents  only  the  way  in  which 
the  world-ground  acts  or  determines  things  to 
act.  If  we  ask  why  it  thus  acts,  either  we  must 
regard  it  as  a  seK- directing  intellect,  and  find 
the  reason  in  purpose,  or  we  must  affirm  some 
opaque  necessity  in  the  world-ground  itseK,  and 
say.  It  does  what  it  does  because  it  must. 

The  oversight  referred  to  is  the  failure  to  see 
that  man  and  mind  are  a  part  and  outcome  of 
the  universe.  The  speculator,  in  curious  seK- 
forgetfulness,  fixes  his  thought  on  the  physical 
system  and  ignores  himself.  He  assumes  a 
monopoly  of  intellect  in  the  universe,  and  for- 
gets that  this  rare  and  lonely  endowment  must 
still  have  its  roots  in  the  universe.  The  prob- 
lem then  arises  how  to  deduce  the  conscious 
from  the  unconscious,  the  inteUigent  from  the 
non-inteUigent,  the  purposive  from  the  non-pur- 
posive, and  freedom  from  necessity.     But  psy- 


100  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

cliology  sliows  the  hopelessness  of  such  a  task. 
This  uisight  has  led  to  the  modem  device  of  a 
double-faced  substance  which,  while  stopping 
short  of  affirming  an  independent  creative  intel- 
ligence, does  still  insist  upon  intelligence  as  one 
of  the  original  factors  of  the  world-ground.  The 
metaphysics  of  this  view  is  somewhat  open  to 
suspicion,  but  it  is  correct  in  concluding  that 
there  is  no  way  from  non-inteUigence  to  intel- 
hgence. 

But  if,  on  the  other  hand,  we  still  insist  on 
regarding  the  world-ground  as  mechanical,  then 
we  reach  the  same  conclusion  by  a  different 
road.  For  if  everything  is  to  be  mechanically 
explained,  then  human  life,  thought,  and  action 
must  be  phases  of  the  all-embracing  necessity. 
But  man  can  form  pui'poses  and  determine  him- 
seK  accordingly.  Hence  it  follows  that  in  the 
department  of  human  life,  at  least,  the  cosmic 
mechanism  does  form  purposes  and  execute 
them.  Here  design  actually  appears  as  real  and 
controlhng.  Hence,  by  the  necessity  of  including 
man,  we  are  forced  to  admit  that  the  cosmic 
mechanism  is  not  incompatible  with  purpose. 
But  if  it  act  purposely  in  the  human  realm, 
there  is  no  theoretical  objection  to  admitting 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT.  101 

that  it  acts  purposely  in  the  physical  realm  if 
the  facts  call  for  it.  The  only  escape  from  this 
conclusion  is  to  deny  our  consciousness  that 
purpose  rules  at  all  in  our  mental  hfe.  But  as 
long  as  this  is  allowed,  the  so-called  cosmic 
mechanism  must  be  viewed  as  one  which  can 
form  plans  and  determine  itself  for  their  execu- 
tion ;  that  is,  it  must  be  what  we  mean  by  mind. 
The  alternative,  as  we  shall  see,  is  to  wreck 
knowledge  in  scepticism. 

§  33.  The  second  general  objection  was,  that 
the  fact  that  the  world-ground  proceeds  as  if  it 
had  aims  does  not  prove  that  it  really  has  them. 
"We  have  in  this  objection  a  rehc  of  the  ancient 
whim  that  atheism  is  sufficiently  estabhshed  by 
disputing  theism.  Let  us  allow  that  the  fact 
that  the  world-ground  proceeds  as  if  it  had  pur- 
poses does  not  prove  that  it  really  has  them ;  it 
is  still  clear  that  this  fact  is  even  further  from 
proving  that  it  does  not  have  them. 

To  the  general  objection  a  first  reply  must  be 
that  all  objective  knowledge  is  based  on  an  "as 
if."  Not  to  refer  to  the  scruples  of  idealism 
concerning  the  objects  of  perception,  the  whole 
of  objective  science  is  based  on  a  certain  truth 


102  PHILOSOPHY  OF   THEIS5I. 

of  appearances.  We  do  not  know  that  there  is 
an  ether,  but  only  that  optical  phenomena  look 
as  if  there  were.  We  do  not  know  that  atoms 
exist,  but  only  that  material  phenomena  look  as 
if  they  did.  We  do  not  know  that  the  fire  rocks 
were  ever  molten,  but  only  that  they  look  as  if 
they  had  been.  We  do  not  know  that  the  sedi- 
mentary rocks  were  ever  deposited  from  water, 
but  only  that  they  look  so.  That  the  present 
land  was  once  under  the  sea  is  not  known,  but 
only  a  behef  resting  on  certain  appearances. 
But  none  of  these  conclusions  could  stand  a 
minute  if  the  principle  of  this  objection  were 
aUowed.  If  the  nature  of  things  can  produce 
the  appearance  of  intelligence  without  its  pres- 
ence, it  ought  to  be  able  to  mimic  igneous  and 
aqueous  action  without  the  aid  of  either  fire  or 
water.  If  the  hypothetical  necessity  of  the  sys- 
tem is  competent  to  bring  organic  matter  into 
a  hving  form,  it  could  certainly  produce  a  fossil 
imitation  at  first  hand ;  or,  better,  if  the  nature 
of  things  includes  the  production  of  living  f  onns, 
it  might  also  include  the  direct  production  of 
fossils.  We  cannot,  then,  conclude  anything 
from  fossil  remains  concerning  the  past  history 
of  our  system;  for  this  would  be  to  conclude 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT.  103 

from  an  "  as  if ;"  and  this  is  forbidden.  If  one 
should  say,  Well,  how  did  they  get  there,  any- 
how ?  the  answer  would  be  that  they  are  there 
because  they  must  be  there,  and  that  no  more 
can  be  said.  If  the  questioner  insisted,  we 
should  say  that  it  is  the  height  of  absurdity  to 
insist  that  things  can  be  explained  in  only  one 
way.  Possibihties  are  infinite ;  and  of  these  we 
can  conceive  only  one;  but  it  must  be  viewed 
as  infinitely  improbable  that  our  httle  way  of 
accounting  for  things  is  the  way  of  the  universe 
itself.  It  is,  then,  unspeakably  rash  to  infer 
anything  beyond  what  we  see.  It  is  curious 
that  this  argument  should  seem  so  profound,  so 
judicious,  so  indicative  of  mental  integrity  when 
apphed  to  theistic  problems,  and  so  unsatisfac- 
tory elsewhere.  Without  waiting  to  solve  this 
psychological  and  logical  puzzle,  we  point  out 
that  the  theistic  "as  if  "  is  as  good  as  the  scien- 
tific "  as  if."  We  cannot  reject  the  one  and  re- 
tain the  other. 

§  34.  But  we  are  not  yet  clear  of  the  "as  if." 
In  general  we  know  what  a  force  is  only  by 
observing  what  it  does.  This  is  especially  the 
case  vrith.  mind,  which  is  never  seen  in  itself,  but 


104  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

only  in  its  effects.  And  this  is  true  not  only  of 
the  divine  mind,  but  of  the  human  mind  as  well. 
A  mistake  which  flows  directly  from  our  gen- 
eral bondage  to  the  senses  leads  us  to  fancy  that 
we  see  our  neighbors'  minds;  and  it  has  gen- 
erally been  argued  against  theism  that  we  see 
mind  in  man,  but  none  in  nature.  This  claim 
the  rudiments  of  psychology  dispel.  We  know 
that  our  fellow-beings  have  minds  only  because 
they  act  as  if  they  had;  that  is,  because  their 
action  shows  order  and  purpose.  In  short,  the 
argument  for  objective  intelligence  is  the  same 
whether  for  man,  animals,  or  God.  But  no  one 
will  claim  that  the  system  of  things  shows  less 
order  and  purpose  than  human  action.  If,  then, 
we  deny  mind  in  nature  because  we  have  only 
an  "  as  if  "  to  reason  from,  we  must  deny  it  also 
in  man;  for  an  "as  if"  is  all  we  have  here. 
And  yet  we  are  wonderfully  ready  to  find  ob- 
jective intelligence,  if  only  it  is  not  referred  to 
God.  The  scantiest  marks  prove  the  presence 
of  intellect  in  man  and  brute,  or  in  human  and 
brute  action;  but  nothing  proves  intelligence 
back  of  nature.  The  ground  of  this  queer  logic 
must  be  sought  in  a  profound  study  of  the  phi- 
losophy of  prejudice  and  confusion. 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT.  105 

The  point  just  dwelt  upon  deserves  further 
notice.  The  belief  in  personal  co-existence  has 
never  been  questioned  by  the  extremest  ideal- 
ists ;  and  we  find  it  in  full  strength  in  our  earli- 
est years.  To  explain  this  fact  some  have  called 
it  an  instinct,  while  others  have  preferred  the 
more  distinguished  title  of  an  intuition.  And 
there  are  the  best  of  reasons  why  this  belief 
should  be  made  an  absolute  certainty  in  advance 
of  all  argument,  and  even  against,  it.  The  cer- 
tainty of  personal  co-existence  constitutes  the 
chief  condition  of  a  moral  activity;  and  if  it 
were  in  any  way  weakened,  the  most  hideous 
results  might  follow.  Nevertheless,  the  logical 
ground  of  the  behef  consists  entirely  in  the  fact 
that  our  neighbors  act  as  if  they  were  intelli- 
gent. And  upon  reflection  one  must  confess 
that  the  activities  from  which  we  infer  intelh- 
gence  are  not  very  strildng,  but  rather  such  as 
the  organism  might  well  execute  of  itseK.  And 
in  all  of  these  cases,  even  in  the  use  .of  speech, 
if  we  should  study  the  effect,  which  is  always 
some  form  of  physical  movement,  we  should 
doubtless  find  a  physical  explanation.  In  the 
case  of  speech  we  should  find  no  thought  in  the 
effect;  that  would  be  an  addition  of  our  own. 


106  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

We  have  simply  vibrating  air,  which  can  be 
traced  to  vibrating  membranes,  which  in  turn 
are  set  in  motion  by  currents  of  air ;  and  these 
are  forced  along  by  the  contraction  of  muscles 
producing  a  contraction  of  the  thorax.  If  we 
care  to  pursue  it  further  we  soon  lose  ourselves 
in  the  mystery  of  nervous  currents,  and  the  sub- 
ject escapes  us.  Nowhere  in  the  series  do  we 
come  in  sight  of  a  mind.  We  have,  to  be  sure, 
an  outcome  which  happens  to  be  intelligible ; 
but  the  atheist  has  instructed  us  that  intelhgi- 
bihty  in  the  outcome  is  far  enough  from  proving 
an  inteUigent  cause.  Besides,  the  outcome,  so 
far  as  we  can  trace  it,  has  a  purely  mechanical 
explanation,  and  need  be  referred  to  no  mind.  It 
would  be  a  highly  suspicious  circumstance  and 
a  grave  infraction  of  the  law  of  continuity  to 
conclude  that  a  series  which  is  physical  as  far  as 
we  can  trace  it,  becomes  something  else  where 
we  cannot  trace  it.  It  has  been  customary  to 
say  that  we  know  that  watches  are  designed, 
but  not  that  eyes  are  designed.  This  is  a  mis- 
take. In  the  case  of  a  watchmaker  we  do  not 
see  the  workman  any  more  than  in  the  case  of 
the  eye.  We  see  only  a  physical  organism  in 
complex  interaction  with  surrounding  matter. 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT.  107 

and  we  see  that  the  work  goes  on  as  if  for  an 
end;  bnt  we  see  nothing  more.  The  hving, 
thinking  workman  is  an  inference  from  an  "as 
if."  But  in  nature,  too,  the  work  goes  on  as  if 
for  an  end;  and  the  "as-ifness"  is  at  least  as 
marked  as  in  the  former  case.  If,  then,  watches 
point  to  an  unseen  workman  who  knows  what 
he  is  doing,  nature  also  points  to  an  unseen 
workman  who  knows  what  he  is  doing.  Any 
doubt  of  the  one  must  extend  to  the  other.  But 
if  we  may  he  practically  sure  of  our  neighbors' 
intelligence,  and  that  because  they  act  intelh- 
gently,  we  may  be  sure  that  the  world-groimd 
is  intelligent  for  the  same  reason. 

§  35.  But  we  must  go  a  step  fm^ther.  The 
last  paragraph  showed  that  the  same  argument 
which  discredits  mind  in  nature  thi'ows  equal 
doubt  upon  mind  in  man.  But  further  reflec- 
tion shows  that  if  there  be  no  controlling  mind 
in  nature  there  can  be  no  controlhng  mind  in 
man.  For  if  the  basal  power  is  bhnd  and  nec- 
essary, all  that  depends  upon  it  is  necessitated 
also.  In  that  case  all  unfolding  is  di'iven  from 
behind,  and  nothing  is  led  from  before.  Thought 
and  feeling  also  come  within  this  necessary  un- 


108  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THEISM. 

folding.  As  such  they  are  products,  not  causes. 
The  basal  necessity  controls  them  in  every  re- 
spect, yet  without  being  in  any  sense  determined 
by  them.  Thought  as  thought  counts  for  noth- 
ing. The  line  of  power  is  through  the  mechan- 
ical antecedents  which  condition  thought,  and 
not  through  the  thought  itself.  Hence  any 
fancy  of  self-control  we  may  have  must  be  dis- 
missed as  delusive.  Human  life  and  history, 
then,  express  no  mind  or  purpose,  but  only  the 
process  of  the  all-embracing  necessity.  Thought 
and  pu.rpose  may  have  been  there  as  subjective 
states ;  but  they  must  be  put  outside  of  the 
dynamic  sequence  of  events,  and  be  made  a  kind 
of  halo  which,  as  a  shadow,  attends  without  af- 
fecting the  cosmic  movement.  Indeed,  so  far 
from  solving,  thought  rather  complicates  the 
problem.  It  offers  no  guidance,  and  is  so  much 
more  to  be  accounted  for.  The  basal  necessity 
has  not  only  to  produce  the  physical  movements 
and  groupings  which  we  mistakenly  ascribe  to 
inteUigence,  but  it  has  also  to  produce  the  illu- 
sion of  conscious  thought  and  seK-control.  This 
extremely  difficult  and  delicate  task  is  escaped 
by  denying  the  human  mind  outright ;  and  this 
is  not  difficult,  as  we  affirm  objective  mind  only 


TDE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT.  109 

from  the  conviction  that  its  guidance  is  neces- 
sary. When  this  conviction  is  lacking,  there  is 
no  ground  for  affirming  objective  thought. 

The  claim,  then,  that  v^e  know  watches  are 
designed,  but  do  not  know  that  eyes  are  de- 
signed, appears  to  be  doubly  untenable.  First, 
we  have  the  same  proof  that  eyes  are  designed 
that  we  have  that  watches  are  designed;  and 
second,  if  eyes  are  not  designed,  then  watches 
are  not  designed.  Both  alike  result  from  neces- 
sity, and  if  any  thought  attends  the  process,  it 
does  not  affect  it. 

The  truth  is,  the  design  argument  derives  its 
force  from  the  consciousness  of  our  own  free 
effort.  We  find  that  combinations  for  ends  arise 
in  our  experience  only  as  they  first  exist  in  con- 
ception, and  are  then  made  the  norms  of  our 
action.  And  wherever  we  find  combination  ap- 
parently for  ends,  we  at  once  supi)ly  the  pre- 
existent  conception  and  the  seK-determination 
which  experience  has  shown  to  be  its  invariable 
condition.  We  have  already  seen  that  in  a  sys- 
tem of  necessity,  teleological  questions  can  never 
be  answered ;  it  is  further  plain  that  in  such  a 
system  they  could  never  logically  arise.  Such 
questions  imply  that  things  might  have  been 


110  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

otherwise,  and  hence  involve  a  denial  of  the 
complete  determination  of  all  existence.  AYhen 
such  determination  is  consciously  affirmed,  to 
ask  why  anything  is  as  it  is,  is  like  asking  why 
a  straight  line  is  the  shortest  distance  between 
two  points.  Spinoza  is  the  only  leading  neces- 
sitarian who  has  clearly  seen  the  opposition 
between  necessity  and  teleology.  Most  neces- 
sitarians have  oscillated  between  this  insight 
and  attempts  at  mechanical  explanation  which 
should  satisfy  the  teleological  craving.  This  in- 
consequence would  seem  to  show  that  the  cos- 
mic necessity  itself  is  somewhat  illogical. 

§  36.  The  third  general  objection,  that  the  dif- 
ference between  human  action  and  cosmic  action 
is  too  great  to  allow  any  conclusion  from  one  to 
the  other,  is  only  a  large  way  of  saying  nothing. 
Theism  argues  from  intelhgible  effects  to  an  in- 
telligent cause.  The  rational  and  intelligible 
work  is  referred  to  intelhgence  and  reason.  The 
suggestion  that  we  have  a  knowledge  in  objec- 
tive human  action  which  we  do  not  have  in  cos- 
mic action  is  mistaken.  The  further  demurrer 
that  while  intelligibihty  in  human  action  points 
to  intelligence,  intelligibihty  in  cosmic  action 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT.       m 

does  not  point  to  intelligence,  is  an  act  of  ca- 
price, not  of  reason.  If  it  be  further  suggested 
that  there  may  be  untold  transcendental  possi- 
bilities any  one  of  which  might  produce  the  ef- 
fects, this  is  only  to  return  to  the  unreason  of 
abandoning  reason  in  order  to  revel  in  inarticu- 
late imaginings,  none  of  which  can  be  construct- 
ed in  thought. 

As  a  result  of  all  these  considerations  we  hold 
that  the  design  argument,  when  the  unity  of  the 
world-ground  is  given,  proves  far  more  conclu- 
sively the  existence  of  mind  in  nature  than  it 
does  the  existence  of  mind  in  man.  The  two 
stand  or  fall  together. 

Argument  from  tJie  Tlieory  of  Knowledge 

§  37.  We  have  already  dwelt  upon  the  rational 
structure  of  the  universe  involved  in  the  as- 
sumed possibility  of  knowledge,  and  also  upon 
the  impossibihty  of  comprehending  this  struct- 
ure without  assuming  it  to  be  founded  in  a  ra- 
tional being  who  is  its  author.  We  propose  now 
to  consider  the  bearings  of  atheism  upon  the 
problem  of  knowledge. 

No  theory  can  be  allowed  to  commit  suicide ; 
and  when  a  theory  is  shown  to  be  suicidal  it  is 


112  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

self -condemned.  In  particular  no  theory  can 
be  allowed  wliicli  would  overturn  reason  itself. 
The  trustworthiness  of  reason  is  the  presuppo- 
sition of  all  speculation;  and  when  a  theory 
conflicts  with  this,  it  must  he  rejected.  One 
could  not  accept  it  without  admitting  that  all 
theories  are  doubtful,  this  one  among  the  rest. 
This  is  the  case  with  atheism,  and  with  all  sys- 
tems of  necessity. 

§  38.  Behef s  can  be  viewed  in  two  ways :  as 
produced  by  causes,  or  as  deduced  from  grounds. 
That  is,  behef s  may  be  merely  mental  events 
due  to  certain  psychological  antecedents,  and 
they  may  be  logical  convictions  which  rest  on 
logical  groimds.  The  distinction  of  rational 
from  irrational  behefs  is  that  the  former  have 
grounds  which  justify  them,  while  the  latter  are 
only  effects  in  us,  deposits  of  habit,  prejudice, 
tradition,  caprice,  etc.  They  have  their  sufficient 
psychological  causes,  but  have  no  justifying  ra- 
tional gi'ounds.  Now  every  system  of  necessity 
cancels  this  distinction.  It  gives  us  causes,  but 
removes  the  grounds,  of  belief.  The  proof  is  as 
follows : 

In  every  mechanical  doctrine  of  mind  there 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT.  II3 

are  no  mental  acts,  but  only  psychological  oc- 
currences. Even  the  drawing  of  a  conclusion 
is  not  an  act  of  the  mind,  but  an  occurrence  in 
the  mind.  The  conclusion  is  not  justified  by 
its  antecedent  reasons,  but  is  coerced  by  its 
psychological  antecedents.  If  we  deny  the  sub- 
stantiality of  mind,  the  conclusion  is  only  the 
mental  symbol  of  a  certain  state  of  the  physical 
mechanism.  If  we  allow  the  mind  to  be  real, 
but  subject  to  necessity,  then  the  conclusion  is 
but  the  resultant  of  the  preceding  mental  states. 
In  both  cases  we  must  replace  the  free,  seK- 
centred  activity  of  reason  by  a  physical  or  men- 
tal mechanism  which  determines  all  our  ideas 
and  their  conjunctions.  This  determination 
takes  on  in  consciousness  the  appearance  of 
reflection,  reasoning,  concluding,  etc.,  but  these 
are  only  the  illusive  symbols  in  consciousness  of 
a  mechanical  process  below  it.  Nothing,  then, 
depends  on  reason,  but  only  on  the  physical  or 
mental  states ;  and  these,  for  aU  we  know,  might 
become  anything  whatever  with  the  result  of 
changing  the  conclusion  to  any  other  whatever. 
But  this  view  is  the  extreme  of  scepticism.  Be- 
Hefs  sink  into  effects;  and  one  is  as  good  as 
another  while  it  lasts.  The  coming  or  going  of 
8 


114  PHiLosornY  of  theism. 

a  belief  does  not  depend  upon  its  rationality, 
but  only  on  tbe  relative  strength  of  the  corre- 
sponding antecedents.  But  this  strength  is  a 
fact,  not  a  truth.  When  a  given  element  dis- 
places another  in  a  chemical  compound,  it  is 
not  truer  than  that  other,  but  stronger.  So 
when  a  psychical  element  displaces  another  in  a 
mental  combination,  not  truth,  but  strength,  is 
in  question.  On  the  plane  of  cause  and  effect, 
truth  and  error  are  meaningless  distinctions. 
Proper  rationahty  is  possible  only  to  freedom ; 
and  here  truth  and  error  first  acquire  signifi- 
cance. The  rational  mind  must  not  be  con- 
trolled by  its  states,  but  must  control  them.  It 
must  be  able  to  stand  apart  from  its  ideas  and 
test  them.  It  must  be  able  to  resist  the  influ- 
ence of  habit  and  association,  and  to  undo  the 
irrational  conjunctions  of  custom.  It  must  also 
be  able  to  think  twice,  and  to  reserve  its  con- 
clusions until  the  inner  order  of  reason  has  been 
reached.  Unless  it  can  do  this,  all  beliefs  sink 
into  effects,  and  the  distinction  of  rational  and 
irrational,  of  truth  and  error,  vanishes. 

We  reach  the  same  conclusion  from  another 
standpoint.  No  system  of  necessity  has  any 
standard  of  distinction  between  truth  and  error. 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT,  115 

If  all  beliefs  are  not  true,  and  as  contradictory 
they  cannot  be,  it  follows  that  error  is  a  fact. 
But  how  can  error  be  admitted  without  cancel- 
hng  truth  ?  On  the  one  hand,  we  must  admit 
that  oiu"  faculties  are  made  for  truth,  and  that 
we  cannot  by  volition  change  truth.  On  the 
other,  we  cannot  allow  that  we  are  shut  up  by 
necessity  to  error,  as  then  our  faculties  would 
be  essentially  untrustworthy.  This  difficulty 
can  be  resolved  only  in  the  notion  of  freedom. 
If  we  have  faculties  which  are  truthful,  but 
which  may  be  carelessly  used  or  wiKully  mis- 
used, we  can  explain  error  without  compro- 
mising truth ;  but  not  otherwise.  If  truth  and 
error  be  ahke  necessary,  there  is  no  standard  of 
truth  left.  If  we  make  the  majority  the  stand- 
ard, what  shall  assure  us  that  the  majority  is 
right?  And  who  knows  that  the  majority  wiU 
always  hold  the  same  views'?  Opinions  have 
changed  in  the  past,  why  not  in  the  future. 
There  is  no  rational  standard  left,  and  no  power 
.to  use  it  if  there  were.  We  cannot  determine 
our  thoughts;  they  come  and  go  as  the  inde- 
pendent necessity  determines.  If  there  were  any 
reason  left,  the  only  conclusion  it  could  draw 
would  be  that  knowledge  is  utterly  impossible. 


IIQ  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

and  that  its  place  must  be  swallowed  up  by  an 
overwhelming  scepticism. 

The  bearing  of  this  upon  theism  is  plain. 
There  can  be  no  rationality,  and  hence  no  knowl- 
edge, upon  any  system  of  necessity.  Atheism 
is  such  a  system,  and  hence  is  suicidal.  It  must 
flout  consciousness,  discredit  reason,  and  end  by 
dragging  the  whole  structure  of  thought  and 
life  down  into  hopeless  ruin.  Rationahty  de- 
mands freedom  in  the  finite  knower ;  and  this, 
in  turn,  is  incompatible  with  necessity  in  the 
world-ground.  This  freedom  does  not,  indeed, 
imply  the  power  on  the  part  of  the  mind  to 
coerce  its  conclusions,  but  only  to  rule  itself 
according  to  preconceived  standards.  Pure  ar- 
bitrariness and  pure  necessity  are  alike  incom- 
patible with  reason.  There  must  be  a  law  of 
reason  in  the  mind  with  which  vohtion  cannot 
tamper;  and  there  must  also  be  the  power  to 
determine  ourselves  accordingly.  Neither  can 
dispense  with  the  other.  The  law  of  reason  in 
us  does  not  compel  obedience,  else  error  would 
be  impossible.  Rationality  is  reached  only  as 
the  mind  accepts  the  law  and  determines  itself 
accordmgly. 

We  conclude,  then,  from  the  total  argument 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT.  117 

that  if  the  trustworthiness  of  reason  is  to  be 
maintained,  it  can  be  only  on  a  tlieistic  basis ; 
and  since  this  trustworthiness  is  the  presuppo- 
sition of  all  science  and  philosophy,  we  must 
say  that  God,  as  free  and  intelligent,  is  the  pos- 
tulate of  both  science  and  philosophy.  If  these 
are  possible,  it  can  be  only  on  a  theistic  basis. 

§  39.  A  not  entirely  irrelevant  aside  may  be 
allowed  on  the  two  factors  of  freedom  and  ne- 
cessity. Complete  determination  is  necessity, 
and  overturns  reason.  Complete  iudetermina- 
tion,  if  possible,  would  be  pure  chance,  and 
would  equally  overturn  reason.  Freedom,  there- 
fore, has  to  assume  a  certain  element  of  uni- 
formity in  order  to  acquire  any  value  or  mean- 
ing; and  necessity  has  to  assume  a  factor  of 
freedom.  Within  the  human  mind,  the  element 
of  uniformity  is  found  in  the  mental  nature  and 
laws  of  thought  and  judgment ;  and  the  element 
of  freedom  hes  in  our  power  to  rule  ourselves 
in  accordance  with  those  laws.  To  deny  either 
element  is  fatal.  In  the  cosmos  these  two  fac- 
tors can  be  adjusted  to  the  demands  of  thought 
only  in  the  notion  of  a  rational  work  depending 
upon  a  free  intelhgence.     The  work  is  deter- 


lis  PHILOSOPHY   OF  THEISM. 

mined  throughout  accordmg  to  principles  of 
reason,  and  thus  admits  of  being  rationally  con- 
strued. But  back  of  the  work  is  the  free  work- 
er as  its  ground  and  cause.  Mental  imsteadiness 
is  common  at  this  pohit.  The  understanding 
can  grasp  only  the  determined,  and  hence  it  is 
tempted  to  posit  everything  as  absolutely  deter- 
mined. This  lust  of  understanding  must  be 
overcome  by  the  insight  that  freedom  is  a  con- 
dition of  the  understanding  itself,  and  that  in  a 
system  of  pure  necessity  nothing  whatever  can 
be  understood. 

§  40.  Thus  far  we  have  sous^ht  to  show  that 
the  facts  of  human  intelhgence  and  of  cosmic 
law  and  order  demand  intelligence  in  the  world- 
ground  as  their  only  sufficient  explanation. 
This  line  of  argument  may  be  brought  to  a  close 
by  assuming  the  theistic  and  atheistic  hypoth- 
eses respectively,  and  inquiring  how  the  facts 
illustrate  and  support  them.  This  is  a  recog- 
nized form  of  logical  procedure  in  deahng  with 
hypotheses.  We  may  either  study  the  facts  and 
deduce  the  hypothesis,  or  we  may  form  the  hy- 
pothesis and  test  it  by  the  facts.  In  the  former 
case  all  facts  are  ruled  out  which  do  not  dis- 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT.  119 

tinctly  demand  the  hypothesis;  in  the  latter 
case  all  the  facts  are  included  which  do  not  pos- 
itively oppose  the  hypothesis.  The  best  result 
is  reached  by  combining  the  two.  By  the  first 
method  the  hypothesis  acquires  a  positive  sup- 
port, and  by  the  second  it  may  be  greatly  ex- 
tended. 

Let  us  suppose,  then,  that  the  universe  is 
founded  in  intelligence.  We  find  the  facts 
agreeing  thereto.  There  is  a  rational  work,  ac- 
cording to  rational  methods,  for  intelligible  ends. 
To  be  sure  our  knowledge  is  limited,  but,  so  far 
as  we  can  understand,  we  find  the  marks  of 
transcendent  wisdom.  In  such  a  case  it  is  not 
hard  to  beheve  that  a  larger  knowledge  would 
make  this  more  and  more  apparent ;  just  as  we 
believe  that  a  deeper  insight  would  reveal  the 
reign  of  law  in  realms  apparently  lawless. 

Let  us  next  make  the  opposite  assumption 
that  the  universe  is  founded  in  non-intelh- 
gence.  Now  nothing  is  what  we  should  expect. 
We  find  an  irrational  power  doing  a  rational 
work.  An  unconscious  power  produces  con- 
sciousness. Non  -  intelligence  produces  intelli- 
gence. Necessity  produces  freedom.  The  non- 
purposive  works  apparently  for  purpose.     The 


120  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISIT. 

unexpected  meets  us  at  every  turn.  The  facts 
appear  in  irreconcilable  and  growing  hostility 
to  the  hypothesis. 

There  is  no  need  to  pursue  these  considera- 
tions. It  seems  plain  (1)  that  the  belief  in  a 
free  and  intelhgent  ground  of  things  is  as  well 
founded  as  any  objective  belief  whatever,  and 
(2)  that  this  belief  is  one  which  enters  so  inti- 
mately into  our  mental  life  that  philosophy  and 
science,  and  even  rationality  itseK  stand  or  fall 
with  it.  On  all  these  accounts  we  hold  that  the 
universe  is  founded  in  intelligence.  The  concep- 
tion of  necessary  mechanical  agency  as  first  and 
fundamental  leads  to  no  true  insight,  and  ends 
in  total  mental  collapse.  SeK-directing  rational 
agency  is  the  only  principle  that  gives  any 
light,  or  that  can  be  made  basal  without  imme- 
diate seK-stultification.  Atheism  and  necessity 
should  be  declared  mental  outlaws,  and  a  per- 
petual rational  injunction  should  be  placed  upon 
their  appearance  in  the  intellectual  world.  The 
dreary  farce  of  appealing  to  reason  in  support 
of  principles  which  destroy  reason  ought  some- 
time to  come  to  an  end.  If  one  should  deny 
reason,  and  forever  after  held  his  peace,  his  posi- 
tion would  be  consistent ;  but  whoever  will  in- 


TEE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  INTELLIGENT.  121 

sist  on  appealing  to  reason  should  in  self-respect 
and  good  faith  debar  himself  from  all  theories 
which  deny  it.  Failure  to  do  so  is  a  procedure 
on  the  level  of  a  solipsist  who,  while  pretending 
to  doubt  his  neighbor's  existence,  should  never- 
theless apply  to  him  for  arguments  to  prove 
that  existence.  Many  bright  and  acute  things 
might  be  said,  but  the  farce  would  be  apparent. 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE  WOKLD-GEOUND  AS  PEESONAL. 

§  41.  The  direct  argument  for  the  mtelhgence 
of  the  world-ground  is  conchisive;  and  unless 
counter-argument  can  be  found  the  conclusion 
must  be  allowed  to  stand.  But  there  is  a  very 
general  agreement  among  speculators  that  such 
argument  exists,  and  of  such  force  withal  as 
greatly  to  weaken,  if  not  to  overthrow,  the  the- 
istic  conclusion.  In  particular  the  objection  is 
made  that  personahty,  and  hence  intelligence, 
cannot  be  attributed  to  an  absolute  and  infinite 
being,  as  these  notions  are  distinctly  incompati- 
ble. Wliile,  then,  we  are  shut  up  on  the  one 
side  to  the  belief  in  an  intelligent,  and  hence 
personal,  world-ground,  we  are  shut  out  on  the 
other  by  the  contradictory  character  of  the  con- 
ception. This  might  be  called  the  antinomy  of 
the  theistic  argument. 


-to' 


§  42.  Before  proceeding  to  the  argument  an 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  PERSONAL.  123 

attempt  at  mediation  must  be  noticed.  Many 
have  held  to  the  intelligence  and  rationahty  of 
the  world-ground  who  yet  have  denied  its  per- 
sonahty.  This  view  has  found  expression  in 
many  poetical,  or  rather  imaginative,  utterances 
of  pantheism.  These  have  some  attraction  for 
the  fancy,  but  most  of  them  offer  nothing  to  the 
intellect.  Along  with  an  astonishing  fecundity 
of  jjhrases  there  has  been  a  still  more  astonish- 
ing barrenness  of  thought. 

Some  have  proposed  to  conceive  the  world- 
ground  as  a  double-faced  substance ;  on  the  one 
side  extension  and  form,  and  on  the  other  side 
life  and  reason.  These  two  sides  constitute  the 
reality  of  the  outer  and  inner  worlds  respective- 
ly. This  conception  finds  expression  in  Spinoza, 
and  in  many  modem  monistic  systems.  It  is 
based  upon  the  antiquated  notion  of  substance 
as  extended  stuff,  and  upon  the  fictitious  ab- 
straction of  thought.  No  one  has  ever  succeed- 
ed in  forming  any  conception  of  what  a  double- 
faced  substance  might  mean.  The  imagination, 
indeed,  masters  the  problem  at  once.  A  thing 
is  conceived  with  two  sides,  and  one  side  is 
called  thought ;  but  this  performance  is  not 
finally  satisfactory.     Again  the  relation  of  the 


124  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

two  faces,  the  physical  and  the  mental,  is  a 
problem  which  has  not  received  its  solution.  If 
the  two  go  along  in  complete  independence, 
there  is  nothing  in  the  physical  world  on  the 
one  hand  to  suggest  thought ;  and  there  is  noth- 
ing in  thought  on  the  other  hand  to  suggest 
the  physical  world.  An  outright  denial  of  the 
latter  would  he  the  immediate  result.  In  short, 
this  doctrine  must  retreat  into  the  affirmation 
of  a  transcendental  something  above  thought 
and  extension ;  and  this  is  only  the  well-known 
phrase  to  which  there  is  no  corresponding 
thought. 

Insight  into  the  emptiness  of  the  doctrine  of 
a  transcendental  X,  and  into  the  impossibihty 
of  founding  the  system  in  simple  material  exist- 
ence, has  led  many  to  give  another  form  to  their 
non-theistic  views.  The  world-ground  has  been 
called  i)ure  will,  unconscious  intelligence,  imper- 
sonal reason,  impersonal  spirit,  universal  life, 
etc.  But  these  too  are  empty  phrases,  obtained 
by  unlawful  abstraction.  For  Schopenhauer 
the  world-ground  is  pure  will  without  intellect 
or  personality.  But  pure  will  is  nothing.  "Will 
itseK,  except  as  a  function  of  a  conscious  and 
intelhgent  spirit,  has  no  meaning.     When  the 


TUE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  PERSONAL.  125 

conscious  perception  of  ends  and  the  conscious 
determination  of  self  according  to  those  ends 
are  dropped,  there  is  nothing  remaining  that  de- 
serves to  be  called  will.  We  may  befog  our- 
selves with  words,  but  the  conception  of  a  bhnd 
and  necessary  force  is  all  that  remains. 

Unconscious  intelligence  is  an  oft-recurring 
notion  in  speculation.  The  anima  mimdi  of  the 
Platonic  physics  and  the  plastic  principle  of 
Cudworth  are  examples.  This  conception  has 
often  found  a  place  in  theistic  systems  from  a 
desire,  first,  to  recognize  something  higher  than 
corpuscular  mechanics  in  the  world  of  life,  and, 
second,  to  free  God  from  the  onerous  duty  of  ad- 
ministering the  details  of  the  universe.  Hart- 
mann  has  extended  this  notion  to  the  world- 
ground  itself.  Against  atheism  he  affirms  its 
intelligence ;  against  theism  he  maintains  its 
unconsciousness.  But  in  the  phrase,  unconscious 
intelligence,  the  adjective  devours  the  noun  in 
its  attempt  to  agree  with  it,  and  the  noun  agrees 
so  ill  with  the  adjective  as  to  destroy  it  alto- 
gether. Only  one  clear  thought  can  be  joined 
to  this  phrase,  namely,  that  of  bhnd  forces, 
which  are  not  intelligent  at  all,  but  which  nev- 
ertheless work  to  produce  intelhgible  results. 


126  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

The  same  is  true  of  the  phrase,  impersonal  rea- 
son. Reason  itseK  is  a  pure  abstraction  which 
is  reahzed  only  in  conscious  spirits ;  and  when 
we  abstract  from  these  all  that  constitutes  them 
conscious  persons  there  is  nothing  intelligible 
left.  By  impersonal  reason  also  we  could  only 
mean  a  blind  force  which  is  not  reason,  but 
which  is  adjusted  to  the  production  of  rational 
results.  In  this  sense  any  machine  has  imper- 
sonal reason. 

Instinct  is  the  standing  illustration  of  uncon- 
scious intelligence  and  impersonal  reason;  but 
it  fails  to  illustrate.  For  if  instinctive  acts  are 
not  performed  with  purpose  and  consciousness, 
they  are  not  outcomes  of  intelligence  at  all,  but 
of  a  mechanical  necessity  which  mimics  intelli- 
gence. This  necessity  may  he  in  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  agent,  or  in  its  physical  structure,  or 
in  the  relations  of  both  to  surroundings ;  but  in 
any  case  there  is  no  intelligence  in  play,  unless 
it  be  the  intelhgence  of  the  Creator  upon  which 
the  necessity  itself  depends.  To  a  mind  which 
has  not  developed  enough  to  see  that  all  think- 
ing must  be  in  inteUigible  terms,  this  must  seem 
horribly  dogmatic.  Who  can  tell  what  the  aw- 
ful Possible  may  contain  ?    Who,  indeed  ?    But 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  PERSONAL.  127 

all  who  are  developed  far  enough  to  see  that 
thought  is  impossible  without  meanings,  know 
that  our  affair  is  not  with  the  awful  Possible, 
but  with  the  much  humbler  problem  of  finding 
that  conception  of  the  world-ground  which  will 
make  the  universe  most  intelhgible  to  us.  And 
for  this  sane  state  of  mind,  intelligence  and  rea- 
son are  such  only  as  they  are  guided  by  ends ; 
and  a  guidance  by  ends  means  nothing  except 
as  those  ends  are  present  in  consciousness  as 
ideal  aims.  Wlien  this  is  not  the  case  we  have 
neither  reason  nor  intelligence,  but  only  neces- 
sary agency  which  may  mimic  rational  activity. 
The  meaning  of  the  previous  doctrines  may 
be  summed  up  in  the  notion  of  an  impersonal 
spirit,  which  is  the  ground  of  all  existence,  and 
which  comes  to  consciousness  only  in  finite 
spirits.  But  this,  too,  is  more  easily  said  than 
understood.  In  fact  it  is  simply  atheism  under 
another  name.  What  the  atheist  calls  persistent 
force  or  the  fundamental  reahty,  is  here  called 
impersonal  spirit;  but  the  meaning  is  in  both 
cases  the  same.  Both  alike  understand  by  the 
terms  that  blind  and  necessary  reahty  which 
underlies  all  phenomena,  and  which,  in  its  nec- 
essary on-going,  brings  to  life  and  death.     But 


128  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

as  the  new  phrase  implies  the  old  thing  we  need 
not  consider  it  further.  We  conclude  that  if 
the  world-ground  be  intelligent  and  rational,  it 
must  also  be  conscious  and  personal. 

§  43.  The  world-ground  must  be  absolute  and 
infinite,  and  these  attributes  are  incompatible 
with  consciousness  and  personality.  In  consid- 
ering this  objection  we  first  remark  that  person- 
ahty  is  not  to  be  confounded  with  corporeahty, 
or  with  form  of  any  sort.  This  confusion  un- 
derlies the  traditional  criticism,  dating  back  to 
Xenophanes,  that  speculating  cattle  would  infer 
a  God  like  themselves.  Oxen,  buffaloes,  and 
even  watches  have  been  used  to  illustrate  this 
profound  objection.  But  if  a  speculative  watch 
should  conclude,  not  to  springs,  levers,  and  es- 
capements, but  to  intelligence  in  its  maker,  it 
would  not  seem  to  be  very  far  astray.  By  per- 
sonahty,  then,  we  mean  only  self-knowledge  and 
seK-control.  Where  these  are  present  we  have 
personal  being ;  where  they  are  absent  the  being 
is  impersonal.  Now  that  the  ability  to  know 
itself  and  what  it  is  doing  should  be  denied  to 
the  ground  and  source  of  all  power  and  knowl- 
edge, is  a  denial  so  amazing  as  to  requhe  the 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  PERSONAL.  129 

best  reasons  to  support  it.  It  is  really  one  of 
the  most  extraordinary  inversions  in  specula- 
tion, and  a  striking  example  of  the  havoc  which 
can  be  wrought  by  using  words  without  attend- 
ing to  their  meaning. 

And  first  it  is  said  that  all  consciousness  in- 
volves the  distinction  of  subject  and  object,  and 
hence  is  impossible  to  an  isolated  and  single 
being.  It  is,  then,  incompatible  with  both  the 
infinity  of  the  world-ground  and  with  its  single- 
ness. As  infinite,  it  can  have  nothing  beyond 
itseK,  and  as  only  it  can  have  no  object.  But 
this  claim  mistakes  a  mental  form  for  an  onto- 
logical  distinction.  The  object  in  all  conscious- 
ness is  always  only  om'  presentations,  and  not 
something  ontologically  diverse  from  the  mind 
itself.  These  presentations  may  stand  for  things, 
but  consciousness  extends  only  to  the  presenta- 
tions. In  self-consciousness  this  is  manifestly 
the  case.  Here  consciousness  is  a  consciousness 
of  our  states,  thoughts,  etc.,  as  our  own.  The 
Infinite,  then,  need  not  have  something  other 
than  himself  as  his  object,  but  may  find  the  ob- 
ject in  his  own  acti^-ities,  cosmic  or  otherwise. 

This  fact  contains  the  answer  to  another  fonn 
of  objection.  The  ego  and  non-ego  are  said  to 
9 


130  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

be  two  correlative  notions,  neither  of  wMch  has 
any  meaning  apart  from  the  other.  Hence  the 
conception  of  the  self  can  arise  only  as  the 
conception  of  the  not-self  arises  with  it;  and 
hence,  again,  self-consciousness  is  possible  only 
for  finite  beings  who  are  limited  by  a  not-self. 

It  is  only  with  effort  that  one  can  beheve  the 
first  part  of  this  claim  to  be  seriously  made. 
Two  notions  whose  meaning  consists  in  deny- 
ing each  other  are  pure  negations  without  any 
positive  content.  Thus,  A  is  not-^,  and  B  is 
not- J. ;  and  hence  A  is  not-not-A,  and  B  is  not- 
not-B.  We  end  where  we  began.  To  make 
any  sense  one  of  the  notions  must  have  a  posi- 
tive meaning  independent  of  the  other.  And  in 
the  case  of  ego  and  the  non-ego,  it  is  plain 
which  is  the  positive  notion.  The  ego  is  the 
immediately  experienced  self,  and  the  non-ego 
is  originally  only  the  sum  of  mental  presenta- 
tions, or  that  which  the  ego  sets  over  against 
itseK  in  consciousness  as  its  object.  Seconda- 
rily, the  non-ego  comes  to  mean  whatever  is 
excluded  from  the  conscious  self.  Each  person 
sets  all  his  objects,  whether  persons  or  things, 
over  against  himself,  and  they  constitute  the 
non-ego  for  him.    By  overlooking  this  ambigu- 


THE  WORLD-GROUXD  AS  PERSONAL.  131 

ity,  some  speculators  have  proved  a  ricli  variety 
of  truths.  Idealism  has  been  confounded  by 
pointing  out  that  consciousness  demands  an 
object  as  well  as  a  subject,  and  the  reahty  of 
matter  has  been  sohdly  established.  Conscious- 
ness demands  a  non-ego ;  and  is  not  matter  pre- 
eminently a  non-ego ! 

The  further  claim  that  the  conception  of  self 
can  arise  only  as  the  conception  of  a  not-self 
accompanies  it,  is  but  a  repetition  of  the  pre- 
ceding objection  concerning  the  ego  and  non- 
ego.  Consciousness  does  involve  the  co-exist- 
ence of  these  conceptions  as  the  form  under 
which  consciousness  arises,  but  not  as  things 
ontologically  diverse.  The  distinction  of  sub- 
ject and  object,  on  which  consciousness  de- 
pends, is  only  a  mental  function,  and  not  an 
ontological  distinction.  The  possibiUty  of  per- 
sonahty  or  self -consciousness  in  no  way  depends 
on  the  existence  of  a  substantial  not-self,  but 
only  on  the  ability  of  the  subject  to  grasp  its 
states,  thoughts,  etc.,  as  its  own.  It  is,  indeed, 
true  that  our  consciousness  begins,  and  that  it 
is  conditioned  by  the  activity  of  something  not 
ourselves;  but  it  does  not  he  in  the  notion  of 
consciousness  that  it  must  begin,  or  that  it  must 


132  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

be  aroused  from  without.  An  eternal,  unbegun 
seK  is  as  possible  as  an  eternal,  unbegun  not- 
self.  Eternal  consciousness  is  no  more  difficult 
than  eternal  unconsciousness ;  and  withal,  if 
unconsciousness  had  ever  been  absolute  there  is 
no  way  of  reaching  consciousness.  In  addition, 
all  the  sceptical  difficulties  which  attend  that 
view  crowd  upon  us.  Hence  to  the  question. 
What  is  the  object  of  the  Infinite's  conscious- 
ness? the  answer  is,  The  Infinite  himself,  his 
thoughts,  states,  etc.  To  the  question,  When 
did  this  consciousness  begin?  the  answer  is. 
Never.  To  the  question,  On  what  does  this 
consciousness  depend?  the  answer  is.  On  the 
Infinite's  own  power  to  know. 

§  44.  On  all  these  accounts  we  regard  the  ob- 
jections to  the  personaUty  of  the  world-ground 
as  resting  on  a  very  superficial  psychology.  So 
far  as  they  are  not  verbal,  they  arise  from  taking 
the  limitations  of  human  consciousness  as  es- 
sential to  consciousness  in  general.  In  fact  we 
must  reverse  the  common  speculative  dogma  on 
this  point,  and  declare  that  proper  personahty 
is  possible  only  to  the  Absolute.  The  very  ob- 
jections urged  against  the  personahty  of  the 


THE  WORLD-GROUND 'AS  PERSOXAL.  I33 

Absolute  show  the  incompleteness  of  human 
personality.  Thus  it  is  said,  truly  enough,  that 
we  are  conditioned  by  something  not  ourselves. 
The  outer  world  is  an  important  factor  in  our 
mental  life.  It  controls  us  far  more  than  we  do 
it.  But  this  is  a  hmitation  of  our  personahty 
rather  than  its  source.  Our  personality  would 
be  heightened  rather  than  diminished,  if  we 
were  self -determinant  in  this  respect.  Again,  in 
our  inner  hfe  we  find  similar  hmitations.  We 
cannot  always  control  our  ideas.  They  often 
seem  to  be  occurrences  in  us  rather  than  our 
own  doing.  The  past  vanishes  beyond  recall; 
and  often  in  the  present  we  are  more  passive 
than  active.  But  these,  also,  are  limitations  of 
our  personahty.  We  should  be  much  more 
truly  persons  if  we  were  absolutely  determinant 
of  all  our  states.  But  we  have  seen  that  all 
finite  things  have  the  ground  of  their  existence, 
not  in  themselves,  but  in  the  Infinite,  and  that 
they  owe  their  peculiar  nature  to  their  mutual 
relations  and  to  the  plan  of  the  whole.  Hence, 
in  the  finite  consciousness,  there  will  always  be 
a  foreign  element,  an  external  compulsion,  a 
passivity  as  weU  as  activity,  a  dependence  on 
something  not  ourselves,  and  a  corresponding 


134  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

subjection.  Hence  in  us  personality  will  always 
be  incomplete.  The  absolute  knowledge  and 
self-possession  which  are  necessary  to  perfect 
personality  can  be  found  only  in  the  absolute 
and  infinite  being  upon  whom  all  things  depend. 
In  his  pure  seK-determination  and  perfect  self- 
possession  only  do  we  find  the  conditions  of 
complete  personahty ;  and  of  this  our  finite  per- 
sonality can  never  be  more  than  the  feeblest 
and  faintest  image. 

§  45.  In  leaving  this  subject  a  word  must  be 
said  about  a  series  of  objections  from  the  ag- 
nostics. These  hold  that  the  world-ground  is 
no  object  of  thought  whatever,  and  hence  can- 
not be  thought  of  as  personal  or  impersonal,  as 
intelhgent  or  non  -  intelligent.  The  reason  is 
found  in  the  mutual  contradictions  alleged  to 
exist  between  the  necessary  attributes  of  the 
fundamental  being.  Thus  we  must  regard  it  as 
self  -  centred,  and  hence  absolute ;  as  unlimited 
by  anything  beyond  itseK,  and  hence  infinite, 
and  as  world-ground,  that  is,  as  first  cause.  But 
while  we  are  shut  up  by  thought  to  these  ad- 
missions, we  are  equally  shut  out  from  them 
by  their  mutual  contradiction.     Thus  the  first 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  PERSONAL.  135 

cause,  as  such,  exists  only  in  relation  to  the  ef- 
fect. If  it  had  no  effect,  it  would  not  be  cause. 
Hence  the  first  cause  is  necessarily  related  to 
its  effect ;  and  hence  it  cannot  be  absolute ;  for 
the  absolute  exists  out  of  all  relations.  The 
absolute  cannot  be  a  cause,  and  a  cause  cannot 
be  absolute.  Nor  can  we  help  ourselves  by  the 
idea  of  time,  as  if  the  world-ground  first  existed 
as  absolute,  and  then  became  a  cause ;  for  the 
other  notion  of  the  infinite  bars  our  way.  That 
which  passes  into  new  modes  of  existence  either 
surpasses  or  sinks  below  itself,  and  in  either 
case  cannot  be  infinite,  for  the  infinite  must  al- 
ways comprise  all  possible  modes  of  existence. 
Hence  we  have  in  these  necessary  attributes  a 
disheartening,  and  even  sickening,  contradiction 
which  shatters  all  our  pretended  knowledge. 

If  this  argument  had  not  passed  for  impor- 
tant, we  should  refer  to  it  only  with  expressions 
of  apology.  In  itself  it  is  mainly  a  play  on 
words.  Etymologically  the  above  meanings  may 
be  tortured  out  of  the  terms.  The  infinite  may 
be  taken  as  the  quantitative  all;  the  absolute 
may  be  taken  as  the  unrelated;  and  then  the 
conclusions  follow.  The  infinite  as  quantitative 
aU  must,  of  course,  be  all-embracing.     Outside 


136  PniLOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

of  the  all  there  can  be  nothing ;  and  if  the  all 
must  comprehend  all  possible  modes  of  exist- 
ence at  all  times,  it  cannot  change;  and  the 
universe  is  brought  to  the  rigid  monotony  of 
the  Eleatics.  It  is  equally  easy  to  show  that 
the  absolute  cannot  be  related  when  we  define 
it  as  the  unrelated.  But  all  this  wisdom  dis- 
appears when  we  remember  the  philosophical 
meaning  of  the  tenns.  Both  absolute  and  in- 
finite mean  only  the  independent  ground  of 
things.  Relative  existence  is  that  which  ex- 
ists only  in  relation  to  other  things.  Both  the 
ground  and  form  of  its  existence  are  bound  up 
in  its  relations.  Such  relations  are  restrictions, 
and  imply  dependence.  But  absoluteness  denies 
this  restriction  and  dependence.  The  absolute 
may  exist  in  relations,  provided  those  relations 
are  freely  posited  by  itself,  and  are  not  forced 
upon  it  from  without.  The  infinite,  again,  is  not 
the  quantitative  all.  This  "  all "  is  purely  a  men- 
tal product  which  represents  nothing  apart  from 
our  thought.  The  world -ground  is  called  infi- 
nite, because  it  is  beheved  to  be  the  independent 
source  of  the  finite  and  its  limitations,  yet  with- 
out being  bound  by  them  except  in  the  sense  of 
logical  consistency.     But  in  this  sense  the  no- 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  PERSONAL.  137 

tions  of  the  absolute  and  infinite  are  so  far  from 
incompatible  that  they  mutually  imply  each 
other,  or  are  but  different  aspects  of  the  same 
thing.  The  infinite  would  not  be  infinite  if  it 
were  not  absolute ;  and  neither  infinite  nor  ab- 
solute would  be  anything  if  it  were  not  a  cause. 
A  final  affectation  must  be  mentioned.  The 
claim  has  been  set  up  that  to  attribute  design 
of  any  kind  to  God  is  a  hmitation.  Tliis  claim 
rests  upon  the  fact  that  we  often  use  design  as 
equivalent  to  contrivance,  and  contrivance,  in 
turn,  has  various  meanmgs.  It  may  be  the 
equivalent  of  design,  or  the  adaptation  of  parts ; 
and  it  may  be  a  makeshift  for  avoiding  difiicul- 
ties,  or  a  combination  of  things  or  processes  for 
doing  indirectly  what  our  power  or  skill  could 
not  directly  accompHsh.  Here,  then,  is  a  fine 
opportunity  for  critical  acumen,  and  it  has  not 
been  overlooked.  We  have  but  to  take  contri- 
vance as  implying  puzzle-headedness  or  inade- 
quacy to  see  that  it  cannot  be  affirmed  of  God. 
When,  in  addition,  we  discreetly  overlook  the 
fact  that  in  theism  it  means  only  the  rational 
connection  of  many  factors  with  reference  to  an 
ideal  end,  unless  the  audience  be  too  critical,  we 
may  at  once  proclaim  the  incompatibility  of  de- 


138  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

sign  with  tlie  absoluteness  of  the  world-ground. 
Such  an  antinomy  could  not  fail  to  prove  a  ver- 
itable metaphysical  Medusa  to  theistic  faith. 

The  history  of  philosophy  abounds  in  gro- 
tesque and  whimsical  misunderstandings;  but 
of  these  none  are  more  extraordinary  than  the 
artificial  and  gratuitous  difficulties  which  have 
been  raised  over  the  question  of  the  divine  per- 
sonahty. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE    METAPHYSICAL    ATTEIBUTES    OP    THE    WOELD- 

GKOUND. 

§  46.  OuE  speculative  conception  of  the  world- 
ground  begins  to  approximate  to  the  religious 
conception  of  God.  A  great  variety  of  influ- 
ences, instinctive,  speculative,  and  ethical,  have 
led  the  human  mind  to  build  up  the  conception 
of  a  personal  and  intelligent  God ;  and  this  view, 
when  criticised,  not  only  proves  able  to  main- 
tain itseK,  but  also  appears  as  a  demand  and 
imphcation  of  reason  itseK.  But  the  race  has 
not  contented  itself  with  this  bare  affirmation, 
but,  by  an  intellectual  labor  extending  over  cen- 
turies, it  has  sought  to  determine  more  closely 
the  content  of  its  theistic  thought.  These  de- 
terminations fall  into  two  classes,  metaphysical 
and  ethical.  The  former  aim  to  tell  what  God 
is  by  virtue  of  his  position  as  first  cause,  and 
the  second  relate  to  his  character.  Or  the  for- 
mer refer  to  the  divine  nature,  the  latter  to  the 


140  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

divine  will.  Beyond  this  distinction,  the  various 
classifications  of  the  divine  attributes  in  which 
dogmatic  theology  abounds  have  no  significance 
for  either  speculative  or  religious  thought.  We 
pass  now  to  consider  the  leading  metaphysical 
attributes  as  belonging  to  the  world -gi'ound. 
The  result  will  be  to  show  a  still  closer  approx- 
imation of  rehgious  and  speculative  thought. 
We  begin  also  to  use  the  terms,  God  and  world- 
ground,  as  interchangeable. 

§  47.  The  unity  of  the  world -ground  is  the 
first  of  these  metaphysical  attributes ;  and  the 
necessity  of  its  affirmation  is  found  in  a  study 
of  interaction.  But  necessary  as  it  is,  its  mean- 
ing is  not  always  clearly  gi-asped.  We  need, 
then,  to  inquire  of  metaphysics  what  is  meant 
by  the  unity  of  being  in  general. 

In  affirming  unity  of  a  thing  the  primal  aim 
is  to  deny  composition  and  di\dsibihty.  A  com- 
pound is  not  a  thing,  but  an  aggregate.  The 
reahty  is  the  component  factors.  The  thought 
of  a  compound  is  impossible  without  the  as- 
sumption of  units ;  and  if  these  are  compounds 
we  must  assume  other  units;  and  so  on  until 
we  come  to  ultimate  and  uncompounded  units. 


METAPHYSICAL  ATTRIBUTES  OF  WORLD-GROUND.         141 

These  are  the  true  realities.  Hence,  the  divisi- 
ble is  never  a  proper  thing,  but  a  sum  or  a 
crowd.  When,  then,  we  say  that  a  thing  is  a 
unit,  we  mean  first  of  all  that  it  is  not  com- 
pounded, and  does  not  admit  of  division.  Hence 
the  doctrine  of  the  unity  of  the  world-ground  is 
first  of  all  a  denial  of  composition  and  divisibility. 

Unity  has  been  taken  to  mean  simphcity,  or 
the  opposite  of  complexity  and  variety.  Her- 
bart  especially  has  identified  them,  and  has  de- 
clared that  unity  of  the  subject  is  incompatible 
with  plurahty  of  attributes.  The  same  view 
has  often  appeared  in  treating  of  the  divine 
unity.  This  has  been  conceived  as  pure  sim- 
phcity ;  and  thus  the  divine  being  has  been  re- 
duced to  a  rigid  and  lifeless  stare.  This  view 
brings  thought  to  a  standstill ;  for  the  one,  con- 
ceived as  pure  simphcity,  leads  to  nothing  and 
explains  nothing.  It  contains  no  ground  of  dif- 
ferentiation and  progress.  So,  then,  there  is  a 
very  general  agreement  that  the  unity  of  the 
world-ground  must  contain  some  provision  for 
manifoldness  and  complexity. 

The  history  of  thought  shows  a  curious  un- 
certainty at  this  point.  On  the  one  hand,  there 
has  been  a  universal  demand  for  unity  with 


142  pniLOSornY  of  theism. 

a  very  general  failure  to  reach  it.  Aiicl  on  the 
other  hand,  if  the  unity  has  been  reached,  there 
has  been  quite  as  general  an  inabihty  to  make 
any  use  of  it.  This  is  a  necessary  result  of 
thinking  only  under  mechanical  conditions.  In 
such  thinking,  when  we  begin  with  a  plurality, 
we  never  escape  it,  for  mechanical  necessity 
cannot  differentiate  itseK.  If  we  trace  the  plu- 
rality to  some  one  being,  we  are  forced  to  carry 
the  plurality  implicitly  into  the  unity,  as  there 
is  no  way  of  mechanically  deducing  plurahty 
from  unity.  But  in  that  case,  though  we  confi- 
dently talk  about  unity,  we  are  quite  unable  to 
tell  in  what  the  unity  of  such  a  being  consists. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  assume  the  unity,  we 
are  unable  to  take  one  step  towards  plurahty. 
The  all-embracing  unity  refuses  to  differentiate 
or  to  move  at  all. 

This  puzzle  can  be  solved  only  by  leaving  the 
mechanical  realm  for  that  of  free  intellect.  The 
free  and  conscious  self  is  the  only  real  unity  of 
which  we  have  any  knowledge,  and  reflection 
shows  that  it  is  the  only  thing  which  can  be  a 
true  unity.  All  other  unities  are  formal,  and 
have  only  a  mental  existence.  But  free  intelli- 
gence, by  its  originating  activity,  can  posit  plu- 


METAPHYSICAL  ATTKIBUTES  OF  WORLD-GROUND.         I43 

rality  distinct  from  its  own  unity,  and  by  its 
self- consciousness,  can  maintain  its  unity  and 
identity  over  against  the  changing  plurahty. 
Here  the  one  is  manifold  without  being  many. 
Here  unity  gives  birth  to  plurahty  without  de- 
stroying itself.  Here  the  identical  changes  and 
yet  abides.  But  this  perennial  wonder  is  possi- 
ble only  on  the  plane  of  free  and  self-conscious 
intelhgence.  For  mechanical  thinking  the  prob- 
lem admits  only  of  verbal  solutions. 

So  much  for  the  metaphysics  of  unity.  Prob- 
ably, however,  the  thought  most  generally  con- 
nected with  the  divine  unity  is  not  so  much 
that  God  is  one  as  that  God  is  only.  Hence 
the  doctrine  has  been  always  monotheism,  and 
not  henotheism.  The  historic  influences  which 
have  led  to  this  monotheistic  faith  are  manifold ; 
and  its  speculative  necessity  is  stringent.  The 
thought  of  many  gods,  each  of  which  should  live 
in  a  world  by  himself,  or  rather,  in  a  universe  of 
his  own,  is  a  pure  fancy  due  to  the  abstracting 
and  hypostasizing  tendency  of  the  mind.  If  they 
should  meet  and  interact  in  a  common  universe 
they  would  necessarily  become  finite  and  con- 
ditioned beings  in  mutual  interaction,  and  hence 
not  independent  and  self -existent.    The  discus- 


144  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

sion  of  the  unity  of  the  world-ground  has  shown 
that  all  things  which  are  bound  up  in  a  scheme 
of  mteraction  must  have  their  existence  in  some 
one  being  on  which  they  depend.  This  being 
founds  the  system,  and  all  that  is  in  the  system 
flows  from  it.  But  we  are  able  to  form  general 
notions,  and  then  to  conceive  an  indefinite  num- 
ber of  members  of  the  class.  We  do  the  same 
with  the  universe  and  the  fundamental  being. 
We  form  the  notions,  and  then  fancy  that  there 
may  be  other  universes  and  other  fundamental 
reahties.  But  plainly  such  fancies  are  mental 
fictions.  The  actual  universe,  whereby  we  mean 
the  total  system  of  the  finite,  must  be  refen^ed 
to  the  one  world-ground.  The  imaginary  sys- 
tems need  nothing  for  their  explanation  beyond 
the  somewhat  unclear  mind  that  forms  them 
and  mistakes  them  for  reahties.  If  one  should 
ask  how  we  know  that  there  may  not  be  some- 
thing entirely  independent  of  our  system  and 
totally  unrelated  to  it,  the  answer  would  be  that 
our  business  is  with  the  actual  universe,  and 
does  not  include  the  disproof  of  chimeras.  This 
only  may  be  allowed.  If  by  universe  we  mean 
the  system  of  sense-perceptions  in  an  ideahstic 
sense,  the  one  world -ground  may  maintain  a 


METAPHYSICAL  ATTRIBUTES  OF  WORLD-GROUND.         145 

series  of  such,  systems.  In  this  sense  a  number 
of  vmiverses  would  be  possible,  but  the  unity 
and  singleness  of  the  fundamental  reality  would 
still  be  necessary. 

This  fact  has  often  been  disregarded  in  spec- 
ulation. Not  a  few  have  been  pleased  to  regard 
space,  time,  and  God  as  mutually  independent 
existences,  or  rather  to  make  sjDace  and  time 
into  pre-existent  necessities  to  which  God  him- 
seK  must  submit.  How  these  independent  and 
unrelated  existences  could  be  brought  into  mu- 
tual relations  is  a  problem  left  unsolved. 

The  unity  of  the  world-ground  means,  then, 
not  only  that  it  is  uncompounded,  indivisible, 
and  without  distinction  of  parts,  but  also  that 
there  is  but  one  such  fundamental  existence. 

§  48.  A  second  attribute  is  that  of  unchange- 
ability.  This  attribute  has  often  been  verbally 
interpreted  with  the  result  of  reducing  existence 
to  a  fixed  rigidity  from  which  all  life  and  move- 
ment are  excluded.  The  Eleatics  made  being 
one  and  changeless,  and  were  then  utterly  una- 
ble to  account  for  the  world  of  plurahty  and 
change.  A  similar  mistake  often  appears  in 
speculative  theology.  It  has  sometimes  so  em- 
10 


146  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM, 

pliasized  the  uncliangeability  as  to  lose  the  hv- 
ing  personal  God  altogether. 

This  misconception  has  its  main  root  in  the 
crude  metaphysics  of  spontaneous  thought.  This 
assumes  that  substance  in  general  is  change- 
less, and  that  change  falls  among  the  activities 
and  properties.  But  a  little  reflection  shows 
that  an  absolutely  rigid  substance  cannot  ex- 
plain the  changing  activities  of  the  thing.  For 
every  change  in  the  activity  or  the  manifesta- 
tion, we  must  affirm  a  corresponding  change  in 
the  thing  itself.  Changes  among  things  must 
depend  upon  changes  in  things.  What  is  true 
of  all  agents  is  true  of  God  or  the  world-ground. 
God,  as  a  rigid  sameness  of  existence,  would 
contain  no  explanation  of  the  advancing  cosmic 
movement,  and  would  admit  of  no  change  in 
action  and  knowledge.  In  truth,  as  metaphysics 
shows,  the  changelessness  of  a  being  consists 
not  in  such  an  ontological  rigidity  or  fixed  mo- 
notony of  being,  but  rather  in  the  constancy 
and  continuity  of  the  law  which  rules  its  sev- 
eral states  and  changes.  The  unchangeability 
of  God  means  only  the  constancy  and  continu- 
ity of  the  divine  nature  which  exists  through  all 
the  divine  acts  as  their  law  and  source.     Meta- 


METAPHYSICAL  ATTRIBUTES  OF  WORLD-GROUND.         I47 

physics  further  shows  that  if  we  insist  upon 
having  some  abiding  and  identical  principle  su- 
perior to  change  and  constant  in  change,  it  can 
be  found  only  in  personality.  And  here  it  does 
not  consist  in  any  rigid  core  of  being,  but  rather 
in  the  extraordinary  power  of  seM-consciousness, 
whereby  the  being  distinguishes  itself  from  its 
states,  and  constitutes  itself  identical  and  abid- 
ing. Where  this  is  lacking,  there  may  be  a  con- 
tinuity of  process,  but  nothing  more.  The  un- 
changeability  is  purely  formal,  as  w^hen  a  given 
note  is  constantly  produced. 

But  in  truth  a  variety  of  things  are  gathered 
up  in  this  attribute.  Rehgious  thought,  as  dis- 
tinct from  theological  thought,  has  generally 
meant  something  distinct  from  the  metaphysi- 
cal formula.  One  aim  has  been  to  affirm  the 
independence  and  eternity  of  God  in  opposition 
to  the  dependence  and  brevity  of  man.  Again, 
the  predicate  has  often  been  made  to  mean  the 
ethical  constancy  of  the  divine  activity,  and  to 
exclude  all  arbitrariness  and  caprice  from  the 
divine  piu'poses.  In  this  last  sense  the  attri- 
bute passes  from  the  metaphysical  into  the  eth- 
ical realm,  and  eludes  any  metaphysical  deduc- 
tion or  justification. 


148  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

§  49.  A  third  attribute  is  that  of  omnipres- 
ence. By  crude  thought  this  is  often  under- 
stood as  implying  extension  of  the  subject. 
Space  is  supposed  to  exist  as  infinite  room, 
which  is  then  filled  out  with  a  boundless  bulk ; 
and  this  is  omnipresence.  This  view  is  specu- 
latively untenable,  and  is  incompatible  with  the 
unity  of  the  world-ground.  Nothing  that  exists 
extended  in  space  can  be  a  unit ;  for  in  every 
such  being  it  vnR  always  be  possible  to  distin- 
guish different  parts  which  are  either  actually 
separate  or  are  held  apart  and  together  only  by 
the  forces  in  them.  In  the  latter  case  the  body 
disappears  into  an  aggregate  of  different  forces, 
and  in  both  cases  its  unity  disappears.  No  more 
can  such  a  thing  be  omnipresent  in  space.  It 
can  only  be  present  in  space  part  for  part,  or 
volume  for  volume,  and  hence  there  is  no  proper 
omnipresence.  Omnipresence  is  real  only  as 
the  entire  being  is  present  at  any  and  every 
point ;  as  the  entire  mind  is  present  in  each  and 
all  its  thoughts. 

Speculatively,  then,  the  doctrine  of  omnipres- 
ence must  take  another  form,  and  one  mainly 
negative.  We  are  able  to  act  directly  upon  only 
a  few  things.     These  are  said  to  be  present  to 


METATEYSICAL  ATTRIBUTES  OF  WORLD-GROUXD.        I49 

US.  In  other  cases  we  can  act  only  thi'ough 
media.  These  are  said  to  be  absent.  If  the  in- 
teraction were  equally  direct  and  immediate  in 
all  cases  there  would  be  no  ground  for  the  dis- 
tinction of  present  and  absent.  Thus  space  ap- 
pears to  us  as  a  limitation,  although  space  is 
really  but  the  form  under  which  our  dynamic 
hmitations  appear.  Omnipresence  means  a  de- 
nial of  these  limitations.  Immediate  action 
means  presence;  immediate  action  which  ex- 
tends to  all  things  means  omnipresence.  God, 
or  the  world-ground,  therefore,  as  immanent  in 
all  things,  is  omnipresent.  If,  then,  he  wills  to 
act  upon  anything,  he  has  not  to  cross  any  dis- 
tance, long  or  short,  to  reach  it,  and  he  is  not 
compelled  to  use  media;  but  his  activity  is 
rather  immediately  and  completely  present. 
Conversely,  if  the  finite  wishes  to  act  upon  God, 
say  by  prayer,  neither  the  prayer  nor  the  person 
need  go  wandering  about  to  reach  and  find  God ; 
for  we  hve  and  have  our  being  in  him ;  and  he 
is  an  ever-present  power  in  us.  Only  in  this 
sense,  which  denies  that  space  is  a  limitation  or 
barrier  for  God,  is  the  doctrine  of  omnipresence 
tenable.  This  view  is  made  all  the  more  neces- 
sary from  the  claim  of  metaphysics  that  space 


150  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

is  no  ontological  reality,  and  lias  only  a  mental 
existence. 

§  50.  The  attribute  of  eternity  has  a  variety 
of  meanings.  The  first  and  lowest  is  that  of 
unbegun  and  endless  duration  of  existence.  If 
time  be  an  ontological  fact,  the  world -ground 
must  be  eternal  in  this  sense,  for  void  time 
could  never  have  produced  anything.  There  is, 
too,  a  certain  SBsthetic  value  in  the  thought  of 
endless  duration  which  is  not  unworthy  of  the 
infinite.  But  in  general,  rehgious  thinkers  have 
been  unmUing  to  identify  the  di\ine  eternity 
with  endless  duration,  but  have  rather  sought 
to  place  it  in  opposition  to  all  time  as  denoting 
an  existence  above  and  beyond  all  temporal  lim- 
its and  conditions.  This  is  an  attempt  to  con- 
ceive the  divine  relation  to  time  likothe  divine 
relation  to  space,  as  a  superior  and  transcen- 
dental one. 

The  common  thought  of  the  matter  is  that 
time  exists  as  a  boundless  form,  which  God  fills 
out  with  his  dui'ation,  just  as  in  the  common 
thought  he  fills  out  space  with  his  extension; 
but  this  is  metaphysically  as  untenable  in  one 
case  as  in  the  other.    Metaphysics  shows  that 


METAPHYSICAL  ATTRIBUTES  OF  WORLD-GROUND.        151 

time  itseK  is  but  the  form  of  change,  and  not 
an  independent  reahty  upon  which  change  de- 
pends and  in  which  change  occurs.  Still  this 
does  not  decide  whether  the  world -ground  is 
above  the  law  of  time;  for  the  temporal  form 
might  still  be  a  necessity  of  its  existence. 

The  shortest  way  out  is  to  call  the  world- 
ground  the  unconditioned,  and  then  to  deduce 
from  this  attribute  its  superiority  to  all  condi- 
tions, temporal  or  otherwise.  But  this  notion 
of  the  unconditioned  is  a  somewhat  vague  one, 
and  cannot  be  used  without  scrutiny.  Thought 
can  positively  affirm  an  imconditioned  being 
only  in  the  sense  of  a  being  wliich  does  not  de- 
pend on  other  beings ;  but  such  a  being  might 
still  have  profound  internal  limitations.  The 
world-ground  is,  indeed,  unconditioned  by  any- 
thing beyond  itseK ;  but  it  must  be  conditioned 
by  its  own  nature  in  any  case,  and  the  question 
arises  whether  this  conditioning  involves  tem- 
poral sequence  in  the  infinite  life  itself.  To  say 
that  it  does  would  involve  us  in  the  gravest 
speculative  difficulties.  We  should  have  to  hold 
that  the  world-gi'ound  is  subject  to  a  law  of  de- 
velopment, and  comes  only  gi'adually  to  itself, 
or,  rather,  that  there  is  some  constitutional  ne- 


152  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

cessity  in  the  world -ground  which  forbids  it 
always  to  be  in  full  possession  of  itseK.  In  fact 
we  should  have  to  hmit  to  the  extent  of  this 
necessity  that  free  and  self-centred  cause  which 
reason  demands  as  the  only  adequate  world- 
ground.  In  consequence  reason  will  always  as- 
sume that  the  world-ground  is  strictly  uncondi- 
tioned until  some  necessity  is  found  for  viewing 
it  as  conditioned.  In  this  the  mind  is  led  on  by 
its  conception  of  the  perfect,  or  by  its  need  of 
ideal  completeness.  The  result  is  not  something 
which  the  mind  can  prove  to  be  true,  but  which, 
in  default  of  disproof,  it  is  sure  to  assume. 

With  this  assumption  we  may  view  the  rela- 
tion of  the  world -ground  to  time  as  follows: 
First,  there  are  certain  features  in  our  relation 
to  time  which  cannot  be  affirmed  of  the  world- 
ground.  Thus  we  are  subject  to  slow  develop- 
ment ;  we  come  gradually  to  self-possession ;  we 
grow  old  and  pass  away.  This  we  express  by 
saying  that  we  are  subject  to  temporal  hmits 
and  conditions.  In  none  of  these  respects  can 
the  unconditioned  world -ground  be  subject  to 
time,  but  must  rather  be  non-temporal.  A  be- 
ing which  is  in  fuU  possession  of  itseK  so  that 
it  does  not  come  to  itself  successively,  but  for- 


METArnYSICAL  ATTRIBUTES  OF  WORLD-GROUND.         153 

ever  is  what  it  wills  to  be,  is  not  in  time  so  far 
as  itself  is  concerned.  Such  a  being  would  have 
a  changeless  knowledge  and  a  changeless  life. 
It  would  be  without  memory  and  expectation, 
yet  in  the  absolute  enjoyment  of  itself.  For 
such  a  being  the  present  alone  would  exist ;  its 
now  would  be  eternal,  and  its  name,  I  Am.  For 
us  the  unconditioned  world-ground,  or  God,  is 
such  a  being;  and  he  is  not  to  be  viewed  as 
conditioned  by  time  with  regard  to  his  own  self- 
consciousness  and  self-possession.  But  only  in 
the  seK-centred  and  self -equivalent  personahty 
can  we  transcend  the  conditions  and  the  sphere 
of  time.  God  in  himseK,  then,  is  not  only  the 
eternal  or  ever-enduring;  he  is  also  the  non- 
temporal,  or  that  which  transcends  temporal 
limits  and  conditions. 

But  God  is  not  merely  the  absolute  person 
without  a  past  and  a  future ;  he  is  also  the 
founder  and  conductor  of  the  world -process. 
This  fact  brings  God  into  a  new  relation  to 
time.  This  process  is  a  developing,  changing 
one,  and  hence  is  essentially  in  time.  Hence 
the  divine  activity  thei'ein  is  essentially  tempo- 
ral. But  here  too  there  is  a  certain  timeless 
element.    As  knowing  all  the  phases  and  pos- 


154  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

sibilities  of  the  process,  the  divine  knowledge  of 
the  system  may  be  viewed  as  without  succes- 
sion, and  hence  as  non- temporal.  But  as  the 
chief  agent  in  the  process,  and  as  ever  adjusting 
his  activity  to  the  advancing  process,  both  his 
activity  and  knowledge  must  be  changing,  and 
hence  temporal.  A  changeless  knowledge  of  an 
ideal  is  possible ;  but  a  changeless  knowledge  of 
a  changing  thing  is  a  contradiction.  A  knowl- 
edge of  reahty  must  embrace  it  as  it  is ;  and  if 
reality  changes  the  knowledge  must  change  to 
correspond.  Unchangeabihty  and  non-temporal- 
ity apply  to  God  only  in  his  relation  to  liimseK. 
They  apply  to  his  knowledge  only  as  related  to 
himself  or  to  the  ideal  and  the  possible. 

Finally,  metaphysics  makes  the  suggestion 
which  may  have  some  value;  that  the  present 
in  time,  hke  the  here  in  space,  may  be  purely 
relative,  and  that  there  may  be  an  all-embracing 
present  as  there  is  an  all-embracing  here.  We 
find  it  utterly  impossible  to  define  the  present 
except  in  relation  to  the  real  in  experience. 
This  reality  does  not  occur  in  the  present,  but 
constitutes  the  present ;  and  hence  the  sugges- 
tion becomes  possible  that  there  may  be  a  gi-asp 
of  reahty  which  shall  constitute  it  all  present. 


METAPHYSICAL  ATTRIBUTES  OF  WORLD-GROUND.         155 

If  this  were  allowed,  the  non-temporahty  of  the 
world-ground  would  offer  no  difficulty. 

§  51.  This  brings  us  to  the  attribute  of  omnis- 
cience. It  is  a  possible  conception  that  intelli- 
gence plays  only  a  co-ordinate,  if  not  secondaiy, 
part  in  the  world-ground.  Our  own  knowledge 
reaches  to  only  a  small  part  of  what  takes  place 
within  us,  and  the  rest  is  shrouded  in  mystery. 
It  is  conceivable  that,  in  hke  manner,  there 
should  be  in  the  world-ground  a  double  reahn, 
one  of  which  is  hidden  from  the  scrutiny  and 
control  of  intelligence.  But  this  supposition  is 
so  destitute  of  positive  gi'ounds  as  to  be  quite 
gratuitous.  If  extended  to  cosmic  action  it 
would  deprive  us  of  the  control  of  free  intellect, 
which  we  have  found  necessary  for  understand- 
ing the  cosmic  order.  Finally,  it  is  at  such  war 
with  the  perfect  ideal  of  the  reason  that  it  never 
has  found  acceptance  with  those  who  admit  any 
intelligence  in  the  world-ground  at  aU.  Still  it 
is  well  to  recognize  that  this  demand  for  perfect 
knowledge  rests  rather  upon  a  subjective  ideal 
than  upon  objective  grounds.  We  proceed  to 
inquire  how  far  such  knowledge  is  seK- con- 
sistent. 


156  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

In  interpreting  omniscience,  etymologizing  lias 
too  often  taken  the  place  of  philosophizing,  and 
speculators  have  sought  to  determine  the  con- 
tent of  the  idea  by  analyzing  the  word.  But 
this  process  is  delusive.  No  idea  can  be  under- 
stood by  studying  the  composition  of  the  word, 
but  only  by  reflecting  upon  the  way  in  which 
the  idea  is  reached.  In  the  largest  sense  of  the 
word,  omniscience  means  a  knowledge  of  all 
things  and  of  all  events,  past,  present,  and  fut- 
ure, necessary,  and  free  ahke.  But  we  cannot 
affirm  that  this  is  possible  on  the  sole  strength 
of  etymology.  We  must  rather  inquire  whether 
this  stretching  of  omniscience  is  not  as  unten- 
able as  the  similar  stretching  of  omnipotence 
when  it  is  made  to  affirm  the  possibihty  of  the 
contradictory.  All  allow  that  the  contradictory 
is  impossible ;  and  hence  we  are  not  at  hberty 
to  include  contradiction  in  our  conception  of 
the  divine  attributes.  As  omnipotence  must  be 
limited  to  the  doable,  so  omniscience  must  be 
limited  to  the  knowable.  If,  then,  there  be  any- 
thing essentially  unknowable,  it  must  be  beyond 
even  omniscience. 

A  preliminary  scruple  exists  concerning  the 
divine  knowledge  of  those  forms  of  finite  expe- 


METAPnTSICAL  ATTRIBUTES  OF  WORLD-GROUND.         157 

rience  which  cannot  be  ascribed  to  the  Infinite. 
The  totahty  of  physical  experiences  seems  to 
belong  only  to  the  finite;  how,  then,  can  the 
Infinite  comprehend  them?  The  work  of  the 
understanding  in  these  cases  consists  entirely  in 
classifying  and  naming ;  the  thing  itseK  is  real- 
ized only  in  immediate  experience.  But  if  we 
are  not  wiUing  to  ascribe  these  experiences,  as 
of  physical  pains,  to  God,  and  are  also  unwiUing 
to  deny  him  knowledge  of  the  same,  we  must 
allow  that  there  are  modes  of  the  divine  know- 
ing which  we  cannot  comprehend.  The  con- 
tents of  a  sense  which  we  do  not  possess  are 
utterly  unknowable  to  us,  and  yet  by  hypothesis 
the  Infinite  comprehends  the  finite  experience 
without  participation  therein.  The  mystery  in- 
volved in  this  assumption  has  led  to  many  sur- 
mises in  both  theology  and  philosophy. 

But  the  chief  difficulty  in  omniscience  con- 
cerns the  foreknowledge  of  free  choices.  The 
past  and  jDresent  may  be  conceived  to  he  open 
to  omniscience.  The  possible  also  may  be  fully 
known.  The  free  creature  can  do  nothing  which 
was  not  foreseen  as  possible.  Here,  then,  is  a 
realm  forever  free  from  all  enlargement  and 
sm^prise.     Here  the  parting  of  the  ways  begins. 


158  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM, 

A  free  act  by  its  nature  is  a  new  beginning,  and 
hence  is  not  represented  by  anything  before  its 
occurrence  which  must  lead  to  it.  Hence  a  free 
act,  until  performed,  is  only  a  possibility,  and 
not  a  fact.  But  knowledge  must  grasp  the  fact 
as  it  is,  and  hence  it  is  held  the  act  can  be  fore- 
linown  only  as  possible,  and  never  as  actual. 
Being  only  a  possibility  antecedently  to  its  oc- 
currence, it  must  be  known  as  such.  On  the 
other  side  it  is  held  that,  though  only  a  possi- 
bility in  itself,  it  may  yet  be  known  as  one 
which  mil  surely  be  realized.  The  knowledge 
in  this  case  does  not  compel  the  fact,  but  fore- 
sees it,  and  leaves  the  fact  as  free  as  if  unfore- 
seen. 

Upon  the  possibihty  of  such  foreknowledge 
opinions  still  differ.  Some  have  asserted  fore- 
knowledge and  denied  freedom ;  others  have  as- 
serted freedom  and  denied  foreknowledge ;  and 
still  others  have  affirmed  both.  Both  of  the 
former  classes  agree  in  viewing  freedom  and 
foreknowledge  as  incompatible,  and  differ  only 
as  to  which  member  of  the  antithesis  they 
reject. 

The  difficulty  in  the  last  view  is  this :  By 
definition  a  free  act  is  an  absolute  beginning, 


METAPHYSICAL  ATTRIBUTES  OF  WORLD-GROUXD.         150 

and  as  such  is  not  represented  by  anything  be- 
fore its  occurrence.  We  trace  it  to  a  specific 
vohtion,  and  beyond  that  it  has  neither  exist- 
ence nor  representation.  But  knowledge  of  a 
future  event  always  supposes  present  grounds 
of  knowing ;  and  in  the  case  of  a  free  act  there 
are  no  such  grounds.  Hence  a  foreknowledge 
of  a  free  act  is  a  knowledge  without  assignable 
grounds  of  knowing.  On  the  assumption  of  a 
real  time  it  is  hard  to  find  a  way  out  of  this 
difficulty.  Indeed,  there  would  be  no  way  out 
unless  we  assume  that  Grod  has  modes  of  know- 
ing which  are  inscrutable  to  us.  A  foreknowl- 
edge of  freedom  cannot  be  proved  to  be  a  con- 
tradiction ;  and  on  the  other  hand  it  cannot  be 
construed  in  its  possibility.  The  doctrine  of 
the  ideahty  of  time  helps  us  by  suggesting  the 
possibility  of  an  all-embracing  present,  or  an 
eternal  now,  for  God.  In  that  case  the  problem 
vanishes  with  time  its  condition. 

§  52.  The  last  attribute  we  consider  is  that  of 
omnipotence.  This  predicate  imphes  what  we 
have  before  assumed  from  metaphysics,  that  the 
world-ground  is  not  a  substance,  but  an  agent ; 
not  a  stuff,  but  a  cause;  and  the  general  aim 


IQQ  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

has  been  to  affirm  the  absoluteness  or  nncondi- 
tionedness  of  the  world-ground. 

Two  tendencies  appear  in  the  common  view 
of  the  matter.  One  is  to  view  God  as  able  to 
do  the  doable,  but  as  hmited  by  some  necessities 
which  cannot  be  transcended.  This  view  has 
not  satisfied  either  religious  feeling  or  specula- 
tive thought;  and  the  result  has  been  to  sug- 
gest the  opposite  view,  according  to  which  God 
is  lifted  above  all  limits,  and  is  able  to  do  the 
impossible  as  weU  as  the  possible.  But  if  the 
former  view  seemed  tame,  the  latter  seems  to 
be  utter  nonsense,  and  the  death  of  reason  itself. 

We  have  already  pointed  out  that  necessity 
has  no  positive  meaning  except  as  rational  ne- 
cessity. The  question  then  concerns  the  rela- 
tion of  God  to  these  necessities  of  reason,  or,  as 
they  are  often  called,  the  eternal  truths.  Is  he 
conditioned  by  them,  or  superior  to  them  ?  We 
shall  need  to  move  warily  and  with  great  cir- 
cumspection to  escape  falling  a  prey  to  the 
swarms  of  abstractions  in  which  this  realm 
abounds. 

§  53.  In  speaking  of  the  unity  of  the  world- 
ground  we  pointed  out  that  it  is  incompatible 


METAPHYSICAL  ATTRIBUTES  OF  WORLD-GROUND.        161 

with  any  plurality  of  fundamental  being.  Hence 
it  follows  that  truth  and  necessity  themselves 
must  in  some  way  be  founded  in  the  world- 
ground.  If  we  should  assume  a  realm  of  truth 
to  exist  apart  from  being,  it  could  have  no  effect 
in  being  unless  we  should  further  assume  an  in- 
teraction between  it  and  being.  But  this  would 
make  truth  a  thing,  and  would  compel  the  as- 
sumption of  another  being  deeper  than  both 
truth  and  reahty  to  mediate  their  interaction. 
At  this  point  we  fall  an  easy  prey  to  our  own 
abstractions.  A  law  of  nature  is  never  the  an- 
tecedent, but  the  consequence  of  reahty.  The 
real  is  first  and  only,  and  being  what  it  is,  its 
laws  result  as  a  consequence,  or,  rather,  are  but 
expressions  of  what  the  things  are.  Yet  so 
easily  do  we  mistake  abstractions  for  things 
that,  after  we  have  gathered  the  laws  from  the 
things,  we  at  once  proceed  to  regard  the  things 
as  the  subjects,  if  not  the  products,  of  the  laws 
they  found.  Then  we  speak  of  the  reign  of  law ; 
and  thus  by  a  double  abstraction  law  is  made 
to  appear  as  a  real  sovereign  apart  from  and 
above  things,  and  as  the  expression  of  some 
fathomless  necessity.  Of  course,  when  reahty 
appears  it  has  nothing  to  do  but  to  fall  into  the 
11 


IQ2  PHILOSOrnY  OF  THEISM. 

forms  which  the  sovereign  laws  prescribe.  Thus 
the  cause  is  made  subject  to  its  own  effects,  and 
reahty  is  explained  as  the  result  of  its  own  con- 
sequences. The  inverted  nature  of  the  thought 
is  manifest.  Natural  laws  are  the  consequences 
of  reality,  and  never  its  grounds  or  anything 
apart  from  it. 

The  same  is  true  for  truth.  Rational  truth, 
as  distinct  from  truth  of  contingent  fact,  is 
never  anything  more  than  an  expression  of  the 
necessary  relations  of  ideas,  or  of  the  way  in 
which  reason  universally  proceeds  As  such  it 
is  nothing  apart  from  the  mind  or  antecedent 
to  it,  but  is  simply  an  expression  of  the  mental 
nature.  But  we  overlook  this  and  abstract  a 
set  of  principles  which  we  call  eternal  truths, 
and  erect  into  a  series  of  fathomless  necessities 
to  which  being  can  do  nothing  but  submit.  But 
the  fictitious  nature  of  this  procedure  is  appar- 
ent. There  is  no  reahn  of  truth  apart  from  the 
world-ground ;  and  we  must  look  in  this  being 
for  the  foundation  of  truth  itself,  and  of  all 
those  principles  whereby  the  distinctions  of  true 
and  false,  consistent  and  contradictory,  possible 
and  impossible,  themselves  exist.  In  a  system 
in  which  these  distinctions  are  already  founded. 


METAPHYSICAL  ATTRIBUTES  OF  WORLD-GROUND.        163 

they  would  be  valid  for  all  new  events,  not, 
however,  as  abstract  necessities,  but  as  actual 
laws  of  a  real  system. 

It  is  partly  oversight  of  this  distinction  which 
leads  us  to  think  that  these  principles  precede 
reahty.  They  do,  indeed,  precede  specific  events 
and  condition  them,  and  hence  we  fancy  that 
they  precede  reality  in  general.  A  further  fancy 
completes  the  illusion.  When  one  speaks  of 
truth  as  valid  even  in  the  void,  he  fails  to  see 
that  his  conception  of  the  void  is  only  a  concep- 
tion, and  that  he  himself  is  present  with  all  his 
ideas  and  laws  of  thought.  And  when  along 
with  his  conception  of  the  void  he  has  other 
conceptions,  and  finds  that  the  customary  rela- 
tions between  them  continue  to  exist,  he  fancies 
that  he  has  truly  conceived  the  void  and  has 
found  that  the  laws  of  thought  would  be  vahd 
if  all  reality  should  vanish.  But  the  illusion  is 
patent.  The  whole  art  of  finding  what  would 
be  true  in  the  void  consists  in  asking  what  is 
now  true  for  the  thinking  mind.  The  true  void 
would  be  the  undistinguishable  nothing;  and 
the  ideal  distinctions  of  truth  and  error  would 
have  no  meaning,  to  say  nothing  of  application. 
Hence  we  conclude  that  truth  is  not  indepen- 


164  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

dent  of  tlie  world-ground,  but  is  in  some  way 
founded  therein  and  dependent  thereon. 

§  54.  This  dependence  may  be  conceived  in 
two  ways.  Truth  may  be  viewed  as  founded 
in  the  nature  of  the  world-ground,  or  as  a  creat- 
ure of  vohtion.  The  latter  view  has  often  ap- 
peared in  theology,  but  is  inconsistent  with  it- 
self. The  statement  that  God  is  arbitrary  with 
regard  to  truth,  that  he  can  make  or  unmake 
it,  assumes  that  truth  exists  and  has  a  meaning 
apart  from  the  divine  volition.  For  why  should 
the  loroduct  of  the  creative  act  be  called  truth 
rather  than  error,  unless  it  agree  with  certain 
fixed  standards  of  truth  with  which  error  disa- 
grees ?  Hence  all  such  statements  as  that  God 
can  make  the  true  false,  or  the  possible  impos- 
sible, imply  that  the  standard  of  both  exists  in- 
dependently of  volition ;  and  God  is  merely  al- 
lowed to  transfer  objects  back  and  forth  across 
limits  which  are  fixed  in  themselves. 

The  inconsistency  of  the  negative  form  of 
statement  is  equally  manifest.  In  order  that 
truth  shall  be  unmade  or  broken,  it  must  first 
exist  as  tnith.  If  any  proposition  which  is  to 
be  broken  v^ero  not  in  itself  true,  there  would 


METAPnTSICAL  ATTRIBUTES  OF  WORLD-GKOUND.        1G5 

be  no  truth  to  break.  A  proposition  which  is 
false  cannot  be  made  false,  for  it  is  false  aheady. 
Hence,  to  make  truth  the  creature  of  volition 
either  denies  truth  altogether,  or  else  it  breaks 
down  through  its  own  seK-contradiction.  But 
the  aim  of  those  who  have  held  this  view  has 
never  been  to  deny  truth,  but  rather  to  exalt 
the  absolute  and  unconditioned  independence  of 
God. 

So,  then,  we  object  to  the  statement  either 
that  God  makes  truth  or  that  he  recognizes  it 
as  something  independent  of  himself.  He  is 
rather  its  som*ce  and  foundation;  and  it,  in 
turn,  is  the  fixed  mode  of  his  procedure.  We 
may  view  rational  principles  as  consequences 
or  expressions  of  the  divine  nature,  or  as  fun- 
damental laws  of  the  divine  activity.  Both 
phrases  have  the  same  meaning. 

§  55.  Many  have  objected  to  ascribing  a  nat- 
ure of  any  kind  to  God  as  the  source  of  the 
divine  manifestation.  They  have  found  in  such 
a  notion  a  hmitation,  and  have  held  that  God, 
as  absolute,  must  give  himself  his  own  nature. 
There  must  be  nothing  constitutional  mth  God, 
but  all  that  he  is  must  be  a  product  of  his  ab- 


1(56  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

solute  will.  In  MmseK  God  has  been  styled 
"the  abyss,"  "the  silence,"  "the  super-essen- 
tial," and  many  other  verbal  vacuities.  This  is 
due  partly  to  a  misunderstanding  of  the  term, 
nature,  and  partly  to  an  overstrained  conception 
of  absoluteness.  We  notice  first  the  misunder- 
standing. 

"We  finite  beings  are  subject  to  development, 
and  view  our  nature  as  the  mysterious  source 
of  the  movement.  Again  we  inherit  much,  and 
we  often  sum  up  our  inherited  pecuharities  as 
our  nature.  This  nature  too  frequently  appears 
as  a  limitation  from  which  we  would  gladly  es- 
cape. Thus  a  split  arises  in  the  soul.  The  free 
spirit  has  to  struggle  against  a  power  wliich 
seems  to  be  not  of  itself — an  old  man  of  the  sea, 
or  a  body  of  death.  In  this  sense  a  nature  can- 
not be  ascribed  to  an  absolute  being.  Such  a 
nature  is  essentially  a  hmitation,  and  can  belong 
only  to  the  conditioned  and  finite. 

But  a  nature  in  the  sense  of  a  fixed  law  of 
activity  or  mode  of  manifestation  involves  no 
such  limitation.  This  is  best  seen  in  a  concrete 
case.  Thinking,  we  say,  is  governed  by  the  laws 
of  thought.  But  these  laws  are  not  anything 
either  out  of  the  mind  or  in  the  mind.     We  feel 


METAPHYSICAL  ATTRIBUTES  OF  WORLD-GROUND.        167 

them  neither  as  an  external  yoke  nor  as  an  in- 
ternal limitation.  The  reason  is  that  they  are 
essentially  only  modes  of  thought-activity,  and 
are  reached  as  formal  laws  by  abstraction  from 
the  process  of  thinking.  The  basal  fact  is  a 
thought-activity,  and  reflection  shovrs  that  this 
has  certain  forms.  These  are  next  erected  into 
laws  and  imposed  on  the  mind ;  and  then  the 
fancy  arises  that  they  are  hmitations  and  hin- 
derances  to  knowledge.  In  fact,  however,  they 
do  not  rule  intellect,  but  only  express  what  intel- 
lect is.  Nor  is  the  mind  ever  so  conscious  of 
itself  as  self -guiding  and  seK-controlled  as  when 
conducting  a  clear  process  of  thought.  It  would 
be  a  strange  proposition  to  free  the  mind  and 
enlarge  knowledge  by  annulhng  the  laws  of 
thought. 

This  brings  us  to  the  overstraining  mentioned. 
To  deny  a  nature  to  God  in  the  sense  just  de- 
scribed would  be  to  cancel  his  existence  alto- 
gether. For  whatever  is  must  be  something, 
must  be  an  agent,  and  must  have  a  definite  law 
of  action.  Without  this  the  thought  vanishes, 
and  only  a  mental  vacuum  remains.  This  may 
indeed  be  fiUed  up  with  words,  but  it  acquires 
no  substance  thereby.     To  regard  this  definite 


168  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

law  as  a  limitation  is  to  make  being  itself  a  lim- 
itation. In  that  case  we  find  true  absoluteness 
only  in  pure  indefiniteness  and  emptiness,  and 
then  there  is  no  way  back  to  definite  existence 
again.  Once  in  such  a  void,  thought  would  re- 
main there.  This  overstraining  of  absoluteness 
defeats  itself.  It  cancels  the  absolute  as  a  real- 
ity, and  leads  to  the  attempt  to  construct  both 
the  universe  and  the  Hving  God  out  of  nothing. 
But  when  we  say  that  the  natiu'e  of  a  thing  is 
a  law,  we  must  not  think  of  the  law  as  a  thing 
in  the  thing,  or  even  as  ruhng  the  thing.  The 
thing  itself  is  all;  and  the  law  is  only  an  ex- 
pression of  what  the  thing  is  or  of  the  way  in 
which  it  proceeds. 

We  come  here  to  a  fact  to  which  we  have  re- 
feiTed  before,  namely,  the  impossibihty  of  dis- 
pensing with  either  necessity  or  freedom  in  a 
thought-system.  To  give  freedom  any  signifi- 
cance it  must  be  based  on  uniformity  or  fixity ; 
and  to  give  this  fixity  any  value  it  must  be 
aUied  with  freedom.  Unmixed  necessity  cancels 
reason.  Pure  arbitrariness  cancels  reason.  It 
is  only  in  the  union  of  the  two  that  the  rational 
life  is  possible. 


METAPHYSICAL  ATTRIBUTES  OF  WORLD-GROUND.        169 

§  56.  Has,  then,  the  divine  will  notliing  to  do 
with  the  divine  existence  ?  Does  God  find  him- 
self given  to  himseK  as  an  object,  or  is  he,  rather, 
his  o^n  cause  ?  The  answer  must  be  both  yes 
and  no.  The  question  really  assumes  that  God 
as  knowing  and  wilhng,  is  subsequent  to  him- 
self as  existing.  Of  course  there  is  no  temporal 
sequence,  but  only  a  logical  one.  God  does 
not  exist  and  then  act,  but  exists  only  in  and 
through  his  act.  And  this  act,  though  not  ar- 
bitrary, is  also  not  necessary ;  or  though  neces- 
sary, it  is  also  free.  Wliat  this  apparent  contra- 
diction means  is  this :  Freedom  and  necessity 
are  contradictory  only  as  formal  ideas,  and  are 
not  mutually  exclusive  as  determinations  of  be- 
ing. Indeed,  both  ideas  are  at  bottom  abstrac- 
tions from  opposite  sides  of  personal  existence. 
We  find  an  element  of  uniformity  and  fixity  in 
our  hfe,  and  this  gives  us  the  only  positive  idea 
of  necessity  which  we  possess.  We  find  also  a 
certain  element  of  self-determination,  and  this 
is  our  idea  of  freedom.  Reahty,  then,  shows 
these  formally  opposite  ideas  united  in  actual 
existence,  and  reflection  shows  that  both  are 
necessary  to  rational  existence.  We  have  an 
illustration  both  of  the  meaning  and  of  the  pos- 


170  THILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

sibility  in  our  own  life.  The  laws  of  thouglit 
are  inviolable  in  the  nature  of  reason.  Vohtion 
can  do  nothing  with  them  in  the  way  of  over- 
throw. And  yet,  though  absolute  and  secure 
from  all  reversal,  they  do  not  of  themselves  se- 
cure obedience.  The  human  soul  does  not  be- 
come a  rational  soul  by  virtue  of  the  law  of  rea- 
son alone ;  there  is  needed,  in  addition,  an  act  of 
corresponding  seK- determination  by  the  free 
spirit.  Hence,  while  there  is  a  necessity  in  the 
soul,  it  becomes  controlhng  only  through  free- 
dom ;  and  we  may  say  that  every  one  must  con- 
stitute himself  a  rational  soul.  How  this  can  be 
is  inconstruable,  but  none  the  less  it  is  a  fact. 
We  come  to  our  full  existence  only  through  our 
own  act.  What  is  true  for  ourselves  in  a  lim- 
ited degree,  we  may  regard  as  absolutely  true 
for  God.  At  every  point  the  absolute  will  must 
be  present  to  give  meaning  to  the  otherwise 
powerless  necessities  of  the  Divine  Being.  In 
this  sense  we  may  say,  with  Spinoza,  that  God 
is  the  cause  of  himseK.  He  incessantly  con- 
stitutes himself  the  rational  and  absolute  spirit. 
God  is  absolute  will  or  absolute  agent,  forever 
determining  himseK  according  to  rational  and 
eternal  principles. 


CHAPTER  V. 

GOD  AND  THE  WOELD. 

Thus  far  we  have  considered  mainly  the  attri- 
butes of  God  in  himself ;  we  have  now  to  con- 
sider his  cosmical  relations.  Of  course  it  is  not 
our  aim  to  tell  how  God  produces  the  world, 
or  how  the  world  depends  on  him,  but  only  to 
find  what  general  thought  we  must  form  of 
their  mutual  relations.  By  the  world,  here,  we 
mean  all  finite  existence.  Two  general  classes 
of  views  exist :  theistic  and  pantheistic.  Pan- 
theism makes  the  world  either  a  part  of  God 
or  a  necessary  consequence  of  the  divine  nat- 
ure. Theism  holds  that  the  world  is  a  free  act 
and  creation  by  God.  We  consider  pantheism 
first. 

§  57.  The  view  that  the  world  is  a  part  of  God 
is  the  common  factor  in  all  theories  of  emana- 
tion, ancient  and  modern.  As  the  waves  are  a 
part  of  the  ocean,  or,  better  still,  as  each  finite 


172  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

space  or  time  is  a  part  of  tlie  one  infinite  space 
or  time,  so  eacli  finite  tiling  is  a  part  or  phase 
of  tlie  one  infinite  existence.  In  eacli  of  these 
views  God  is  regarded  as  world-substance  rath- 
er than  first  cause ;  and  this  substance  is  con- 
ceived as  a  kind  of  plastic  stuff  or  raw  mate- 
rial wliich,  hke  clay,  can  be  variously  fashioned, 
and  which  is  at  least  partly  exhausted  in  its 
products.  Sometimes  the  view  is  less  coarse, 
and  God  is  conceived  as  the  background  of  the 
world,  something  as  space  is  the  infinite  back- 
ground and  possibility  of  the  figures  in  it. 
Sometimes  God  is  said  to  produce  or  emit  the 
world  from  himself,  or  by  a  process  of  seK-di- 
remption  to  pass  from  his  own  unity  into  the 
plurality  of  cosmic  existence.  The  finite,  on 
the  other  hand,  is  a  part,  or  mode,  or  emana- 
tion of  the  infinite,  and  shares  in  the  infinite 
substance.  Whether  the  world  is  eternal  is  not 
decided.  Some  will  have  it  to  be  an  eternal 
part  and  factor  of  God,  while  others  think  it 
as  made  out  of  God. 

All  views  of  this  class  are  products  of  the  im- 
agination and  result  from  the  attempt  to  picture 
that  which  is  essentially  unpicturable.  When 
we  try  to  conceive  the  origin  of  the  world  we 


GOD  AND  THE  WORLD.  173 

are  tempted  to  form  the  fancy  of  some  back- 
lying  plastic  substance  of  wliich  the  world  is 
made,  and  then  the  imagination  is  satisfied. 
Either  we  refer  the  world  to  some  pre-existent 
stuff,  or  we  regard  it  as  pre-existing  itself  in 
some  potential  form.  Then  its  production  be- 
comes either  the  working  over  of  a  given  stnff 
or  a  letting  loose  of  potentiahties. 

Yiews  of  this  class  are  as  obnoxious  to  reason 
as  they  are  dear  to  the  irrational  fancy.  Meta- 
physics shows  that  reality  is  never  a  stuff,  but 
an  agent.  Nor  does  an  agent  have  any  sub- 
stance in  itself  whereby  it  exists,  but  by  virtue 
of  its  acti\aty  it  is  able  to  assert  itself  as  a  de- 
termining factor  in  existence,  and  thus  only  does 
it  acquire  any  claim  to  be  considered  real.  To 
explain  the  universe  we  need  not  a  substance, 
but  an  agent ;  not  substantiality,  but  causality. 
The  latter  expresses  all  the  meaning  of  the 
former,  and  is  free  from  misleading  sense-impU- 
cations.  Metaphysics  further  shows  that  every 
agent  is  a  imit,  uncompounded  and  indivisible. 
God,  then,  is  not  the  infijiite  stuff  or  substance, 
but  the  infinite  cause  or  agent,  one  and  indivisi- 
ble. From  this  point  all  the  previous  views  of 
the  relation  of  God  to  the  world  disappear  of 


174  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

themselves.  He  has  no  parts  and  is  not  a  sum. 
Hence  the  world  is  no  part  of  God,  nor  an  em- 
anation from  him,  nor  a  sharer  in  the  divine 
substance ;  for  all  these  views  imply  the  divisi- 
bility of  God  and  also  his  stuff -hko  nature.  His 
necessary  unity  forbids  all  attempts  to  identify 
him  with  the  world,  either  totally  or  partially. 
If  the  finite  be  anything  real,  it  must  be  viewed, 
not  as  produced  from  God,  but  as  produced  by 
God ;  that  is,  as  created.  Only  creation  can  rec- 
oncile the  reality  of  the  finite  with  the  unity  of 
the  infinite.  For  the  finite,  if  real,  is  an  agent, 
and  as  such  it  cannot  be  made  out  of  anything, 
but  is  posited  by  the  infinite. 

Similar  objections  lie  against  all  views  which 
speak  of  the  world  as  a  mode  of  God.  This 
phrase,  in  its  common  use,  is  alhed  to  the  imagi- 
nation, and  is  based  upon  the  notion  of  a  pas- 
sive substance.  The  thought  commonly  joined 
with  it  is  that  each  thing  is  a  particular  and 
separate  part  of  the  infinite,  as  each  wave  is  not 
a  phase  of  the  entire  sea,  but  only  of  the  part 
comprised  in  the  wave  itself.  But  metaphysics 
further  shows  that  the  unity  of  being  is  com- 
patible with  plurality  of  attributes  only  as  each 
is  an  attribute  of  the  whole  thing.    Any  concep- 


GOD  AND  TEE  WORLD.  175 

tion  of  diverse  states  whicli  are  states  of  only  a 
part  of  the  thing  would  destroy  its  unity.  The 
entire  being  must  be  present  in  each  state ;  and 
this  cannot  be  so  long  as  the  notion  of  quan- 
tity is  apphed  to  the  problem.  The  only  way 
in  which  a  being  can  be  conceived  as  entire  in 
every  mode,  is  by  dropping  all  quantitative  and 
spatial  conceptions  and  viewing  the  being  as  an 
agent,  and  the  modes  as  forms  of  its  acti^dty. 
If,  then,  finite  things  are  modes  of  the  infinite, 
this  can  only  mean  that  they  are  acts  of  the  in- 
finite, or  modes  of  agency. 

Another  conception  of  this  relation  has  been 
ventured,  based  on  the  relation  of  the  universal 
to  the  particulars  subsumed  under  it,  and  more 
especially  on  the  relation  of  the  universal  reason 
to  the  individual  mind.  As  reason  is  the  same 
in  all,  and  as  no  one  can  claim  a  monopoly  of  it, 
but  only  a  participation  in  it,  we  may  say  that 
the  universal  reason  is  the  reality,  and  that  the 
finite  mind  exists  only  in  and  through  it  as  one 
of  its  phases  or  manifestations.  But  this  is 
only  an  echo  of  the  scholastic  realism.  Class 
terms  denote  no  possible  existence,  and  have  re- 
ahty  only  in  the  specific  existences  from  which 
they  are  abstracted. 


X76  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

§  58.  Two  conceptions  of  the  finite  are  logi- 
cally possible.  First,  we  may  regard  it  as  only  a 
mode  of  the  divine  activity  and  without  any 
proper  thinghood.  Secondly,  we  may  view  it  as 
a  proper  thing,  not  only  as  an  act  of  God,  but  as 
a  substantial  product.  The  former  conception 
is  illustrated  by  the  relation  of  thoughts  to  the 
mind.  These  are  not  modes  of  mind,  but  mental 
acts.  They  are  not  made  out  of  anything,  but 
the  thinking  mind  gives  them  existence.  At  the 
same  time,  they  are-  not  things  in  the  mind,  but 
exist  only  in  and  through  the  act  which  creates 
them. 

The  decision  between  these  views  can  l^e 
reached  only  as  we  find,  in  the  finite,  things 
which  can  know  themselves  as  things.  At  first 
sight,  indeed,  things  and  substances  appear  to 
be  given  in  immediate  perception ;  but  psychol- 
ogy shows  that  the  objects  of  perception  are  pri- 
marily never  more  than  our  own  conceptions 
and  representations  which  have  been  objectified 
under  the  forms  of  space  and  time,  substance 
and  attribute,  cause  and  effect,  etc.  They  repre- 
sent only  the  way  in  which  the  mind  reacts 
against  a  series  of  incitements  from  without. 
Metaphysics  further  shows  that  the  external 


GOD  AND  THE  WORLD.  177 

fact  is  totally  unlike  the  appearance ;  and  when 
these  considerations  are  followed  out  we  reach 
the  insight  that  true  substantial  existence,  in  dis- 
tinction from  phenomenal  existence,  can  be  pred- 
icated only  of  persons.  Only  selfhood  serves  to 
mark  off  the  finite  from  the  infinite,  and  only 
the  finite  spirit  attains  to  substantial  otherness 
to  the  infinite.  The  impersonal  finite  has  only 
such  otherness  as  a  thought  or  act  has  to  its 
subject. 

This  view  does  not  commend  itself  to  sponta- 
neous thought,  and  is  questioned  by  many  in  the 
name  of  common-sense.  The  objections  com- 
monly rest  upon  misapprehension.  Our  sense- 
experience  puts  us  in  connection  with  a  system 
of  things.  Concerning  this  system,  we  may  ask 
whether  it  depends  on  us,  as  the  illusions  of  the 
madman  depend  on  his  distempered  mind,  or 
whether  it  is  independent  of  us  and  our  percep- 
tion. The  common  conception  of  idealism  is 
that  it  affirms  the  former  view.  This  is  one  of 
the  chronic  misconceptions  for  which,  when  once 
established,  there  seems  to  be  no  exorcism.  No 
rational  ideahst,  however,  has  ever  held  such  a 
view.  He  beheves,  as  much  as  any  one,  that  the 
system  of  experience  is  no  product  of  our  own, 
12 


178  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

and  that  it  exists  for  all.  He  only  raises  the 
question  what  this  system  may  be  in  its  essential 
nature.  The  reahst  proposes  the  conception  of  a 
brute  existence  as  expressing  its  ultimate  nature ; 
but  the  ideahst  has  no  difficulty  in  showing  that 
such  a  conception  is  only  the  reahst's  theory, 
and  not  a  fact  of  immediate  experience,  and  that 
this  theory,  moreover,  is  quite  unable  to  do  the 
work  assigned  it.  And  the  realist  himself  is 
compelled  to  relax  his  theory  when  he  comes 
to  consider  the  relation  of  God  and  the  world. 
Of  course  the  imagination  has  no  difficulty  in 
construing  this  relation  as  a  spatial  one — as  one 
of  mutual  inclusion  and  exclusion  —  but  not 
much  reflection  is  needed  to  show  the  impossi- 
bihty  of  such  a  view  or  the  contradictions  in- 
volved in  it.  The  most  striking  advantages  of 
the  realistic  view  for  the  imagination  become 
its  chief  embarrassments  for  reflective  thought. 
But  this  question  is  aside  from  our  theistic  ar- 
gument. Tills  remains  the  same  whatever  our 
attitude  towards  the  reahstic  controversy. 

§  59.  In  any  case  the  spirit  must  be  viewed  as 
created.  It  is  not  made,  for  making  imphes 
a  pre -existent  stuff.     Creation  means  to  posit 


GOD  AND  THE  WORLD.  179 

something  in  existence  which  before  was  not. 
Concerning  it  two  consistent  questions  are  pos- 
sible. (1.)  Who  is  the  agent?  (2.)  How  is  it 
possible?  To  the  first  question  the  answer  is, 
God.  To  the  second  there  is  no  rational  answer. 
Besides  these  consistent  questions,  various  in- 
consistent ones  are  asked,  as,  for  instance  :  What 
is  the  world  made  "  out  of"  ?  The  common  an- 
swer is,  out  of  nothing.  Both  question  and  an- 
swer are  worthy  of  each  other.  Both  are  haunted 
by  the  notion  of  a  pre-existent  stuff,  and,  to  com- 
plete the  absurdity,  the  answer  suggests  nothing 
as  that  stuff ;  as  if  by  some  process  God  fash- 
ioned the  nothing  into  something.  The  old  saw, 
from  nothing  nothing  comes,  is  also  played  off 
against  creation,  but  without  effect.  The  truth 
therein  is  merely  that  nothing  can  ever  produce, 
or  be  formed  into  anything.  But  theism  does 
not  teach  that  nothing  produces  something,  but 
rather  that  God,  the  all-powerful,  has  caused  the 
world  to  exist.  No  more  does  theism  hold  that 
God  took  a  mass  of  nothing  and  made  some- 
thing out  of  it,  but  rather  that  he  caused  a  new 
existence  to  begin,  and  that,  too,  in  such  a  way 
that  he  was  no  less  after  creation  than  before. 
God  neither  made  the  world  from  nothing  as  a 


180  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

raw  material,  nor  from  himself ;  both  notions 
are  absurd ;  but  he  caused  that  to  be  which  be- 
fore was  not.  Of  course,  we  have  no  recipe  for 
this  process.  Creation  is  a  mystery;  but  any 
other  view  is  a  contradiction  of  thought  itseK. 
Creation  is  the  only  conception  which  reconciles 
the  unity  of  God  with  the  existence  of  the  finite. 
Perhaps,  too,  we  need  not  be  especially  troubled 
at  the  mystery,  as  mystery  is  omnipresent ;  and 
besides,  creation  is  not  our  affair. 

Some  speculators  have  sought  relief  from 
the  mystery  of  creation  in  the  claim  that  the 
world  was  not  made  from  nothing,  but  from 
the  potentialities  of  the  divine  nature.  The 
only  intelhgible  meaning  of  this  view  is  that 
the  world  existed  as  a  conception  in  the  di^dne 
thought  before  it  became  real.  This  conceptual 
existence  constituted  its  potentiality,  but  this 
in  no  way  shows  how  that  which  existed  as 
conception  was  posited  in  reality.  For  the  rest, 
the  claim  in  question  is  only  a  form  of  words  of 
learned  sound  but  without  meaning. 

§  CO.  The  world  depends  upon  a  di\ane  ac- 
tivity, and  is  not  a  mode  of  the  infinite  sub- 
stance.    But  this  also  admits  of  a  double  in- 


GOD  AND  THE  WORLD.  181 

terpretation.  We  may  regard  this  activity  as 
a  necessary  consequence  of  the  divine  nature, 
or  as  resting  upon  the  divine  will.  The  former 
view  is  held  by  all  the  higher  forms  of  panthe- 
ism, and  even  some  theists  have  held  that  God 
must  create.  This  view  also  is  double,  accord- 
ing to  our  thought  of  being  in  general.  In  one 
view  God  exists  as  the  all -conditioning  sub- 
stance, and  the  world,  as  its  necessary  imphca- 
tion,  co-exists  eternally  with  it.  Spinoza's  doc- 
trine is  the  best  expression  of  this  view.  But 
this  conception  compels  us  either  to  affirm  that 
all  things  are  eternal,  or  else  to  declare  change 
to  be  an  unaccountable  illusion  of  the  finite. 
This  view,  which  might  be  called  static  panthe- 
ism, has  generally  been  exchanged  for  another, 
which  might  be  called  dynamic  pantheism.  In 
the  latter  view  the  infinite  is  forever  energizing 
according  to  certain  laws,  and  producing  thereby 
a  great  variety  of  products.  But  these  laws  are 
throughout  expressions  of  its  nature  and  admit 
of  no  change.  The  world-order  is  the  di\dne 
nature,  and,  conversely,  the  divine  nature  is  the 
world -order.  Hence  pantheists  of  this  order 
have  always  been  the  stoutest  opponents  of 
miracles,  for  miracles  imply  a  will  apart  from 


1S2  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

and  above  nature.  If  the  world-order  were  really 
the  divine  nature,  then,  of  course,  God  could  not 
depart  from  that  order  without  denying  liimself . 
This  conviction  is  further  strengthened  by  the 
natural  tendency  of  the  untaught  mind  to  mis- 
take the  uniformities  of  experience  for  necessi- 
ties of  being;  and  thus  the  world-order  is  finally 
established  as  necessarily  invariable,  the  mind 
not  recognizing  its  own  shadow.  This  is  the 
\'iew  which  underhes  all  schemes  of  philosophic 
evolution,  and  a  large  part  of  cuiTcnt  scientific 
speculation,  or  rather  speculation  on  the  sup- 
posed basis  of  scientific  facts  and  principles. 
While  static  pantheism  says.  In  the  beginning 
was  the  eternal  substance  or  the  eternal  reason 
CO -existing  changelessly  with  all  its  implica- 
tions; dynamic  pantheism  says.  In  the  begin- 
ning was  force,  necessary  and  persistent,  and  by 
its  inherent  necessity  forever  generating  law 
and  system.  When  this  view  is  combined  ^ath 
the  impersonality  and  unconsciousness  of  the 
world -ground,  it  becomes  identical  with  vulgar 
atheism.  The  world-ground  is  simply  the  unit- 
ary principle  and  basal  reahty  of  the  cosmos, 
and  is  exhausted  in  its  cosmic  manifestation. 
There  is  immanence  without  transcendence ; 


GOD  AND  THE  WORLD.  183 

and  God  and  the  world  are  but  opposite  names 
for  the  same  thing. 

§  61.  Static  pantheism  is  an  untenable  ab- 
straction which,  if  allowed,  would  bring  the 
universe  to  a  standstill  and  load  thought  with 
illusion.  It  would  give  us  a  rigid  and  resting 
being  from  which  all  time  and  change  would 
be  excluded,  and  which  could  in  no  way  be  con- 
nected with  our  changing  experience.  If  we 
should  call  that  experience  delusion,  the  delu- 
sion itself  would  be  as  unaccountable  as  the 
fact.  On  this  rock  the  Eleatic  philosophy  was 
wrecked,  and  here,  too,  Spinoza's  system  went  to 
pieces.  The  truth,  then,  in  pantheism,  if  there 
be  any,  lies  in  dynamic  pantheism.  But  even 
this  view  has  but  scanty  value,  and  this  value 
lies  in  its  emj^hasis  of  law  in  opposition  to  a 
blind  and  reckless  arbitrariness.  For  the  rest, 
pantheism  is  unsatisfactory  in  all  respects. 
First,  it  is  ethically  objectionable,  because  it 
leads  to  a  complete  determinism,  both  in  God 
and  man.  All  things  happen  by  necessity,  and 
nothing  is  the  outcome  of  proper  prevision  and 
purpose.  The  vforld  and  all  its  details  are  de- 
termined from  everlasting.     There  is  no  room 


184  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

for  freedom,  hence  none  for  purpose,  and  hence 
none  for  any  rational  distinction  of  good  and 
evil. 

The  view  is  also  speculatively  obnoxious  in 
the  following  respects : 

1.  It  is  unclear.  It  prqvides  only  for  the 
world -order  and  does  not  recognize  its  details. 
But  the  vforld- order,  as  a  system  of  general 
laws,  accounts  for  no  specific  fact  whatever. 
We  must  reckon,  then,  not  only  the  world-order 
to  the  divine  nature,  but  also  the  cosmic  details. 
And  since  these  are  incessantly  shifting,  the  di- 
\'ine  nature,  which  is  their  ground,  must  also  be 
shifting,  and  hence  a  temporal  thing.  Thereby 
the  infinite  is  degraded  to  a  temporal  existence 
and  its  absoluteness  disappears;  for  only  the 
self-determining  can  be  absolute. 

2.  Self-determination  being  denied,  we  must 
find  some  ground  for  the  changing  activity  of 
the  infinite ;  and  this  must  be  found  in  some 
mechanism  in  the  infinite  whereby  its  states 
interact  and  determine  the  outcome.  This  view 
carried  out  would  cancel  the  unity  of  the  in- 
finite altogether.  We  might  continue  to  speak 
of  unity,  but  we  should  be  quite  unable  to  tell 
in  what  that  unity  consisted.     As  we  have  al- 


GOD  AXD  THE  WORLD.  185 

ready  pointed  out,  the  free  and  conscious  self 
is  the  only  real  unity  of  which  we  have  any 
knowledge ,  and  reflection  shows  that  it  is  the 
only  thing  which  can  be  a  true  unity. 

3.  We  have  seen  that  the  alleged  necessity  of 
natural  laws  and  products  is  purely  hypotheti- 
cal. No  reflection  upon  necessary  truth  shows 
the  present  order  to  be  a  necessary  imphcation 
in  any  respect. 

4.  We  have  further  seen  that  every  system  of 
necessity  overturns  reason  itself. 

On  all  these  grounds  we  hold  that  God  is 
free  in  his  relation  to  the  world,  and  that  the 
world,  though  conditioned  by  the  divine  nature, 
is  no  necessary  product  thereof,  but  rather 
rests  upon  the  divine  will.  To  carry  the  world 
into  God  is  to  carry  time  and  evolution  into 
God ;  and  the  notion  of  an  evolving,  developing 
God  does  not  commend  itseK  to  speculative 
thought.  Again,  to  carry  the  actual  world  into 
God  with  all  its  antitheses  of  good  and  evil, 
and  its  boundless  wastes  of  insignificance  and 
imperfection,  would  be  to  degrade  the  theistic 
idea  to  about  the  level  of  the  Platonic  demi- 
urge.    Everything  would  be  divine  but  God. 

In  concluding  that  God  is  free  in  his  relation 


186  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

to  the  world,  we  abandon  all  hope  of  a  specula- 
tive deduction  of  creation.  Such  hope  has  often 
been  entertained,  and  numberless  attempts  have 
been  made  to  realize  it.  Inasmuch  as  we  con- 
clude from  the  world  to  God,  we  must  be  able 
to  conclude  from  God  to  the  world.  Sometimes 
the  matter  has  been  made  very  easy  by  defining 
creation  as  essential  to  the  divine  nature ;  and 
then  the  conclusion  has  been  drawn  that  God 
without  the  world  would  be  a  contradiction.  In 
addition  to  being  failures,  these  attempts  spring 
fi'om  a  speculative  lust  for  understanding  and 
construing,  which  fails  to  grasp  the  conditions 
of  understanding.  In  this  respect  they  are  on 
a  par  with  the  infantile  wisdom  which  asks. 
Who  made  God? 

§  62.  The  world,  then,  depends  on  the  divine 
will.  In  estimating  this  result,  care  must  be 
taken  not  to  apply  to  the  di\dne  willing  the 
limitations  of  the  human.  As  in  human  con- 
sciousness there  are  many  features  which  are 
not  essential  to  consciousness,  and  which  arise 
from  our  hmitations,  so  in  human  willing  there 
are  many  features  which  are  not  essential  to 
willing,  and  which  result  from   our  finiteness. 


GOD  AND  THE  WORLD.  187 

Since  we  get  our  objects  of  volition  gradually 
and  by  experience,  we  tend  to  think  of  will  as 
a  momentary  activity  which  comes  into  our  life 
now  and  then,  but  which,  for  the  most  part,  is 
quiescent.  In  this  way  we  come  to  think  of  an 
act  of  will  as  having  nothing  to  do  with  the 
maintenance  of  a  fixed  state,  but  only  as  pro- 
ducing a  change;  or  if  it  should  look  to  the 
preservation  of  a  given  state,  it  would  only  be  as 
that  state  might  be  threatened  by  something  ex- 
ternal. And  so,  finally,  it  comes  to  pass  that  we 
think  of  wiUing  as  something  necessarily  tem- 
poral or  beginning.  When,  then,  we  speak  of  the 
world  as  depending  on  the  divine  will,  the  im- 
agination finds  it  difficult  to  grasp  this  thought 
without  assuming  an  empty  time  before  its 
origination. 

But  these  features  of  human  willing  are  not 
to  be  transferred  to  God  without  inspection. 
To  begin  Tvdth,  willing  does  not  necessarily  im- 
ply beginning.  In  studjdng  the  divine  omnipo- 
tence we  saw  that  Grod's  will  in  reference  to 
himself  must  be  eternal ;  that  is,  it  is  as  un- 
begun as  God,  being  but  that  fi'ee  self-deter- 
mination whereby  God  is  God.  It  is  only  in 
relation   to  the  world  that  God's  wiU  can  be 


188  PUILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

temporal;  and  here,  too,  there  is  an  essential 
difference.  We  come  only  gradually  to  a  knowl- 
edge of  our  aims;  but  this  cannot  be  affirmed 
of  God.  We  have  seen  that  in  his  absolute  self- 
knowledge  and  seK-possession  God  has  neither 
past  nor  future.  Hence  the  ideals  of  the  di- 
vine will  are  also  eternal  in  the  di\'ine  thought. 
The  will  to  create,  however,  is  differently  re- 
garded. Some  view  it  as  an  eternal  predicate 
of  God,  and  others  view  it  as  a  temporal  predi- 
cate. 

Still  another  distinction  between  our  will  and 
the  creative  will  must  be  noticed.  With  us  to 
will  is  not  necessarily  to  fulfil;  and  thus  we 
come  to  think  that  in  addition  to  the  will  there 
must  also  be  a  special  activity  of  realization. 
Some  have  carried  this  conception  over  to  God, 
and  have  affirmed  the  will  to  create  to  be  eter- 
nal, while  the  execution  is  temporal.  But  this 
view  confounds  intention  with  will,  and  for  the 
rest,  is  false.  This  feature  of  our  trilling  is  due 
altogether  to  our  finiteness.  Our  willing,  in  fact, 
extends  only  to  our  mental  states,  and  is  not 
absolute  even  there.  For  the  production  of 
effects  in  the  outer  world  we  depend  on  some- 
thing not  ourselves;  and  as  this  is  not  always 


GOD  AND  THE   WORLD.  189 

STibser\dent  to  us,  we  come  to  distinguish  be- 
tween volition  and  realization.  Again,  we  find 
that  we  cannot  always  control  oui'  thoughts, 
because  they  are  partly  due  to  external  causes ; 
and  in  the  struggle  which  thus  arises  we  find 
additional  ground  for  distinguishing  the  will 
and  the  realization.  Finally,  our  control  of  the 
body  is  attended  by  many  feehngs  of  strain  and 
effort,  and  these  we  carry  into  the  idea  of  ^Yi]l 
itself,  where  it  by  no  means  belongs.  These 
feehngs  are  effects  of  muscular  tension  result- 
ing from  our  will,  but  they  are  no  part  of  the 
will  itself.  None  of  these  elements  can  be 
transferred  to  God.  He  is  unconditioned  by 
anything  beyond  himself.  He  is  the  absolutely 
seK-determining,  and  with  him  wilhng  must  be 
identical  with  realization. 

§  63.  Two  views,  we  said,  are  held  of  the  will 
to  create,  some  making  it  an  eternal  and  others 
only  a  temporal  predicate  of  God.  Of  these  two 
"vdews  the  latter  is  the  more  easily  realized  by 
the  imagination.  By  its  affirmation  of  an  empty 
time  before  the  creative  act,  that  act  is  made 
to  appear  more  like  an  act  than  an  eternal 
doing  would  be,  and  at  the  same  time  the  view 


190  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

marks  off  creation  as  an  act  of  will  more  clearly 
from  the  opposite  doctrine,  which  makes  crea- 
tion a  necessary  consequence  of  the  divine  nat- 
ure. This,  however,  is  only  an  aid  to  the  im- 
agination. If  the  Creator  be  free,  he  is  eternally 
free.  He  did  not  first  exist  and  then  become 
free,  but  his  freedom  is  coexistent  with  him- 
self; and  hence  his  free  doing  may  coexist 
with  himself.  There  is  nothing  in  the  notion 
of  eternal  creation  which  is  incompatible  with 
divine  freedom  or  with  the  absolute  dependence 
of  the  world  on  the  divine  will.  The  notion  of 
a  temporal  creation  has  the  disadvantage  also 
of  raising  certain  troublesome  questions,  such 
as,  What  was  God  doing  in  the  eternity  before 
creation  ?  or,  ^Yhy  did  creation  take  place  when 
it  chd,  and  not  at  some  other  time  ?  We  can- 
not fill  up  this  time  with  a  di\dne  seK- evolu- 
tion, as  if  God  were  gradually  coming  to  himself 
and  getting  ready  to  create,  for  this  would  can- 
cel his  absoluteness  and  reduce  him  to  a  tem- 
poral being.  Some  of  the  more  naive  specu- 
lators have  thought  to  fill  up  the  time  before 
creation  by  a  series  of  pre^dous  creations — a 
suggestion  which  shows  more  appreciation  of 
the  difficulty  of  the  problem  than  of  the  re- 


GOD  AND  THE  WORLD.  191 

quired  solution.  It  seems,  then,  that  no  reason 
for  delay  can  be  fomid  in  God,  and  certainly 
none  can  be  found  in  time  itseK,  since  one  mo- 
ment of  absolute  time  is  like  any  other;  and 
hence,  finally,  it  seems  that  a  temporal  creation 
must  be  an  act  of  pure  arbitrariness.  On  all 
these  accounts  many  theologians  have  declared 
for  an  eternal  creation,  and  have  further  de- 
clared creation  to  mean  not  temporal  origina- 
tion, but  simply  and  only  the  dependence  of  the 
world  on  God. 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  notion  of  an 
eternal  creation  of  the  world  is  not  without 
its  difficulties,  partly  real  and  partly  imaginary. 
To  begin  with  the  latter,  it  is  said  that  the  cos- 
mic process  is  a  changing  one,  and  hence  tem- 
poral and  hence  begun.  The  answer  is  that 
change  does  not  take  place  in  time,  but  founds 
time,  so  that  time  is  only  the  form  of  change. 
Hence  temporality  and  change  are  identical. 
But  temporality  in  tliis  sense  is  simply  a  mode 
of  existence,  and  its  antithesis  is  not  the  un- 
begun but  the  changeless.  Viewed  as  enduring, 
the  changing  process  may  be  as  eternal  as  its 
cause. 

This  conception  of  time   gives  a  somewhat 


192  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

different  aspect  to  the  question.  Metaphysics 
shows  that  time  cannot  be  a  proper  ontological 
reahty,  but  is  only  the  form  of  change  in  gen- 
eral. The  cosmic  process  is  not  in  time,  but  by 
its  incessant  change  it  produces  the  form  of 
time.  God,  however,  as  the  absolute  person,  is 
non- temporal  and  exists  in  absolute  self-pos- 
session Avithout  past  or  future.  Hence  time  be- 
gan with  the  cosmic  process,  and  the  questions, 
What  was  God  doing  before  creation?  and  Why 
did  he  create  when  he  did?  have  no  meaning. 
In  his  absolute  self -related  existence,  God  is 
timeless.  Hence  he  did  not  create  at  a  certain 
point  of  absolute  time,  but  he  created  and  thus 
gave  both  the  world  and  time  their  existence. 
If,  then,  we  view  the  world  as  begun,  it  is 
strictly  absurd  to  ask  when  or  at  what  mo- 
ment of  the  eternal  flow  of  time  did  God  create. 
There  is  no  such  flow ;  and  hence  creation  did 
not  take  place  at  any  moment.  In  the  begin- 
ning God  created,  for  creation  was  the  begin- 
ning even  of  time  itself. 

§  64.  Many  attempts  have  been  made  to  prove 
eternal  creation  to  be  a  contradiction.  These 
generally  rest  on  the  assumption  of  a  real  time, 


GOD  AND  THE  WORLD.  193 

and  fall  into  contradiction  with  themselves. 
The  claim  is  that  the  world  must  have  had  a 
beginning  in  time,  while  the  arguments  em- 
ployed prove  with  equal  cogency  that  time  itseK 
must  have  had  a  beginning.  This  is  the  case 
even  with  Kant,  whose  famous  antinomy  is  no 
more  efficient  against  the  eternity  of  the  world 
than  it  is  against  the  eternity  of  time.  But 
no  one  who  admits  an  infinite  past  time  can 
find  any  good  reason  for  denying  that  something 
may  always  have  been  happening  in  it.  Every 
believer  in  necessity  must  hold  that  something 
has  always  been  going  on ;  and  every  theist 
must  allow  that  something  may  always  have 
been  going  on.  There  is  no  apriori  reason  in 
theism  for  denying  that  the  cosmic  process  may 
be  coeternal  with  God. 

The  difficulties  commonly  urged  depend  on 
the  contradiction  said  to  inhere  in  the  notion 
of  an  infinite  elapsed  time.  But  this  arises 
from  overlooking  the  sense  in  which  past  time 
is  said  to  be  infinite.  This  infinity  means  sim- 
ply that  past  time  cannot  be  exhausted  by  any 
finite  regress.  Past  time  is  infinite  just  as 
space  in  any  direction  is  infinite.  In  the 
forjner  case  no  regress  will  find  a  beginning, 
13 


194  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

just  as  in  the  latter  case  no  progress  will  find 
an  end.  If,  now,  time  were  anything  capable 
of  real  objective  existence,  its  past  infinity,  in 
the  sense  described,  would  offer  no  difficulty  to 
thought ;  indeed,  it  would  rather  seem  to  be  a 
necessary  affirmation.  Such  difficulty  as  might 
arise  would  be  due  to  confounding  thought  and 
imagination.  The  imagination  cannot  represent 
either  space  or  time  as  unhmited,  but  thought 
cannot  conceive  either  as  limited.  But  with  in- 
finite time  and  the  eternal  God  as  data,  there 
seems  to  be  no  reason  for  denying  the  possi- 
bihty  of  a  cosmic  process  extending  throughout 
the  infinite  time. 

Some  further  objections  are  offered,  based  on 
the  nature  of  number.  Number  is  necessarily 
finite,  and  hence  anything  to  which  number 
apphes  must  be  finite  also.  But  number  ap- 
phes  to  time  as  its  measure,  and  hence  time 
must  be  finite,  and  hence  must  have  a  begin- 
ning. Such  argument,  however,  puzzles  rather 
than  convinces.  To  begin  with,  the  necessary 
finiteness  of  number  means  only  that  any  num- 
ber whatever  admits  of  increase.  But  it  is  en- 
tirely compatible  with  this  finitude  that  the 
number  should  not  admit  of  exhaustion  in  any 


GOD  AXD  THE  WORLD.  195 

finite  time.  If  we  suppose  time  to  be  real  and 
infinite,  then  in  the  past  time  a  definite  num- 
ber of  units  have  passed  away ;  but  that  num- 
ber does  not  admit  of  expression  in  finite  terms. 
It  is  constantly  growing,  to  be  sure,  because 
time  is  constantly  passing.  In  no  other  sense 
need  it  be  finite.  If  it  be  said  that  the  very  nat- 
ure of  a  series  demands  a  beginning,  as  there 
can  be  no  second  without  a  first,  we  need  to 
consider  whether  such  apphcation  of  number 
to  the  boundless  continuum  of  time  is  not  as 
relative  to  ourselves  as  its  similar  application 
to  space.  For  our  apprehension  we  have  to  set 
up  axes  of  reference  in  both  cases ;  but  we  are 
not  able  to  say  that  the  fact  itseK  depends 
upon  those  devices  by  which  we  conceive  it. 
The  celestial  horizon  and  equator  do  not  make 
the  motions  and  positions  which  they  enable 
us  to  grasp  and  measure.  The  argument  from 
number  proves  the  finitude  of  space  quite  as 
cogently  as  that  of  time.  But  if  we  allow  that 
time  is  infinite,  and  claim  only  that  the  cosmic 
process  in  time  must  be  finite,  w^e  fall  into  a 
curious  antinomy.  On  the  one  hand,  it  seems 
clear  that  the  Eternal  God  may  always  have 
been  doing  something;  but  on  the  other  hand, 


196  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

owing  to  the  potency  of  number,  God  must 
have  waited  for  the  past  eternity  to  elapse 
before  he  could  do  anything.  The  truth  is, 
we  have  here  the  opposition  between  time  as 
thought  and  time  as  imagined,  to  which  refer- 
ence has  abeady  been  made.  Oversight  of  this 
distinction  vitiates  not  a  few  of  the  traditional 
arguments  for  a  first  cause.  Our  inability  to 
represent  an  eternal  process  is  taken  for  the 
proof  of  a  beginning. 

But  it  is  time  to  return  from  this  long  ex- 
cursion. Our  view  of  time  empties  most  of 
these  questions  of  all  significance.  We  need 
not  concern  ourselves  with  what  God  was  do- 
ing in  the  long  eternity  before  creation;  for 
there  was  no  such  eternity.  There  was  simply 
the  self-existent,  self-possessing,  timeless  God, 
whose  name  is  I  Am,  and  whose  being  is  with- 
out temporal  ebb  and  flow.  Temporal  terms 
have  meaning  only  within  the  cosmic  process 
itself,  and  are  altogether  empty  when  apphed 
to  the  absolute  God.  And  within  the  cosmic 
process  itself  temporal  relations  are  but  the 
fonn  under  which  we  represent  the  unpictur- 
able  dynamic  relations  among  the  things  and 
phases  of  that  process. 


GOD  AND  THE  WORLD.  197 

§  65.  The  conception  of  creation  as  a  free 
act  and  not  as  a  necessary  evolution  of  the  nat- 
ure of  the  world -ground,  forbids  all  attempts 
to  identify  the  world  with  God.  But  specula- 
tive thought  has  been  prolific  in  attempts  to 
understand  the  manner  and  motive  of  creation. 
A  superficial  type  of  speculation  has  sought  to 
explain  the  manner  by  a  great  variety  of  cos- 
mogonies, some  of  which  are  still  in  fashion. 
None  of  these  have  either  rehgious  or  specula- 
tive significance.  They  relate  only  to  the  trans- 
forming and  combining  of  given  material,  and 
say  nothing  concerning  its  origination.  For 
understanding  the  origin  of  the  creative  act, 
we  have  only  the  analogy  of  our  own  experi- 
ence, according  to  which  we  first  form  concep- 
tions and  then  reahze  them.  Hence  the  divine 
understanding  has  been  distinguished  from  the 
divine  will,  and  a  kind  of  division  of  labor  has 
been  made  between  them.  The  understanding 
furnishes  the  conception  of  all  possibihties,  and 
from  these  the  divine  wisdom  chooses  the  best 
for  reahzation  by  the  divine  will.  Many  scru- 
ples have  been  raised  concerning  this  distinc- 
tion, on  the  ground  that  in  God  knowing  and 
wilhng  must  be  identical;   but  tliis  identity  is 


198  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

secured  only  by  defining  each  term  so  as  to 
include  the  other.  In  both  cases,  however,  we 
have  to  leave  out  those  features  of  our  know- 
ing and  wiUing  which  arise  from  our  hmita- 
tions.  In  general  the  identification  of  know- 
ing and  willing  in  God  confounds  synchronism 
with  identity.  In  knowing  which  looks  towards 
doing  there  is  no  assignable  reason  why  the 
doing  should  be  postponed,  and  thus  we  are  led 
to  ^dew  them  as  contemporaneous.  But  know- 
ing and  wiUing  as  mental  functions  remain  as 
distinct  as  ever.  Besides,  God's  knowledge  ex- 
tends to  the  e\T-l  as  well  as  the  good;  does  he 
therefore  Vvdll  the  evil? 

Concerning  the  motive  of  creation  pure  spec- 
ulation can  say  nothing  positive.  It  can  only 
point  out  that  if  the  divine  absoluteness  is  to 
be  maintained,  this  motive  must  not  he  in  any 
lack  or  imperfection  of  the  Creator.  For  posi- 
tive suggestion  we  must  have  recourse  to  our 
moral  and  religious  nature ;  and  this  refuses  to 
be  satisfied  with  any  lower  motive  than  ethi- 
cal love.  This  fact,  together  with  the  positive 
teachings  of  Christianity,  has  led  to  many  at- 
tempts to  deduce  the  system  as  an  outcome  of 
love;  but  the  success  has  been  very  shght.    We 


GOD  AND  THE  WORLD.  199 

are  so  little  able  to  tell  apriori  what  that  love 
implies  that  we  cannot  even  adjust  a  large  part 
of  actual  experience  to  the  conception  of  any 
kind  of  love,  ethical  or  otherwise.  It  only  re- 
mains that  we  believe  in  love  as  the  source  of 
creation  and  the  essence  of  the  divine  nature, 
without  being  in  any  way  able  to  fix  its  imph- 
cations. 

§  66.  The  world  was  produced  by  the  divine 
will,  but  this  does  not  determine  its  present  re- 
lation to  that  will.  Concerning  this  there  are 
two  extreme  views  and  an  indefinite  number  of 
intermediate  ones.  One  extreme,  deism,  regards 
the  world  as  needing  only  to  be  created,  being 
able  to  exist  thereafter  entirely  on  its  own 
account.  The  other  extreme  finds  so  Httle 
substantiahty  in  the  world  as  to  regard  its 
continued  existence  as  a  perpetual  creation. 
Between  these  extremes  lie  the  views  which, 
against  deism,  maintain  an  activity  of  conserva- 
tion distinct  from  that  of  creation,  and  which, 
on  the  other  hand,  refuse  to  identify  creation 
and  conservation. 

The  deistic  view  sets  up  nature  as  an  inde- 
pendent power  with  laws  and  rights  of  its  own. 


200  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

while  God  appears  as  an  absentee  and  without 
any  administrative  occupation  so  far  as  nature 
is  concerned.  The  impossibihty  of  this  concep- 
tion has  already  appeared.  No  finite  thing  has 
any  metaphysical  rights  of  its  own  whereby  it 
becomes  an  obstacle  or  barrier  in  any  sense  to 
God.  Both  laws  and  things  exist  or  change 
solely  because  of  the  demands  of  the  divine 
plan.  If  this  calls  for  fixedness,  they  are  fixed ; 
if  it  calls  for  change,  they  change.  They  have 
in  themselves  no  ground  of  existence  so  as  to 
be  a  limit  for  God;  because  they  are  nothing 
but  the  divine  purpose  flowing  forth  into  reali- 
zation. If  natural  agents  endure  it  is  not  be- 
cause of  an  inherent  right  to  existence,  but 
because  the  creative  will  constantly  upholds 
them.  If  in  the  cosmic  movement  the  same 
forces  constantly  appear  working  according  to 
the  same  laws,  this  is  not  because  of  some  eter- 
nal persistence  of  force  and  law,  but  because  it 
lies  in  the  divine  plan  to  work  in  fixed  forms 
and  methods  for  the  production  of  compound 
effects.  In  a  word,  the  continuity  of  natural 
processes  upon  which  physical  science  is  based 
is  admitted  as  a  fact,  but  not  as  a  fact  which 
accounts  for  itself  or  which  rests  upon  some 


GOD  AND  THE  WORLD.  201 

metapliysical  necessity,  but  rather  as  a  fact 
which  depends  at  every  moment  upon  the  di- 
vine will,  and  which  only  expresses  the  con- 
sistency of  the  divine  methods.  As  against 
deism,  then,  we  hold  that  the  world  is  no  self- 
centred  reahty,  independent  of  God,  but  is 
simply  the  form  in  which  divine  purpose  real- 
izes itself.  It  has  no  laws  of  its  own  which 
oppose  a  bar  to  the  divine  purpose,  but  all  its 
laws  and  ongoings  are  but  the  expression  of 
that  purpose.  In  our  deahng  with  nature  we 
have  to  accommodate  ourselves  to  its  laws,  but 
with  God  the  purpose  is  original,  the  laws  are 
its  consequence.  Hence  the  system  of  law  is 
itseK  absolutely  sensitive  to  the  di\dne  purpose, 
so  that  what  that  purpose  demands  finds  im- 
mediate expression  and  realization,  not  in  spite 
of  the  system,  but  in  and  through  the  system. 

The  view  which  identifies  conservation  with 
perpetual  creation  is  manageable  only  when  ap- 
pHed  to  the  physical  system.  Here  form  and 
law  are  the  only  fixed  elements  we  can  find; 
and  metaphysics  makes  it  doubtful  whether 
there  can  be  others.  In  that  case  the  physical 
order  becomes  simply  a  process  which  exists 
only  in  its  perpetual  ongoing.    It  has  the  iden- 


202  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

tity  of  a  musical  note,  and,  like  such  a  note,  it 
exists  only  on  condition  of  being  incessantly 
and  continuously  reproduced.  But  we  cannot 
apply  this  ^dew  to  the  world  of  spirits  without 
losing  ourselves  in  utterly  unmanageable  diffi- 
culties. 

We  seem,  then,  shut  up  to  distinguish  crea- 
tion from  preservation.  But  the  nature  of  this 
distinction  eludes  all  apprehension.  We  are  led 
here  to  affirm  something  whose  nature  and 
method  are  utterly  opaque  to  our  thought.  On 
the  one  hand,  we  have  a  measure  of  seK-hood 
and  self-control.  This  fact  constitutes  our 
claim  to  be  considered  reahties.  On  the  other 
hand,  we  are  forced  to  admit  that  our  existence 
forever  depends  on  some  absolute  existence. 
How  these  two  facts  coexist  is  perhaps  the 
deejDest  mystery  of  speculation.  Possibly  the 
ideality  of  time  might  serve  to  reheve  the  diffi- 
culty involved  in  distinguishing  creation  and 
preservation. 

§  67.  If  the  physical  system  only  were  con- 
cerned, nothing  more  need  be  added  about 
the  relation  of  the  world  to  God.  He  is  its 
creator  and  conserver,  and  we  should  add  noth- 


GOD  AND  THE  WORLD.  203 

ing  ill  calling  him  its  ruler  or  governor.  Even 
realism  regards  the  world  of  things  as  receiving 
its  law  from  God,  and  as  unable  in  any  way  to 
depart  from  it.  Such  tilings  need  no  govern- 
ment ;  or,  rather,  government  has  no  meaning 
when  applied  to  them.  We  can  speak  of  gov- 
ernment only  where  there  are  beings  which  by 
a  certain  independence  threaten  to  withdraw 
themselves  from  the  general  plan  wliich  the 
ruler  aims  to  realize.  We  find  the  proper  sub- 
jects of  a  divine  government  only  in  finite 
spirits,  as  only  these  have  that  relative  inde- 
pendence over  against  God  which  the  idea  of 
government  demands. 

The  notion  of  a  divine  government,  then, 
imphes  free  spirits  as  its  subjects.  But  free- 
dom in  itself  is  a  means  only  and  not  an  end. 
Apart  from  some  good  which  can  be  realized 
only  by  freedom,  a  free  world  is  no  better  than 
a  necessary  one.  Hence  the  notion  of  a  world- 
government  acquires  rational  meaning  only  as 
some  supreme  good  exists  which  is  to  be  the 
outcome  of  creation,  and  which,  therefore,  gives 
the  law  for  all  personal  activity.  A  world-gov- 
ernment implies  a  world -goal  which,  in  tm^n, 
imphes  a  world-law.    A  cosmic  movement  with- 


204  PUILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

out  direction  and  aim  could  not  be  the  outcome 
of  a  seK-respecting  intelligence. 

What,  then,  is  that  great  end  which  all  free 
beings  should  serve?  Nature  shows  us  num- 
berless particular  ends,  but  none  of  these  have 
supreme  worth,  and  most  of  them  have  no  as- 
signable worth.  So  far  as  observation  goes,  the 
ends  realized  in  nature  are  generally  so  insig- 
nificant that  they  seem  to  add  nothing  to  the 
perfection  of  the  world,  and  in  many  cases 
they  even  appear  as  blemishes.  Observation 
discovers  no  supreme  end.  The  cosmos  as  a 
whole  does  not  seem  to  set  very  definitely  in 
any  direction,  and  presents  a  drifting  movement 
rather  than  a  fixed  course.  Nor  can  we  find 
the  aim  of  the  cosmic  movement  in  any  de- 
velopment of  the  world-ground,  as  that  would 
reduce  it  to  a  temporal  existence.  But  if  we 
insist  on  having  a  world -goal,  we  can  find  a 
sufficient  one  only  in  the  moral  realm.  A  com- 
munity of  moral  persons,  obeying  moral  law 
and  enjoying  moral  blessedness,  is  the  only  end 
which  could  excuse  creation  or  make  it  worth 
while.  Hence  the  notion  of  a  moral  govern- 
ment leads  at  once  to  the  ethical  realm,  and 
miplies  notions  foreign  to  metaphysics.     If  one 


GOD  AND  THE  WORLD.  205 

lias  not  these  notions  there  can  be  no  ques- 
tion of  snch  a  government,  and  theistic  philoso- 
phy closes  with  considering  the  causal  relation 
of  God  to  the  world. 

§  68.  If  we  suppose  the  world  of  things  to 
contain  the  reason  of  its  existence  within  itself, 
there  is  no  reason  why  the  fixed  order  of  ante- 
cedence and  sequence  should  ever  be  departed 
from.  In  such  a  world  any  one  state  would 
be  as  good  as  any  other,  and  new  departures 
would  have  no  significance.  But  a  world  of 
things  which  is  to  minister  to  a  world  of  per- 
sons must  not  be  thus  rigid.  It  must  be  capa- 
ble of  taking  up  new  factors  or  of  receiving 
impulses  from  without.  Only  on  this  condition 
can  it  become  the  servant  of  finite  intelligence. 
The  actual  system  is  such  a  system.  It  is 
perpetually  taking  on  new  modifications  which 
are  not  the  results  of  the  antecedent  states  of 
the  system,  but  which  have  their  source  in 
human  vohtion.  This  vohtion,  however,  breaks 
no  laws,  but  reahzes  itself  through  the  laws. 
As  soon  as  the  vohtional  impulse  is  given,  the 
effect  enters  into  the  great  web  of  law  and  is 
carried  out  by  the  same. 


206  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM, 

This  fact  suggests  a  means  of  conceiving  the 
method  of  the  divine  government.  In  a  world 
of  free  beings  there  may  be  at  times  a  de- 
parture from  the  ideal  order  of  things,  and  to 
remedy  this  it  may  be  necessary  to  meet  it  by 
changes  in  things  which  are  not  consequents 
of  the  antecedent  states  of  the  system.  As  the 
system  is  constantly  taking  on  modifications 
which  have  their  source  in  human  volition,  so 
it  may  be  constantly  taking  on  modifications 
which  have  their  source  in  special  divine  voh- 
tion.  In  that  case  effects  would  be  produced 
which  the  system  in  its  accustomed  movement 
would  not  reahze.  Such  effects  involve  no  gen- 
eral suspension  of  natural  laws,  nor  even  a 
break  of  phenomenal  continuity.  They  would 
arise  apparently  as  the  result  of  famihar  natu- 
ral processes  although  really  rooted  in  a  special 
di\dne  volition.  This  conception  of  miracle 
pro\ides  for  a  divine  government  as  distinct 
from  the  simple  maintenance  of  a  rigid  order. 
Miracles  as  signs  we  have  no  call  to  discuss. 

This  general  conception  of  interpolated  effects 
has  been  stoutly  rejected.  So  far  as  this  rejec- 
tion rests  on  atheistic  assumptions,  it  does  not 
exist  for  theism.    So  far  as  it  proceeds  from  the- 


GOD  AND  THE  WORLD.  207 

ists,  it  generally  depends  on  the  deistic  concep- 
tion of  the  relation  of  God  and  the  world.  God 
being  an  absentee,  and  the  world  being  able  to 
take  care  of  itself,  any  modification  appears  as 
an  "  interference ;"  and  as  interfering  often  de- 
notes a  morally  reprehensible  procedm-e,  there 
seems  to  be  no  help  for  rejecting  the  notion. 
In  truth,  the  "interference"  does  no  more  vi- 
olence to  the  system  than  do  the  analogous 
interferences  of  human  volition.  It  seems  per- 
missible, then,  to  hold  that  what  is  possible 
with  man  may  be  possible  with  God.  God, 
then,  may  be  present  in  hmnan  history,  guid- 
ing the  world,  raising  up  leaders,  giving  direc- 
tion to  pubhc  thought,  purifying  the  receptive 
and  wilhng  heart,  answering  prayer  according 
to  his  wisdom,  and  scourging  pubhc  and  private 
wickedness ;  yet  without  in  any  way  breaking 
through  the  fixed  phenomenal  order. 

But  this  only  suggests  a  possibihty  and  a 
method  of  conceiving  how  the  divine  govern- 
ment may  coexist  Vvdth  fixed  laws.  The  reahty 
of  the  fact  is  another  matter.  If  there  be  any 
reason  for  affii-ming  it,  speculation  has  no  word 
of  vahd  objection.  It  is  plain,  however,  that 
such  interventions  must  be   sought  chiefly  in 


208  THILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

the  life  of  the  spirit.  Our  freedom  produces 
only  slight  modifications  in  the  outer  world  and 
none  in  its  laws.  These  need  no  change;  and 
it  is  hard  to  see  of  what  use  such  change  would 
be  if  it  were  real.  The  modifying  activity  of 
God  doubtless  finds  its  chief  field  in  the  inner 
life,  and  here  not  in  the  way  of  using  the  spirit 
as  a  passive  instrument,  but  rather  by  furnish- 
ing it  with  special  incitements  to  activity  which 
neither  the  outer  world  nor  the  mental  mechan- 
ism provides.  But  even  this  directing  activity 
takes  place  \vithout  any  apparent  irruption  from 
without  and  without  destroying  the  apparent 
continuity  of  psychological  law. 

§  69.  The  discussion  of  miracle  has  proceed- 
ed thus  far  on  the  reahstic  conception  of  the 
cosmos.  From  my  own  metaphysical  stand- 
point the  question  assumes  a  somewhat  differ- 
ent form.  In  this  view  the  cosmos  contains 
two  factors,  elementary  forms  of  action  and 
laws  for  their  combination.  These  laws  are 
fixed ;  but  the  f oi-ms  of  action  are  simply  what 
the  divine  purpose  at  any  moment  demands. 
They  represent,  therefore,  nothing  fixed  once 
for  all,  so  that  from  their  state  at  any  one  mo- 


GOD  AND  THE  WORLD.  209 

ment  we  could  deduce  their  state  at  all  other 
moments.  They  are  not,  then,  rigid  fixities,  but 
flowing  expressions  of  the  divine  plan ;  and  to 
know  them  we  must  know  the  plan  and  pur- 
pose which  they  express.  They  are  forever 
becoming  that  winch  the  Creator  wills  them  to 
be.  Here  is  where  power  has  its  seat  and  the 
road  by  which  purpose  marches  to  its  reahza- 
tion.  But  with  this  conception  of  the  di\i.ne 
immanence  and  of  the  absolute  dependence  of 
the  system  in  all  respects  upon  the  divine  pui'- 
pose,  the  question  of  miracle  loses  all  special  sig- 
nificance. Nature  becomes,  not  a  self-enclosed 
existence,  but  only  a  general  term  for  the  es- 
tablished order  of  procedure;  and  a  natural 
event  is  one  in  which  familiar  processes  can  be 
traced,  or  which  can  be  connected  with  other 
events  according  to  general  laws.  The  nih^acu- 
lous,  on  the  other  hand,  would  have  no  such 
connection;  but  both  the  natural  and  the  mi- 
raculous alike  would  have  their  root  in  the  su- 
pernatural. Finally,  we  may  question  even  the 
existence  of  laws  except  as  formal  and  subjec- 
tive. There  is  not  first  a  system  of  general 
laws  into  which  effects  are  afterwards  inter- 
jected ;  but  there  is  the  actual  system  of  re- 
14 


210  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

ality,  uplield  and  maintained  by  the  immanent 
God.  For  our  thought  this  system  admits  of 
being  analyzed  into  universal  laws  on  the  one 
hand  and  particular  effects  on  the  other;  but 
in  fact  this  is  only  a  logical  separation.  The 
effects  are  no  more  consequences  of  the  laws 
than  the  laws  are  consequences  of  the  effects. 
The  analyses  and  devices  of  discursive  thought 
do  not  give  us  reality  in  its  actual  existence, 
but  only  a  formal  equivalent  for  purposes  of 
our  calculation.  It  is  plain  that  in  this  view 
neither  religion  nor  speculation  can  have  any 
special  interest  in  scientific  cosmogonies,  evolu- 
tionary or  otherwise.  These  relate  only  to  the 
method  of  cosmic  procedure,  and  throw  no  hght 
on  the  nature  of  the  agent  at  work. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE  WOKLD-GKOUND   AS  ETHICAL. 

The  attributes  thus  far  considered  are  purely 
metaphysical  and  concern  only  the  understand- 
ing. They  are  such  properties  as  the  specula- 
tive intellect  must  affirm  in  deahng  with  the 
problem  of  the  universe  and  its  ground.  But 
if  we  should  stop  here  we  should  not  attain  to 
any  properly  religious  conception,  but  only  to 
the  last  term  of  metaphysical  speculation.  A 
good  example  of  this  is  furnished  by  Aristotle, 
with  whom  the  idea  of  God  has  a  purely  met- 
aphysical function  and  significance.  God  ap- 
pears as  prime  mover,  as  self-moved,  as  the 
primal  reason,  etc.,  but  not  as  the  object  of  love 
and  trust  and  worship. 

But  the  human  mind  in  general  has  not  been 
content  with  a  metaphysical  conception  of  God, 
but  has  rather  demanded  a  rehgious  one.  And 
the  latter  conception  has  always  been  first  and 
not  second.     The  metaphysical  thought  instead 


212  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

of  being  the  foundation  upon  which  the  rehg- 
ious  thought  was  built,  has  rather  been  reached 
by  later  analysis  as  an  implication  of  the  re- 
hgious  conception.  The  race  has  been  univer- 
sally religious,  but  only  moderately  metaphys- 
ical. 

From  the  religious  standpoint  the  important 
attributes  concern  the  divine  character  or  eth- 
ical nature.  We  have  now  to  inquire  for  the 
ground  of  their  affirmation. 

§  71.  If  we  accept  the  mental  ideal  of  a  per- 
fect being  as  the  ground  of  the  universe  the 
question  is  settled  at  once.  Moral  quahties  are 
the  highest.  The  true,  the  beautiful,  and  the 
good  love  goodness  and  righteousness;  these 
are  the  only  things  that  have  absolute  sacred- 
ness  and  unconditional  worth.  The  thought  of 
a  perfect  being  in  which  these  qualities  should 
be  lacking,  or  present  in  only  an  imperfect  de- 
gree, would  be  an  intellectual,  aesthetic,  and 
moral  absurdity  of  the  first  magnitude.  But 
this  demand  for  faith  in  the  ideal  when  thus 
boldly  made  is  apt  to  stagger  us,  and  w^e  prefer 
to  reach  the  result  in  somewhat  obscure  man- 
ner.    When  we  are  told  that  the  problem  of 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  ETHICAL.  213 

knowledge  demands  the  assumption  of  a  uni- 
verse transparent  to  our  reason,  so  that  what 
the  laws  of  our  thought  demand  the  universe 
cannot  fail  to  fulfil,  we  are  staggered  and  have 
many  doubts  and  scruples.  So  large  an  assump- 
tion is  not  to  be  made  without  due  wariness 
and  circumspection.  But  we  make  the  assump- 
tion piecemeal,  without  a  single  critical  qualm. 
In  the  actual  study  of  nature,  in  deahng  with 
specific  problems,  we  assume  the  principle  in 
question  as  a  matter  of  course.  It  is  only 
when  stated  in  its  abstract  universality  that 
it  appals  us.  It  is  so  with  the  larger  ideal 
of  the  perfect  being.  We  assume  it  implicit- 
ly and  upon  occasion,  but  we  do  not  like  to 
have  it  brought  out  in  sharp  abstract  state- 
ment. Here,  then,  is  a  psychological  limitation 
of  the  average  mind  which  must  be  regarded. 
We  shall  find  it  interesting,  however,  to  note 
the  way  in  which  the  ideal  determines  our 
reasoning. 

§  72.  There  is  no  way  of  speculative  de- 
duction. The  metaphysical  attributes  of  the 
world-ground  are  ethically  barren.  They  fur- 
nish the  possibihty   of  an   ethical  nature,  but 


214  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

they  do  not  imply  it  as  a  necessity.  There  is 
no  way,  then,  except  to  have  immediate  faith 
in  our  ideal  of  the  perfect  being,  or  else  to 
appeal  to  experience  to  prove  that  the  world- 
ground  proceeds  according  to  ethical  i^rinci- 
ples.  Our  actual  i^rocedure  is  a  mixture  of 
both. 

The  empirical  argument  for  the  moral  char- 
acter of  the  world -ground  is  derived  from  our 
moral  nature,  the  structure  of  society,  and 
course  of  history.  The  two  lii'st  are  held  to 
point  to  a  moral  author,  and  the  last  reveals  a 
power  not  ourselves,  making  for  righteousness, 
and  hence  moral. 

§  73.  Our  moral  nature  may  be  considered 
in  two  ways,  (1)  as  an  effect  to  be  explained, 
and  (2)  in  its  immediate  implications.  The 
first  problem,  then,  is  to  account  for  the  ex- 
istence of  our  moral  nature. 

The  readiest  solution  is  that  this  moral  nat- 
ure has  a  moral  author.  He  that  formed  the 
eye,  shall  not  he  see?  He  that  giveth  man 
knowledge,  shall  not  he  know?  So  also,  He 
that  implanted  in  man  an  unalterable  rever- 
ence for  righteousness,  shall  not  he  himself  be 


THE  WORLD-GROUND   AS  ETHICAL.  215 

righteous?  There  can  be  no  question  about 
the  knowledge  of  moral  distinctions  by  the  Cre- 
ator. Such  a  doubt  would  imply  that  some 
knowledge  is  impossible  to  the  source  of  all 
knowledge.  The  question  can  only  concern  his 
recognition  of  these  distinctions  in  his  action. 

A  great  deal  of  ingenuity  has  been  expend- 
ed in  trying  to  evade  the  conclusion  from  the 
moral  effect  to  a  moral  cause.  Much  of  this 
has  been  irrelevant,  and  all  of  it  has  been  un- 
successful. As  there  is  no  known  way  of  de- 
ducing intelhgence  from  non  -  intelhgence,  so 
there  is  no  known  way  of  deducing  the  moral 
from  the  non-moral;  except,  of  course,  by  the 
easy,  but  unsatisfactory,  way  of  begging  the 
question. 

The  irrelevance  mentioned  consists  in  the 
fact  that  a  large  part  of  this  discussion  has 
concerned  itself  with  the  inquiry  how  we  come 
to  recognize  moral  distinctions.  This  belongs 
to  the  debate  between  the  empirical,  and  the 
intuitional  school  of  morals,  and  does  not  nec- 
essarily touch  the  deeper  question  as  to  the 
reality  of  moral  distinctions.  To  become  rele- 
vant it  must  go  on  to  claim  that  moral  ideas 
are  purely  matters  of  opinion  and  prejudice, 


216  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

that,  in  fact,  there  is  neither  right  nor  ^Tong, 
and  that  one  thing  is  as  good  and  praiseworthy 
as  another.  Even  this  view  has  been  theoreti- 
cally affirmed,  but  it  conld  never  be  practically 
maintained  because  of  the  sharp  contradiction 
of  hfe  and  conscience.  The  theorist  himself 
could  never  maintain  it  outside  of  the  closet. 
As  soon  as  he  came  into  contact  with  others 
he  found  himself  compelled  to  acknowledge 
the  difference  of  right  and  wrong.  Hence 
spontaneous  thought  has  generally  regarded  the 
moral  nature  in  man  as  pointing  to  a  moral 
character  in  God  as  its  only  sufficient  ground. 
Speculation,  too,  knows  of  no  better  account  to 
give. 

§  74.  The  moral  nature,  we  said,  may  also  be 
considered  in  its  immediate  implications.  The 
claim  has  been  made  by  a  great  many  that 
conscience  itself  immediately  testifies  to  a 
moral  person  over  against  us  to  whom  it  re- 
sponds and  to  whom  we  are  responsible.  This 
claim  can  hardly  be  maintained  in  its  hteral 
form.  In  cases  of  high  rehgious  development 
and  sensibility  the  feehng  of  obhgation  may 
take  on  this  personal  form.     Right  is  the  will 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  ETHICAL.  217 

of  God;  sin  is  sin  against  God.  This  view  is 
both  strongly  asserted  and  warmly  disputed; 
and,  as  is  usual  in  such  cases,  there  seems  to  be 
some  truth  on  both  sides.  That  conscience 
carries  with  it  a  direct  assertion  of  God  the 
judge  and  the  avenger  can  hardly  be  pretended 
by  any  student  of  psychology ;  but  that  the 
assertion  of  a  supreme  judge  and  avenger  has 
its  chief  roots  in  the  moral  nature  cannot  well 
be  denied.  The  sacredness  of  right,  the  sin  of 
oppression  and  injustice,  the  intolerable  nature 
of  a  universe  in  which  justice  is  not  regarded, 
and  guilt  and  innocence  come  to  a  common 
end — these  considerations  have  led  the  race  to 
posit  a  supreme  justice  and  righteousness  in 
the  heavens.  To  this  all  literature  bears  wit- 
ness ;  and  practically  these  reflections  are  po- 
tent arguments.  But  in  logic  they  are  not  ar- 
guments at  all.  To  one  who  assumes  nothing 
concerning  the  universe,  one  thing  is  no  more 
surprising  than  another,  and  one  thing  is  as  al- 
lowable as  another.  If  we  do  not  assume  that 
the  universe  is  bound  to  be  moral,  we  cannot 
be  surprised  at  finding  it  non-moral.  If  we  do 
not  assume  that  our  interests  ought  to  be  con- 
sidered by  the  world -ground,  we  ought  not  to 


218  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

be  astonished  at  finding  tliem  disregarded.  The 
truth  is  that  in  arguments  of  this  sort  we  have 
an  underlying  assumption  of  a  perfect  being, 
and  of  the  supremacy  of  human  and  moral  in- 
terests ;  and  this  gives  the  conclusion  all  its 
force.  Suppose  justice  is  not  regarded,  what 
does  that  prove  unless  we  have  assumed  that 
justice  must  be  regarded?  Suppose  the  uni- 
verse should  turn  out  to  be  an  ugly  and  shabby 
thing  without  moral  or  aesthetic  value ;  who 
knows  that  it  is  bound  to  be  the  seat  and 
manifestation  of  the  true,  the  beautiful,  and 
the  good?  The  true  force  of  such  considera- 
tions is  not  logical ;  they  serve  rather  and  only 
to  reveal  to  us  the  distressing  and  intolerable 
negations  involved  in  certain  views.  Their  re- 
jection is  not  a  logical  inference,  but  an  imme- 
diate refusal  of  the  soul  to  abdicate  its  own 
nature  and  surrender  to  pessimism  and  de- 
spair. Hence  whatever  enriches  the  inner  hfe 
strengthens  the  appropriate  faith.  A  poem  hke 
"In  Memoriam,"  a  growing  affection,  a  strong 
sense  of  justice,  may  do  more  for  faith  than 
acres  of  logic.  But  this  insight  into  the  true 
nature  of  the  argument  need  not  prevent  us 
from  yielding  to  it ;   for  we  have  abundantly 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  ETHICAL.  219 

seen  that  it  is  tlie  real  basis  of  our  whole  men- 
tal hfe. 

The  considerations  just  dwelt  upon  are  the 
gist  of  the  so-called  moral  argimient  for  the 
divine  existence.  We  shall  return  to  this  point 
in  the  next  chapter. 

§  75.  The  second  form  of  empirical  argument 
is  drawn  fi-om  the  structure  of  hfe  and  society, 
and  the  course  of  history.  Life  itself  is  so 
constructed  as  to  furnish  a  constant  stimulus 
in  moral  directions.  Nature  itseK  inculcates 
with  the  utmost  strenuousness  the  virtues  of 
industry,  prudence,  foresight,  self-control,  hon- 
esty, truth,  and  helpfulness.  In  spite  of  the  re- 
vised version,  the  way  of  the  transgressor  con- 
tinues hard.  When  all  allowance  is  made  for 
failing  cases,  there  can  be  no  question  that  the 
nature  of  things  is  on  the  side  of  righteous- 
ness. This  is  so  much  the  case  that  one  school 
of  morahsts  has  claimed  that  the  virtues  are 
simply  the  great  utihties.  The  possibihty  of 
such  a  claim  shows  the  ethical  framework  of 
hfe.  And  it  is  true  that  the  virtues  are  great 
utihties;  ethical  dispute  could  arise  only  over 
the  claim  that  utilities  are  necessarily  virtues; 


220  rniLosopiiY  of  theism. 

and  even  then  the  debate  would  turn  on  the 
meaning  of  utiUty.  If  we  define  utility  so  as 
to  include  the  satisfaction  of  the  moral  nature, 
there  is  no  longer  any  ground  of  dispute. 

Society,  again,  in  its  organized  form  is  a  moral 
institution  with  moral  ends.  However  selfish 
individuals  may  he,  they  cannot  live  together 
without  a  social  order  which  rests  on  moral 
ideas.  And  when  these  ideas  are  lacking,  and 
injustice,  oppression,  and  iniquity  are  enacted  by 
law,  social  earthquakes  and  volcanoes  begin  to 
rock  society  to  its  foundations.  The  elements 
melt  with  fervent  heat,  and  the  heavens  pass 
away  with  a  great  noise.  Neither  man  nor 
society  can  escape  the  need  of  righteousness, 
truthfulness,  honesty,  purity,  etc.  No  cunning, 
no  power,  can  forever  avail  against  the  truth. 
No  strength  can  long  support  a  he.  The 
wicked  may  have  great  power  and  spread  him- 
self hke  a  green  bay -tree,  but  he  j)asses  away. 
The  righteous  are  held  in  everlasting  remem- 
brance, but  the  name  of  the  wicked  rots.  When 
wickedness  is  committed  on  a  large  scale  by 
nations  the  result  is  even  more  marked.  No 
lesson  is  more  clearly  taught  by  history  than 
that  righteousness  exalteth  a  nation  while  sin 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  ETHICAL.  221 

is  a  reproach  to  any  people.  Nations  rich,  in 
arts  and  sciences  have  perished,  or  been  fear- 
fully punished,  because  of  evil-doing.  Oppres- 
sion, injustice,  sensuahty,  have  dragged  nation 
after  nation  down  into  the  dust  and  compelled 
them  to  drink  the  cup  of  a  bitter  and  terrible 
retribution.  The  one  truth,  it  is  said,  which 
can  be  verified  concerning  the  world-ground  is 
that  it  makes  for  righteousness. 

§  76.  These  empirical  arguments,  however, 
wliile  they  may  serve  to  illustrate  and  confirm 
our  faith,  are  plainly  not  its  source.  They  all 
rest  upon  picked  facts,  and  ignore  some  of  the 
most  i^i'ominent  aspects  of  experience.  This 
is  especially  the  case  with  the  historical  argu- 
ment. Here  a  scanty  stream  of  progress  is  dis- 
covered; and  the  swamps  and  marshes  of  hu- 
manity through  which  it  finds  its  doubtful  way 
are  overlooked.  The  area  of  progress  is  limited, 
while  the  great  mass  of  humanity  seems  to  have 
no  significance  for  history  or  development,  and 
to  have  no  principle  of  movement  above  simple 
animal  want.  Here  is  no  history,  no  progress, 
no  ideas,  only  physical  cravings  and  brute  in- 
stincts.    But  we  get  on  with  the  utmost  cheer- 


222  PniLOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

fulness  by  letting  the  "  race  "  and  "  man  "  pro- 
gress, and  by  ignoring  individuals  and  men. 
Clearly,  we  need  something  beside  these  facts 
as  the  source  of  our  faith.  As  in  the  world 
we  find  marks  of  wisdom  but  not  of  perfect 
wisdom;  so  in  the  world  we  find  marks  of 
goodness  but  not  of  perfect  goodness.  In  both 
cases  we  pass  from  the  limited  wisdom  and 
goodness  which  we  find  to  the  perfect  wisdom 
and  goodness  in  which  we  beheve,  only  by  force 
of  our  faith  in  the  perfect  and  complete  ideal. 
Then,  having  thus  gained  the  conceptions,  we 
come  back  to  the  world  of  experience  again 
for  their  illustration.  And  the  facts  which 
from  a  logical  standpoint  make  a  poor  show  as 
proof  are  very  effective  as  illustration ;  and  this 
passes  for  proof.  It  does  indeed  produce  con- 
viction; but  the  true  nature  of  the  argument 
should  not  be  overlooked.  If  any  one  had  an 
interest  in  maintaining  the  opposite  hypotheses 
of  unwisdom  and  evil  in  the  world  -  ground,  a 
great  deal  might  be  said  for  them.  The  great 
mass  of  apparent  insignificance  and  all  the 
facts  of  evil  with  which  life  is  crowded  would 
lend  themselves  only  too  readily  to  illustrate 
such  a  view.     Of  course  a  purely  objective  pro- 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  ETHICAL.  223 

cedure  would  demand  that  we  take  all  tlie  facts 
into  account  and  strike  the  average.  Such  a 
study  of  the  facts  would  leave  us  in  great  un- 
certainty. Over  against  the  good  in  nature  we 
should  put  the  evil ;  and  this  would  hinder  the 
affirmation  of  goodness.  But  over  against  the 
evil  we  should  put  the  good;  and  this  would 
not  allow  us  to  affirm  a  fundamental  malignity. 
Over  against  the  wisdom  in  nature  we  should 
put  the  meaningless  aspects  of  existence,  the 
cosmic  labor  which  seems  to  end  in  nothing ; 
and  these  would  leave  us  in  doubt  whether  we 
were  not  contemplating  the  work  of  some  blind 
demiurge  rather  than  of  supreme  wisdom.  But 
over  against  these  facts  w^e  should  put  the  ever- 
growing rational  wonder  of  the  universe ;  and 
this  would  drive  us  into  doubt  again.  The  out- 
come would  probably  be  the  affirmation  of  a 
being  either  morally  indifferent,  or  morally  im- 
perfect, or  morally  good,  but  hmited  by  some 
insuperable  necessity  which  forbids  anything 
better  than  oui*  rather  shabby  universe. 

But  the  mind  is  not  satisfied  to  take  this 
road.  It  will  not  allow  its  ideals  to  collapse 
without  some  effort  to  save  them.  It  prefers 
rather  to  maintain  its  faith  in  the  ideal,  and  to 


224  niiLOSOPiiY  of  theism. 

set  aside  the  conflicting  facts  as  something  not 
yet  understood,  but  wliich  to  perfect  insight 
would  fall  into  harmony.  This  assumption  is 
made  both  in  the  cognitive  and  the  moral  realm ; 
and,  so  far  as  logic  goes,  it  is  as  well-founded 
in  one  realm  as  in  the  other.  In  both  cases  our 
procedure  is  not  due  to  any  logical  compulsion ; 
it  is  rather  an  act  of  instinctive  self-defence  on 
the  part  of  the  mind  whereby  it  seeks  to  save 
its  hfe  from  destruction. 

§  77.  That  experience  does  not  prove  the 
goodness  of  the  world -ground  is  generally  al- 
lowed. The  claim  of  the  optimist  is  rather 
that  experience  is  not  incompatible  therewith; 
and  the  opposing  claim  of  the  pessimist  is  that 
our  optimistic  faith  must  perish  when  con- 
fronted with  the  dark  realities  of  life  and  nat- 
ure. A  word  of  exposition  seems  desirable,  as 
both  parties  have  done  not  a  little  fighting  in 
the  dark. 

The  pessimistic  conclusion  from  the  appai  ent 
worthlessness  and  insignificance  of  existence  to 
the  denial  of  creative  wisdom,  as  distinct  from 
mere  skill,  rests  upon  two  assumptions  :  (1)  that 
perfect  wisdom  is  compatible  only  with  a  per- 


THE   WORLD-GROUND  AS  ETHICAL.  225 

feet  work ;  and  (2)  that  we  know  the  facts  in 
question  to  be  truly  worthless  and  insignificant. 
In  the  first  assumption  we  detect  only  a  certain 
Pharisaism  of  the  intellect;  and  in  the  second 
we  detect  an  arrogance  wliich  is  not  entirely 
compatible  with  the  humihty  which  so  often  re- 
nounces knowledge  altogether.  The  pessimist 
may  say  that  he  proceeds  inductively,  and  that 
where  he  sees  no  purpose  he  affirms  none ;  but 
in  this  he  rather  deludes  himself.  "Whex^e  he 
sees  no  purpose  he  denies  purpose ;  where  he 
sees  no  significance  he  denies  significance.  This 
denial  must  be  recalled;  and  the  optimist  and 
pessimist  must  choose  sides.  The  optimist  says 
that  he  finds  wisdom  as  far  as  he  can  under- 
stand, and  he  knows  his  own  insight  to  be  very 
limited.  He  prefers,  therefore,  to  beheve  that 
advancing  knowledge  will  dispel  our  difficulties. 
He  adds  that  this  is  the  method  on  which  thought 
generally  proceeds.  Thus  experience  is  largely 
chaotic.  A  reign  of  law  is  discerned  only  to  a 
very  hmited  extent.  But  instead  of  suffering 
chaos  to  dispute  the  sovereignty  of  law  we  rule 
it  out  as  an  intolerable  and  impossible  thought. 
The  optimistic  faith  is  only  another  case  of  the 
same  principle,  and  is  certainly  as  respectable  as 
15 


226  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

the  pessimistic  faith  which  is  based  on  the  as- 
sumption of  omniscence. 

But  this  is  only  a  skirmish ;  we  must,  if  pos- 
sible, come  to  closer  quarters.  The  debate  has 
generally  been  confused  by  introducing  the  su- 
perlative notion  of  the  best  possible  system; 
and  this  has  given  rise  to  limitless  verbal  quib- 
bhng.  This  notion  has  no  clear  content,  and 
taken  quantitatively  it  is  a  contradiction,  like 
the  largest  possible  number  or  the  largest  pos- 
sible limited  space.  But  if  we  take  the  notion 
quahtatively,  it  must  still  contain  quantitative 
factors,  and  the  difficulty  reappears.  The  no- 
tion, then,  is  to  be  dismissed.  Of  any  finite 
system  whatever  the  questions  would  be  possi- 
ble: Why  thus  and  not  otherwise?  Why  now 
and  not  then  ?  Why  on  this  plane  and  not  on 
that?  Why  so  much  and  not  more  or  less? 
Questions  of  this  sort  are  forever  possible  and 
forever  insoluble,  and  should  be  sacredly  left 
to  debating  youths  and  other  transcendent  in- 
telhgences.  The  only  question  that  has  any 
meaning  is  whether  the  system  is  good  or  not. 

§  78.  The  optimist  claims  that  the  system  is 
good,  the  pessimist  claims  that  it  is  bad.     But 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  ETHICAL.  227 

plainly  no  judgment  can  be  reached  unless  we 
have  a  knowledge  of  the  system  as  a  whole  and 
especially  a  knowledge  of  its  outcome.  A  care- 
ful logic  would  dismiss  the  suit  on  the  ground 
of  no  jurisdiction.  But  as  the  htigants  insist 
on  being  heard,  we  must  continue  to  follow  the 
case. 

The  present  type  of  thought  in  the  specula- 
tive world  is  somewhat  favorable  to  optimism. 
The  current  notions  of  development,  progress, 
and  improvement  enable  the  optimist  to  claim 
that  everything  shows  a  tendency  to  the  better. 
The  universe  is  not  yet  complete,  but  only  in 
its  raw  beginnings.  Meanwhile  we  see,  if  not  a 
finished  optimism,  at  least  a  decided  mehorism, 
and  mehorism  is  optimism.  He  calls,  therefore, 
upon  the  pessimist  to  master  the  significance 
of  the  great  law  of  evolution,  and  pending  this 
mastery  to  hold  his  peace.  The  pessimist  wants 
to  know  why  things  were  not  made  perfect  at 
once ;  but  the  current  type  of  thought  dechnes 
the  question  as  a  survival  of  an  obsolete  mode 
of  thought.  If  evolution  is  the  law  of  life,  of 
course  the  present  must  seem  imperfect  relative 
to  the  future,  and  the  past  imperfect  relative  to 
the  present.     This  is  fairly  good  chaffing,  but 


228  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

it  does  not  meet  the  question  why  this  progress 
might  not  have  been  accomphshed  at  less  cost 
of  toil  and  struggle  and  pain.  In  truth,  it  is 
only  another  way  of  saying  that  the  system  is 
to  he  judged  only  in  its  outcome  and  the  out- 
come is  assumed  to  he  good.  The  fancy  that 
evolution  in  any  way  diminishes  the  Creator's 
responsibility  for  evil  is  really  somewhat  infan- 
tile. It  rests  on  the  assumption  that  there  is 
some  element  of  chance  or  seK  -  determination 
in  the  system  whereby  it  is  able  to  make  new 
departures  on  its  own  account.  But  in  a  me- 
chanical system  there  is  no  such  element,  and 
the  founder  is  responsible  for  the  outcome. 

It  is  also  worth  while  to  note  how  com- 
pletely the  discussion  rests  upon  the  assumed 
supremacy  of  human  interests.  What  is  meant 
by  a  good  or  a  bad  universe  1  Imphcitly  our  in- 
terests furnish  the  standard.  That  universe  is 
good  which  meets  our  wishes,  and  that  is  bad 
which  ignores  them.  But  how  do  we  know 
that  the  universe  exists  for  us^?  May  it  not 
well  have  inscrutable  ends  which  it  perfectly 
realizes,  and  may  not  our  complaints  be  like 
those  of  a  nest  of  ants  who  should  first  assume 
that  the  universe  is  meant  to  be  an  ant-hill. 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  ETHICAL.  229 

and  sliould  then  condemn  it  for  its  unhappy 
adjustment  to  formic  necessities?  Pessimism 
is  the  most  striking  illustration  possible  of  the 
fact  that  the  mind  is  hound  to  measure  the 
universe  by  itself. 

But  once  again,  what  do  we  mean  by  a  good 
or  bad  universe,  and  how  is  such  goodness  or 
badness  to  be  tested?  Here  the  debaters  have 
generally  imposed  upon  themselves  with  ab- 
stractions. The  pessimist  is  apt  to  forget  that 
pain  in  the  abstract  is  nothing,  and  that  it  has 
existence  only  as  felt  by  sensitive  beings.  He 
heaps  up  all  the  misery  of  all  beings,  past,  pres- 
ent and  future,  and  forthwith  makes  a  sum  so 
great  as  to  hide  all  well-being  from  his  vision. 
Thus  he  resembles  the  man  who,  from  long 
dweUing  in  the  hospital,  should  heap  up  in  one 
thought  all  the  sickness  of  the  world,  and 
should  become  so  impressed  thereby  as  to  con- 
clude that  health  and  soundness  nowhere  exist. 
The  illusion  is  completed  by  attributing  this 
sum  of  pains  to  the  abstraction,  man;  and  then 
all  the  conditions  for  profound  closet  woe  and 
the  appropriate  rhetoric  are  fully  met.  But  if 
we  are  to  get  on  we  must  dismiss  this  integral 
of  abstract  pains  and  this  abstract  man  who 


230  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

suffers  them,  and  ask  for  living  men  to  come 
forward  and  testify.  The  abstract  man  cannot 
be  miserable,  but  only  concrete,  conscious  men. 
The  declaration  that  the  world  is  bad  must, 
then,  mean  that  its  structure  is  such  as  neces- 
sarily to  make  hfe  not  worth  li^dng.  The  ques- 
tion, then,  becomes  simply  one  as  to  the  worth 
of  life.  This  question  each  person  must  decide 
for  himself.  The  vanity  of  argument  is  ap- 
parent. As  well  might  one  appeal  to  theory  to 
decide  whether  he  enjoys  his  dinner.  The  spec- 
tacle of  a  closet  philosopher  deciding  by  theoriz- 
ing whether  life  is  worth  hving,  might  move 
one  either  to  mirth  or  to  compassion,  accord- 
ing to  one's  mood  or  nature. 

§  79.  The  value  of  hfe  must  be  decided  by 
the  race ;  and  the  race  has  never  recognized 
the  pessimist's  standard  of  value.  This  has 
commonly  been  taken  from  the  passive  sensi- 
bility; as  if  the  only  good  in  life  were  passive 
pleasure,  and  the  only  evil  passive  pain.  Hence 
the  pessimist  has  often  demanded  why  this 
passive  pleasure  is  not  incessantly  produced 
without  effort  of  our  own.  A  being  of  infinite 
goodness  might  do  it  just  as  well  as  not ;  and 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  ETHICAL.  231 

the  failure  to  do  so  weighs  heavily  upon  our 
so-called  minds.  But  experience  shows  two 
sets  of  values,  those  of  the  passive,  and  those 
of  our  active  nature,  and  the  race  has  agreed 
in  placing  all  significant  values  of  hfe  in  the 
latter  class,  and  in  viewing  the  former  with  a 
certain  measure  of  contempt.  Conscious  seK- 
development,  growing  self-possession,  progress, 
conquest,  the  successful  putting  forth  of  energy 
and  the  resulting  growth — these  are  the  things 
which  the  race  has  judged  truly  valuable.  The 
mere  presence  of  pain  has  seldom  shaken  the 
faith  of  any  one  except  the  sleek  and  well-fed 
speculator.  The  couch  of  suffering  is  more 
often  the  scene  of  loving  trust  than  are  the 
pillows  of  luxury  and  the  chief  seats  at  feasts. 
The  human  soul,  as  long  as  it  retains  anything 
noble  and  reverend  in  its  nature,  is  amazingly 
loyal  to  faith  in  supreme  goodness.  The  real 
difficulty  for  the  race  has  never  been  the  fact 
of  passive  pain,  but  the  apparent  moral  indif- 
ference which  the  cosmos  often  shows;  and 
this  difficulty  it  has  provided  for  by  assmning 
a  future  adjustment  of  all  rights  and  wrongs. 

But  assuming  that  life  is  not  worth  living,  the 
question  arises.  Who  or  what  is  to  blame  ?     In 


232  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

deciding  this  we  should  need  to  distinguish  be- 
tween the  evil  which  arises  necessarily  from 
the  structure  of  the  cosmos  and  that  which  is 
due  to  our  own  folly  and  sin.  The  latter  can- 
not be  laid  to  the  account  of  the  universe  ex- 
cept in  a  roundabout  way.  We  may  comj^lain 
of  the  system  for  making  our  folly  possible, 
but  the  complaint  will  not  weigh  much  with 
the  upright  mind  and  conscience.  A  large  part 
of  our  worst  woes  are  of  our  own  making. 
The  most  fearful  ills  of  life  result  from  laws  in 
themselves  good,  such  as  the  law  of  heredity, 
of  social  solidarity,  and  mutual  dependence. 

In  the  animal  world  the  problem  of  e\dl  is 
sunply  one  of  pain.  The  extent  and  nature  of 
animal  pain  are  entirely  unknown.  A  multi- 
tude of  facts  indicate  that  even  the  more  highly 
organized  animals  are  far  less  sensitive  to  pain 
than  men  are ;  while  of  the  sensibility  of  the 
simple  organic  forms  we  have  no  knowledge 
whatever. 

§  80.  Proper  pessimism  is  even  more  illogical 
than  optimism.  There  is  evil,  but  there  is  also 
good  in  the  universe.  There  is  pain,  but  there 
is  also  happiness.     Pain  results  from  animal 


TUE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  ETHICAL.  233 

structure,  but  only  as  an  implication,  not  as  a 
manifest  aim.  The  evolutionists  liave  often 
pointed  out  that  the  tendency  of  life  must  be 
to  increase  pleasure  and  eliminate  pain.  For 
pain  that  exists  the  optimist  often  succeeds  in 
showing  a  beneficent  function.  The  high  minis- 
tries of  pain  in  the  development  of  the  virtues 
and  graces  of  character  are  a  favorite  theme 
with  the  moralist  and  the  preacher.  Hence 
thoughtful  pessimists,  as  distinct  from  the  rhe- 
torical shrieker,  have  generally  concluded  not 
to  mahgnity,  but  to  a  Hmited  or  conditioned 
goodness.  Why  might  not  pain  have  been  dis- 
pensed with  as  a  means  ?  Why  might  not 
everything  have  been  made  perfect  at  once? 
Things  may  be  as  good  as  possible,  but  if 
there  be  an  omnipotent  goodness  at  the  root  of 
things,  why  are  they  not  better  ?  There  is  no 
end  to  these  questions,  and  also  no  answ^er. 
The  solution  of  the  problem  demands  data 
which  lie  beyond  our  horizon.  The  desultory 
character  of  the  actual  debate  is  evident.  It  is 
a  series  of  skmnishes  between  armies  in  a  fog, 
and  ends  mostly  in  noise  and  panic.  At  last 
we  have  to  choose  sides.  We  may  say  that  there 
is  some  inscrutable  necessity  which  prevents 


234  PHILOSOPHY  of  theism. 

tilings  from  getting  on  faster  and  better  than 
they  do ;  or  we  may  hold  to  the  moral  and  met- 
aphysical perfection  of  the  world -ground  and 
believe  in  a  possible  solution  which  at  present 
we  do  not  comprehend.  The  facts  neither  com- 
pel nor  forbid  this  faith.  They  permit  it,  and 
to  some  extent  illustrate  it ;  and  the  mind,  with 
that  faith  in  the  perfect  ideal  which  imderhes 
all  its  operations,  refuses  to  stop  short  of  the 
highest. 

§  81.  Only  a  reference  is  necessary  to  the 
various  theories  of  the  origin  and  meaning  of 
evil.  A  first  thought,  of  course,  was  to  find 
its  source  in  something  altogether  apart  from 
God.  A  devil,  a  seK- existent  evil  principle,  an 
intractable  matter,  or  something  of  the  sort, 
was  adduced  in  explanation.  When  advanc- 
ing thought  showed  the  untenabihty  of  such  a 
view,  recourse  was  generally  had  to  the  notion 
that  the  eternal  truths,  or  necessities  of  reason, 
are  in  some  way  responsible  for  evil.  Unfort- 
unately no  one  ever  succeeded  in  connecting 
the  eternal  truths  with  the  particular  facts  of 
evil.  No  one  ever  showed  that  any  eternal 
truth  would  have  been  violated,  or  that  any 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  ETHICAL.  235 

other  damage  would  have  been  done,  if  many 
of  the  obnoxious  features  of  the  cosmic  order 
had  been  left  out.  Many  have  also  taken  great 
comfort  in  the  thought  of  evil  as  a  necessary 
means  to  good.  It  is  the  shadow  which  brings 
out  the  light,  the  discord  which  heightens  the 
sense  of  harmony.  It  is,  too,  a  pedagogical  fac- 
tor in  the  development  of  humanity.  Such  con- 
siderations have  given  birth  to  limitless  fine 
writing  and  served  to  give  the  appearance  of 
logic  and  philosophy  to  a  purely  practical  post- 
ulate. In  themselves  they  are  so  inadequate  to 
a  complete  solution  of  the  problem  that  they 
aggravate  rather  than  reheve  the  case ;  and  in 
so  far  they  become  a  part  of  the  problem  itself. 

§  82.  Speculative  theology  has  produced  elabo- 
rate schemes  of  the  ethical  attributes  as  well  as 
of  the  metaphysical.  Love,  mercy,  justice,  right- 
eousness, and  hohness  have  been  set  up  as 
separate  attributes;  and  a  good  deal  of  inge- 
nuity has  been  shown  in  adjusting  their  rela- 
tions. Into  these  questions  we  have  no  need 
to  enter.  The  ethical  nature  of  God  is  suffi- 
ciently determined  for  all  rehgious,  and,  we  may 
add,  for  all  speculative  purposes,  as  being  holy 


236  PHILOSOPUY  OF  TUEISM. 

love.  These  factors  belong  together.  Love 
without  holiness  would  be  simply  well-wishing 
without  any  ethical  content ;  and  holiness  with- 
out love  would  be  a  hfeless  negation. 

Love  needs  no  definition;  but  the  notion  of 
hohness  is  not  so  clear.  Negatively,  holiness 
imphes  the  absence  of  all  tendencies  to  evil  and 
of  all  dehght  in  evil.  Positively,  it  involves 
the  dehght  in  and  devotion  to  goodness.  The 
knowledge  of  evil  must  exist  in  the  divine 
thought,  but  perfect  holiness  imphes  that  it 
finds  no  echo  in  the  divine  sensibility  and  no 
reahzation  in  the  divine  will.  It  further  im- 
phes, positively,  that  in  Grod  the  ideal  of  moral 
perfection  is  reahzed;  and  this  ideal  involves 
love  as  one  of  its  chief  factors. 

In  determining  this  ideal  we  can  only  fall 
back  upon  the  immediate  testimony  of  the 
moral  nature.  No  legislation  can  make  any- 
thing an  abiding  part  of  this  ideal  unless  it  be 
commanded  by  conscience ;  and  nothing  can  be 
allowed  to  enter  into  it  which  is  forbidden  by 
conscience.  It  is  this  voice  of  conscience  which 
distinguishes  the  non-moral  good  and  evil  of  sim- 
ple sensibihty  from  the  moral  good  and  evil  of 
the  ethical  hfe. 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  ETHICAL.  237 

§  83.  In  maintaining  the  absoluteness  of  God 
as  a  moral  being  a  curious  difficulty  arises  from 
the  nature  of  the  moral  life  itseK.  This  hfe 
implies  community  and  has  no  meaning  for 
the  absolutely  single  and  only.  Love  without 
an  object  is  nothing.  Justice  has  no  meaning 
except  between  persons.  Benevolence  is  impos- 
sible without  plurality  and  community.  Hence, 
if  we  conceive  God  as  single  and  alone,  we  must 
say  that,  as  such,  he  is  only  potentially  a  moral 
being.  To  pass  from  potential  to  actual  moral 
existence  the  Infinite  must  have  an  object. 

Several  ways  out  of  this  difficulty  offer  them- 
selves. First,  we  may  admit  that  the  absolute 
and  essential  God  is  metaphysical  only  and  not 
moral.  His  morahty  is  but  an  incident  of  his 
cosmic  activity,  and  not  something  pertaining 
to  his  own  essential  existence.  God's  meta- 
physical existence  is  absolute,  but  his  moral 
life  is  relative  to  creation  and  has  no  meaning 
or  possibihty  apart  from  it. 

The  immediate  imphcation  of  this  view  is 
another,  as  follows :  God  is  not  absolute  and 
seK-sufficient  in  his  ethical  hfe,  but  needs  the 
presence  of  the  finite  in  order  to  reahze  his 
own  ethical  potentiahties  and  attain  to  a  truly 


238  PHiLOSornT  of  theism. 

moral  existence.  But  tliis  view  either  makes 
God  dependent  on  tlie  world  for  his  own  com- 
plete seK  -  reahzation  or  it  makes  the  cosmic 
activity  the  necessary  means  by  which  God 
comes  into  full  self-possession.  In  either  form 
the  moral  is  made  subordinate  to  the  meta- 
physical, the  proper  absoluteness  of  God  is  de- 
nied, and  a  strong  tendency  to  pantheism  ap- 
pears. When  the  view  is  made  to  affirm,  as 
often  happens,  that  God  apart  from  the  world 
is  as  impossible  as  the  world  apart  fi'om  God, 
we  have  pronounced  pantheism. 

The  third  view  aims  to  escape  these  difficul- 
ties by  providing  for  community  of  personal 
life  in  the  di\ine  unity  itself.  In  this  way  the 
conditions  of  ethical  hfe  are  found  within  the 
divine  nature;  and  the  ethical  absoluteness  of 
God  is  assured.  But  how  this  community  in 
unity  is  possible  is  one  of  the  deepest  mysteries 
of  speculation.  The  only  suggestion  of  solu- 
tion seems  to  he  in  the  notion  of  necessary 
creation.  Such  creation  would  be  unbegun  and 
endless,  and  would  depend  on  the  divine  nature 
and  not  on  the  divine  wiU.  If  now  we  suppose 
the  divine  nature  to  be  such  that  the  essential 
God  must  always  and  eternally  produce  other 


THE  WORLD-GROUND  AS  ETHICAL.  239 

beings  than  himself,  those  other  beings,  though 
numerically  distinct  from  himself,  would  be  es- 
sential imphcations  of  himself.  There  would 
be  at  once  a  numerical  plurahty  and  an  organic 
unity.  Hence  pantheism,  while  viewing  God  and 
the  world  as  numerically  distinct,  has  always 
maintained  that  they  are  organically  and  essen- 
tially one.  Such  a  conception  can  in  no  way 
be  discredited  by  a  verbal  shuffling  of  formal 
ideas  such  as  one  and  many,  unity  and  plural- 
ity. Formally  these  ideas  are  opposed ;  but  re- 
ality has  ways  of  uniting  our  formal  opposi- 
tions in  indivisible  syntheses  which  our  formal 
thought  cannot  construe. 

But  we  have  abeady  seen  that  we  cannot 
carry  the  actual  world  of  finite  things  into  God 
without  speculative  disaster  and  shipwreck.  It 
only  remains  to  abandon  the  notion  of  a  neces- 
sary creation  whereby  God  forever  posits  com- 
munity for  himself,  or  else  to  find  its  objects 
apart  from  the  finite  system  as  persons  coeter- 
nal  with  God  himself.  If  it  be  said  that  this  is 
polytheism,  the  answer  would  be  that  polythe- 
ism imphes  a  plurality  of  mutually  independent 
beings.  If  it  be  said  that  these  dependent  per- 
sonahties  are  created,  the  answer  would  be  that 


240  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

their  existence  does  not  depend  on  tlie  divine 
will,  but  on  the  divine  nature.  They,  therefore, 
coexist  with  God ;  nor  could  God  exist  mthout 
them.  If,  then,  in  iDantheism  we  say  that  the 
world  is  God,  what  can  we  say  of  these  but  that 
they  are  God,  at  once  numerically  distinct  and 
organically  one  ?  If  creation  seems  to  be  an  ex- 
pression implying  will,  we  may  exchange  it  for 
the  profoundly  subtle  terms  of  early  theological 
speculation,  and  speak  of  an  eternal  generation 
and  procession.  These  terms  throw  no  hght  upon 
the  matter,  and  only  serve  to  mark  off  the  eter- 
nal implications  of  the  divine  nature  from  the 
free  determinations  of  the  divine  will. 

The  consideration  of  the  ethical  absoluteness 
of  God  has  led  us  into  speculations  which  sug- 
gest the  Christian  doctrine  of  the  Trinity,  and 
which  may  explain  why  so  many  thinkers  have 
insisted  on  holding  that  doctrine  in  spite  of  the 
formal  opposition  of  the  ideas  of  unity  and  trin- 
ity. But  into  this  question  we  have  no  call  to 
enter.  In  any  case  speculation  can  only  caU 
attention  to  difficulties  and  suggest  possibilities 
without  being  able  to  say  anything  positive. 


CHAPTER  YII. 

THEISM    AND    LIFE. 

The  considerations  thus  far  dwelt  upon  are 
chiefly  such  as  address  themselves  to  man  as 
a  contemplative  being.  But  man  is  not  merely 
nor  mainly  contemplation,  he  is  also  will  and 
action.  He  must,  then,  have  something  to  work 
for,  aims  to  realize,  and  ideals  by  which  to  hve. 
In  real  hfe  the  centre  of  gra\dty  of  theistic 
faith  hes  in  its  relation  to  these  aims  and  ideals. 
God  is  seen  to  be  that  without  which  our  ideals 
collapse  or  are  made  unattainable,  and  the 
springs  of  action  are  broken.  Hence  the  exist- 
ence of  God  is  affirmed  not  on  speculative  or 
theoretical  grounds,  but  because  of  the  needs  of 
practical  life.  This  has  often  been  called  the 
moral  argument  for  the  divine  existence ;  a  bet- 
ter name  would  be  the  practical  argument. 

§  84.  That  this  argument  has  no  logical  value 
is  evident.     It  is  essentially  a  conclusion  from 
16 


242  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

what  we  think  ought  to  be  to  what  is,  or  from 
our  subjective  interests  to  objective  fact;  and 
such  a  conclusion  is  forever  invahd  in  logic.  It 
becomes  valid  only  on  the  assmnption,  expressed 
or  imphcit,  that  what  our  nature  calls  for,  reality 
must,  in  one  form  or  another,  supply.  Hence 
Kant,  who  was  one  of  the  leading  expounders 
of  this  conception,  expressly  denied  its  specu- 
lative cogency.  On  the  contrary,  he  claimed  to 
have  shown  that,  by  way  of  speculation,  neither 
proof  nor  disproof  is  possible ;  and  in  this  bal- 
ance of  the  speculative  reason  practical  inter- 
ests may  be  allowed  to  turn  the  scale.  All  that 
can  be  done,  then,  is  to  show  that  theism  is 
a  demand  of  our  moral  nature,  a  necessity  of 
practical  hfe.  Whether  to  accept  this  subjec- 
tive necessity  as  the  warrant  for  the  objective 
fact  every  one  must  decide  for  liimself.  That 
our  entire  mental  hfe  rests  upon  such  an  accept- 
ance we  have  already  abundantly  seen. 

The  moral  argument  has  often  been  misman- 
aged. Sometimes  it  is  put  forward  as  proof, 
and  then  it  falls  an  easy  prey  to  the  hostile 
critic.  Again,  the  discussion  has  often  taken  on 
a  hedonistic  turn  and  run  off  into  gross  selfish- 
ness, by  the  side  of  which  even  atheism  itself 


THEISM  AND  LIFE.  243 

might  seem  morally  superior.  We  need,  then, 
to  consider  the  relation  of  theism  and  atheism 
to  the  moral  life. 

§  85.  A  peremptory  rejection  of  atheism  as  de- 
structive of  all  moral  theory  might  not  be  un- 
warranted, hut  it  would  fail  to  show  the  real 
points  of  difficulty.  To  do  this  we  need  to  con- 
sider the  matter  more  in  detail.  Any  system  of 
practical  ethics  involves  several  distinct  factors  : 
(1)  a  set  of  formal  moral  judgments  concerning 
right  and  wrong,  (2)  a  set  of  aims  or  ideals  to 
he  realized,  and  (3)  a  set  of  commands  to  he 
obeyed.  In  the  first  class  we  have  only  the 
moral  form  of  conduct ;  in  the  second  class  we 
have  the  material  contents  of  conduct,  and  in 
the  third  class  the  contents  of  the  two  first  are 
prescribed  as  duties.  The  perennial  short-com- 
ing of  traditional  ethics  has  been  the  failure  to 
see  the  equal  necessity  of  all  of  these  factors. 
The  result  has  been  numberless  one-sided  sys- 
tems with  resulting  war  and  confusion. 

What,  now,  is  the  bearing  of  atheism  upon 
these  several  factors,  the  system  of  judgments, 
the  system  of  ideals,  the  system  of  duties  ?  We 
consider  the  last  first. 


244  PUILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

To  answer  this  question  we  must  consider  the 
automatism  involved  in  atheism.  This  imphca- 
tion,  though  not  perhaj^s  strictly  necessary,  can 
be  escaped  only  by  admissions  fatal  to  all  think- 
ing, and  hence  atheism  and  automatism  have 
generally  been  united.  Hence  when  we  begin 
to  construct  a  system  of  duties  we  are  met  at 
once  by  the  question  how  an  automaton  can 
have  duties.  To  this  question  there  is  no  an- 
swer. The  traditional  evasion  consists  in  sajdng 
that  moral  judgments,  hke  aesthetic  judgments, 
are  independent  of  the  question  of  freedom.  In 
determining  what  is  beautiful  or  ugly  we  take  no 
account  of  freedom  or  necessity,  and  the  same 
is  true  in  determining  what  is  right  or  wrong. 
If  ethics  were  only  a  set  of  moral  judgments,  this 
claim  would  not  be  without  some  foundation. 
But  ethics  is  also  a  set  of  precepts  to  be  obeyed, 
and  obedience  is  reckoned  as  merit,  and  diso- 
bedience as  demerit ;  and  for  these  notions  the 
conception  of  freedom  is  absolutely  necessary. 

The  same  evasion  sometimes  takes  on  another 
form,  as  follows :  We  judge  persons  for  what  they 
are,  no  matter  how  they  became  so.  A  thing 
which  is  ugly  by  necessity  is  stiU  ugly,  and  a  per- 
son who  is  wicked  by  necessity  is  still  wicked. 


THEISM  AND  LIFE.  245 

It  is,  then,  a  mistake  to  claim  that  om^  judgment 
of  persons  is  in  any  way  conditioned  by  behef  in 
their  freedom.  To  this  the  answer  is  that  oiu' 
judgments  of  persons  are  from  a  double  stand- 
point, that  of  perfection  and  that  of  ability.  On 
the  former  depend  judgments  of  imperfection, 
on  the  latter  depend  judgments  of  guilt  or  in- 
nocence. But  however  imperfect  one  may  be, 
he  cannot  be  responsible  for  anything  that  tran- 
scends his  ability.  So,  then,  in  any  atheistic 
system  the  question  must  still  remain,  How  can 
automata  have  duties  ?  This  question  is  so  im- 
portant that  it  is  much  to  be  mshed  that  the 
universal  necessity  or  some  of  its  subordinate 
phases  might  be  brought  to  consider  it.  If  this 
question  were  once  answered,  it  would  next  be 
in  order  to  inquire  how  an  automaton  could  per- 
form its  duties  if  necessity  set  in  another  direc- 
tion, or  how  it  could  help  performing  them  if 
necessity  set  that  way.  Another  interesting  and 
important  question  would  concern  the  ground  of 
the  moral  difference  between  the  several  auto- 
mata. These  questions,  however,  are  not  likely 
to  receive  a  speedy  answer,  owing,  of  course,  to 
the  intractabihty  and  illogicahty  of  the  cosmic 
necessity  in  general ;  and  we  shall  do  better  to 


246  PniLOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

go  on  to  consider  the  bearing  of  atheism  upon 
ethics  as  a  system  of  moral  judgments. 

§  86.  Our  formal  judgments  of  right  and  wrong 
have  no  direct  dependence  upon  theistic  faith. 
It  is  at  this  point  that  the  moral  argument  has 
been  most  mismanaged.  How  can  the  obhgation 
of  justice,  truth,  benevolence,  gi^atitude  be  made 
to  depend  even  on  the  existence  of  God  ?  And 
with  what  face  can  we  pretend  that  atheism 
would  make  these  virtues  less  binding  than  they 
are?  These  are  absolute  moral  intuitions.  If 
no  one  regarded  them  they  would  still  be  vahd. 
Certainly  if  they  depend  at  all  on  theism  it  must 
be  indirectly.  In  this  respect  our  moral  judg- 
ments are  hke  our  judgments  of  true  and  false. 
The  rejection  of  theism  would  not  make  the 
unjust  just  any  more  than  it  would  make  the 
false  true.  But  in  both  cases  we  can  show  that 
our  nature  falls  into  discord  with  itseK,  or  is 
unable  to  defend  itself  against  scepticism,  until 
our  thought  reaches  the  conception  of  God  as 
supreme  reason  and  holy  will.  Then  reason  and 
conscience,  from  being  psychological  facts  in 
us,  become  universal  cosmic  laws,  and  their  su- 
premacy is  assured.     But  so  long  as  they  are 


THEISM  AND  LIFE.  247 

limited  to  human  and  terrestrial  manifestation 
they  are  perpetually  open  to  the  sceptical  sur- 
mise that  after  all  they  may  only  be  our  way  of 
thinking,  and  hence  matters  of  opinion.  That 
this  conclusion  has  been  persistently  di'awn  from 
atheistic  premises  is  a  matter  of  history.  This 
is  further  strengthened  by  the  fact  that  right 
and  wrong,  if  distinct,  can  have  no  application 
to  actual  hfe  because  of  the  universal  automa- 
tism. On  this  account  theorists  of  this  school 
have  generally  tended  to  reduce  the  distinction 
to  one  of  utility  and  inutihty.  This  distinction 
plainly  exists ;  and  by  and  by  we  remember  that 
right  and  wrong  are  other  names  for  the  same 
thing.  Forthwith  we  use  them,  and  thus  give 
variety  to  our  terminology  and  save  moral  dis- 
tinctions at  the  same  time. 

§87.  A  consistent  atheism,  then,  cannot  defend 
itself  against  ethical  scepticism  any  more  than 
against  speculative  scepticism  in  general.  But 
there  is  no  need  to  insist  upon  this  point ;  for  if 
these  formal  principles  were  set  on  high  above 
all  doubt,  we  should  still  not  have  all  the  con- 
ditions of  a  complete  moral  system.  Such  a  sys- 
tem involves,  not  only  these  formal  principles, 


248  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

but  also  a  set  of  extra-etliical  conceptions  wliich 
condition  their  application.  Of  these  the  most 
important  are  our  general  world-view,  our  con- 
ception of  hfe,  its  meaning  and  destiny,  our 
conception  of  personality  also,  and  its  essential 
sacredness.  These  elements,  however,  express 
no  immediate  intuition  of  conscience,  but  are 
taken  from  our  general  theory  of  things.  Yet 
any  variation  in  these  elements  must  lead  to 
corresponding  variations  in  practice,  even  while 
the  formal  principles  remain  the  same. 

Illustrations  abound.  The  law  of  benevolence 
may  be  absolute  as  a  disposition,  but  its  prac- 
tical apphcation  is  hmited  by  a  prudent  self- 
regard  on  the  one  hand,  and  by  our  conception 
of  the  nature  and  significance  of  the  object  on 
the  other.  Only  a  high  conception  of  humanity 
gives  sacredness  to  human  rights  and  incites  to 
strenuous  effort  in  its  behalf.  The  golden  rule, 
also,  must  be  conditioned  by  some  conception  of 
the  true  order  and  dignity  of  hfe ;  otherwise  it 
might  be  perfectly  obeyed  in  a  world  of  sots  and 
gluttons.  With  Plato's  conception  of  the. rela- 
tion of  the  individual  to  society,  Plato's  doctrine 
of  infanticide  seems  correct  enough.  With  Aiis- 
totle's  theory  of  man  and  his  destiny,  Aristotle's 


THEISM  AND  LIFE.  249 

theory  of  slavery  is  altogether  defensible.  From 
the  standpoint  of  the  ancient  ethnic  conceptions, 
the  accompanying  ethnic  morahty  was  entirely 
allowable.  Apart  from  some  conception  of  the 
sacredness  of  personality,  it  is  far  from  sure  that 
the  redemption  of  society  could  not  be  more 
readily  reached  by  killing  off  the  idle  and  mis- 
chievous classes  than  by  philanthropic  effort  for 
their  improvement.  And  Christianity  wrought 
its  great  moral  revolution,  not  by  introducing 
new  moral  principles,  but  by  revealing  new  con- 
ceptions of  God  and  man  and  their  mutual  re- 
lations. By  making  all  men  the  children  of  a 
common  Father  it  did  away  with  the  earlier  eth- 
nic concej)tions  and  the  barbarous  morality  based 
upon  them.  By  making  every  man  the  heir  of 
eternal  hfe  it  gave  to  him  a  sacredness  which 
he  could  never  lose  and  which  might  never  be 
ignored.  By  making  the  moral  law  the  expres- 
sion of  a  Holy  Will,  it  brought  that  law  out  of 
its  impersonal  abstraction  and  assured  its  ulti- 
mate triumph.  Moral  principles  may  be  what 
they  were  before,  but  moral  practice  is  forever 
different.  Even  the  earth  itself  has  another  look 
now  that  it  has  a  heaven  above  it. 

These  illustrations  show  that  the  actual  guid- 


250  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

ance  of  life  involves  not  only  a  knowledge  of  for- 
mal moral  principles,  but  also  a  series  of  extra- 
moral  conceptions  "wMch.  condition  their  appli- 
cation. They  also  show  how  impossible  it  is  to 
construct  a  code  of  conduct  which  shall  be  in- 
dependent of  our  general  theory  of  things. 

Oversight  of  this  fact  has  been  the  perennial 
weakness  of  the  intuitional  ethics.  It  has  dread- 
ed to  take  the  aim  and  outcome  of  conduct  into 
account  lest  it  fall  into  utihtarianism.  As  a  re- 
sult it  has  had  to  fall  back  upon  purely  formal 
principles  which,  while  good  and  even  necessary 
as  far  as  they  go,  furnish  no  positive  guidance 
for  practical  hfe.  We  are  told  to  be  virtuous, 
to  be  conscientious,  to  act  from  right  motives, 
and  to  act  so  that  the  maxims  of  our  conduct 
shall  be  fit  to  be  universal  law.  But  this  only 
concerns  the  form  of  conduct  and  overlooks  the 
fact  that  conduct  must  have  aims  beyond  itself, 
and  that  these  aims  must  be  in  harmony  with 
the  nature  of  things.  Besides,  it  is  narrow.  The 
moral  task  of  the  individual  by  no  means  con- 
sists solely  in  being  conscientious  or  even  vir- 
tuous, but  rather  and  chiefly  in  an  objective 
reahzation  of  the  good.  Mere  conscientiousness 
is  the  narrowest  possible  conception  of  wtue. 


THEISM  AND  LIFE.  251 

and  the  lowest  possible  aim.  A  worthy  moral 
aim  can  he  found  only  in  the  thought  of  a  king- 
dom of  righteousness  and  blessedness  reahzed  in 
a  commiuiity  of  moral  persons.  But  no  one  can 
work  with  this  aim  without  implicitly  assuming 
a  higher  power,  which  is  the  guarantee  of  the 
possibility  of  its  reahzation.  In  other  words, 
morahty  which  goes  beyond  mere  conscientious- 
ness must  have  recourse  to  rehgion. 

§  88.  Working  ethics  must  present  not  only 
rules  for  conduct,  but  ideals  to  reahze ;  and  here 
we  touch  the  point  of  chief  practical  difficulty 
with  all  etliics.  The  great  practical  trouble,  after 
all,  is  less  a  lack  of  hght  than  a  general  discour- 
agement, a  doubt  whether  anything  worth  while 
is  attainable.  We  can,  indeed,  live  in  peace  and 
mutual  helpfulness  with  our  neighbors  without 
looking  beyond  visible  existence ;  but  when  we 
are  looking  for  some  supreme  aim  which  shall 
give  meaning  and  dignity  to  life  and  make  it 
worth  while  to  hve,  forthwith  we  begin  to  grope. 
We  can  see  with  some  clearness  what  ought  to 
be,  but  we  are  not  so  sure  that  what  ought  to  be 
is.  Moral  ideals  are  fair,  no  doubt,  but  it  is  not 
so  clear  that  they  are  practicable.    Life  is  short. 


252  pniLOSOPHY  of  tueism. 

The  great  cosmic  order  is  not  manifestly  con- 
structed for  moral  ends.  It  seems  mostly  in- 
different to  them,  and  at  times  even  opposed.  It 
only  remains  that  we  find  the  law  of  hfe  within 
the  sphere  of  visible  existence.  And  here  too 
ideals  do  not  count  for  much.  Virtue  within 
the  Hmits  of  prudence  is  wise,  but  an  abandon 
of  goodness  is  hardly  worldly-wise.  Upon  the 
whole,  visible  life  seems  not  over-favorable  to 
ideals,  unless  it  be  the  modest  one  of  not  being 
righteous  overmuch.  One  could  indeed  wish  it 
were  otherwise,  that  \drtue  were  at  home  in  the 
universe  and  that  our  ideals  were  only  shadows 
of  the  glorious  reahty.  But  what  avails  it  to 
wish  ?  It  is  not  so,  and  we  must  make  the  best 
of  it.  To  meet  the  depressing  and  dishearten- 
ing influences  arising  from  considerations  of 
this  kind  the  race  has  always  had  recourse  to 
the  belief  in  God  and  the  future  life.  Visible 
existence  is  not  all,  and  righteousness  is  at  the 
heart  of  things.  Hence  we  may  beheve  in  its 
final  trimnph,  and  in  some  new  existence  we 
shall  see  it.  This  practical  conviction  must  be 
shared  by  the  theorist  to  this  extent:  either 
we  must  restrict  our  ideals  to  those  attainable 
in  our  present  life,  or  we  must  enlarge  the  life 


THEISM  AND  LIFE.  253 

SO  as  to  make  the  larger  ideals  attainable  and 
save  them  from  collapse.  The  first  duty  of  even 
a  theory  of  morals  is  to  be  rational ;  and  it  can 
never  be  rational  to  live  for  the  unpossible.  Our 
conception  of  the  nature  and  destiny  of  a  being 
must  determine  our  conception  of  the  law  the 
being  ought  to  follow. 

Some  have  affected  to  find  an  unholy  selfish- 
ness in  this  claim,  and  have  even  dreaded  to  ad- 
mit a  future  Uf e  lest  the  purity  of  their  devotion 
should  be  sullied.  This  is  one  of  the  drollest 
whimseys  which  our  self -sophisticated  time  has 
produced.  But  since  this  pure  devotion  is  most- 
ly manifested  in  polemics,  there  is  room  for  sus- 
pecting that  it  is  mainly  rhetorical  virtue.  In 
this  respect  it  seems  to  be  about  on  a  par  with 
the  dehcate  feehng  of  the  bibhcal  critic,  who 
with  his  mouth  full  of  beef  or  mutton  professes 
to  be  shocked  at  the  cruelty  to  animals  involved 
in  the  temple  sacrifices.  But,  however  that  may 
be,  the  feehng,  so  far  as  it  is  real  and  not  profes- 
sional, rests  upon  an  inability  to  distinguish  be- 
tween a  demand  that  we  be  paid  for  our  virtue, 
and  the  revolt  of  our  nature  against  a  system 
which  treats  good  and  bad  alike,  and  throws  the 
better  half  of  our  nature  back  upon  itself  as  ab- 


254r  pniLOSOPHY  of  tueism. 

surd  and  meaningless.  Neither  God  nor  the  fut- 
ui-e  hfe  is  needed  to  pay  us  for  present  \irtue, 
but  rather  as  the  conditions  without  which  our 
nature  falls  into  irreconcilable  discord  with  it- 
self and  passes  on  to  pessimism  and  despair. 
High  and  continued  effort  is  impossible  without 
correspondingly  high  and  abiding  hopes.  Moral 
theory  which  looks  to  form  only  and  ignores  ends 
reduces  conduct  to  etiquette.  It  may  claim,  in- 
deed, to  be  sublime,  but  it  misses  subhmity  by 
just  one  fatal  step. 

§  89.  The  only  elements  in  ethics  that  can 
claun  to  be  absolute  are  purely  formal,  and  fur- 
nish only  a  negative  guidance  for  life.  All 
working  theories  of  ethics  must  transcend  these 
formal  principles,  and  seek  for  the  supreme 
moral  aims  and  ideals  in  some  general  theory 
of  life  and  the  world.  This  leads  us  to  con- 
sider the  third  factor  mentioned  as  involyed  in 
ethical  system.  What  is  the  relation  of  athe- 
ism to  the  ideals  of  conduct,  or  what  ideals  can 
atheism  furnish  ? 

This  question  is  sufficiently  answered  by  a 
moment's  survey  of  life  from  the  standpoint  of 
atheistic  theory.    To  begin  with,  we  have  a  blind 


THEISM  AND  Lli^E.  255 

power,  or  set  of  powers,  perpetually  energizing 
without  purpose  or  plan,  without  seK-knowledge 
or  objective  knowledge,  forever  weaving  and  for- 
ever unweaving  because  of  some  inscrutable  ne- 
cessity. The  outcome  is,  among  innumerable 
other  things,  a  serio-comic  procession  of  "  cun- 
ning casts  in  clay"  in  all  forms  from  moUusk  to 
man.  No  one  of  these  forms  means  any  more 
than  any  other,  for  nothing  means  anything  in 
this  theory.  A  procession  of  wax  figures  would 
not  be  more  truly  automatic  than  these  forms 
are  in  all  respects.  When  we  come  to  the  hu- 
man forms  we  find  a  curious  set  of  illusions. 
Most  of  them  necessarily  beheve  in  a  God, 
whereas  there  is  no  God.  Most  of  them  neces- 
sarily beheve  that  they  are  free,  whereas  they 
are  not  free.  Most  of  them  necessarily  beheve 
themselves  responsible,  whereas  no  one  and 
nothing  is  responsible.  Most  of  them  necessa- 
rily believe  in  a  distinction  between  right  and 
wrong,  whereas  there  is  no  distinction.  Most 
of  them  necessarily  beheve  in  duty,  whereas 
automata  cannot  have  duties,  or  cannot  per- 
form them,  or  cannot  help  performing  them,  ac- 
cording as  necessity  determines.  All  of  them, 
without  exception,  necessarily  assume  the  possi- 


256  rniLOSOPHY  of  theism. 

bility  of  logical  thought  and  reasoning,  whereas 
this  assumption  is  totally  unfounded.  Further, 
the  members  of  this  procession  are  perpetually 
falhng  out,  and  that  is  the  end  of  them  as  in- 
dividuals. For  a  time  the  melancholy  order 
is  kept  up  by  the  fundamental  unconscious- 
ness through  the  incessant  reproduction  of  new 
forms,-  but  there  are  signs  that  the  process  it- 
self will  yet  come  to  an  end,  and  leave  no  sign. 
Such  is  the  history,  meaning,  and  outcome  of  hu- 
man life  on  atheistic  theory.  It  seems  needless 
to  add  anjrthing  about  the  moral  ideals  of  athe- 
ism. If  we  speak  of  them  at  aU  it  is  only  by  a 
fundamental  inconsistency  which,  however,  is 
not  to  be  reckoned  to  ourselves,  but  to  the  basal 
necessity,  which  is  given  to  doing  odd  things. 

The  difficulties  of  atheism  in  constnicting  a 
system  of  ethics  may  be  summed  up  as  follows  : 

First,  ethics  as  a  system  of  duties  is  absurd  in 
a  system  of  automatism.  The  attendant  ideas 
of  obligation  and  responsibility,  merit  and  de- 
merit, guilt  and  innocence,  are  illusory  in  such 
a  theory.  Second,  ethics  as  a  system  of  judg- 
ments concerning  right  and  wrong  is  in  unsta- 
ble equilibrium  in  atheistic  theory.  For  atheism 
has  no  way  of  escaping  the  sceptical  implica- 


THEISM  AND   LIFE.  257 

tions  of  all  systems  of  necessity.  The  necessity 
of  denying  proper  moral  differences  among  per- 
sons empties  onr  moral  judgments  of  all  appli- 
cation to  practical  life.  Third,  atheism  can  hold 
out  no  good  for  the  individual  or  for  the  race 
but  annihilation.  At  each  of  these  points  Chris- 
tian theism  is  adequate.  By  affirming  a  free 
Creator  and  free  creatures  it  gives  moral  gov- 
ernment a  meaning.  By  making  the  moral  nat- 
ure of  man  the  manifestation  of  an  omnipotent 
and  eternal  righteousness  which  underlies  the 
cosmos,  it  sets  our  moral  convictions  above  all 
doubt  and  overthrow.  Finally,  it  provides  a 
conception  of  man  and  his  destiny  which  gives 
man  a  worthy  task  and  an  inalienable  sacred- 
ness.  The  mere  etiquette  of  conscientiousness 
is  transformed  into  loyal  devotion  to  the  law 
and  kingdom  of  God. 

§  90.  The  attitude  of  atheistic  speculation  tow- 
ards religion  has  undergone  a  great  change  in 
recent  years.  From  an  atheistic  standpoint  this 
would  mean  that  the  basal  and  unconscious  ne- 
cessity is  producing  a  new  order  of  conceptions. 
At  all  events,  the  sturdy  brutalities  of  the  last 
century  are  out  of  date.  The  ancient  claim  that 
17 


258  rniLOSOPUY  of  theism. 

religion  is  an  adventitious  accretion  without  any 
essential  foundation  in  liuman  nature  is  obso- 
lescent if  not  obsolete.  The  religious  nature  is 
recognized  as  a  universal  human  fact,  and  as 
one  which  cannot  be  ignored.  The  natural  as- 
sumption in  such  a  case  would  be  that  the  objec- 
tive implications  of  this  fact  should  be  recog- 
nized as  real,  at  least  until  they  are  positively 
disproved.  Failing  to  do  this,  we  have  an  in- 
stinct Avithout  an  object,  an  organ  without  a 
function,  a  demand  with  no  supply.  This  is  the 
position  of  the  rehgious  nature  in  modern  athe- 
istic systems.  They  cannot  get  along  without 
it,  and  are  utterly  at  a  loss  to  get  along  with  it. 
The  need  of  making  some  provision  for  rehgion 
mthout  admitting  its  objective  foundation  has 
caused  infinite  embarrassment  and  given  bh-th 
to  many  schemes  for  its  removal.  In  the  lack 
of  God  we  have  been  urged  to  worship  the  cos- 
mos; and  "cosmic  emotion"  has  been  put  for- 
ward as  something  to  take  the  place  of  rehgion. 
Some  have  emphasized  the  claims  of  the  sun  as 
a  religious  object,  seeing  that  it  is  the  source 
of  light  and  warmth  and  life.  Hmnanity,  also, 
has  been  set  up  as  a  supreme  object  of  worship 
and  endowed  with  many  extraordinary  functions 


THEISM  AND  LIFE.  259 

and  attributes.  The  Unknowable,  too,  lias  its 
altar,  and  has  been  worshipped  with  much  emo- 
tion, mainly  of  the  cosmic  sort.  Occasionally  a 
suspicion  seems  to  come  across  the  minds  of 
the  apostles  that  these  shreds  and  tatters  of 
old  idolatries  hardly  satisfy  the  rehgious  nature, 
but  they  drive  it  off  by  sharply  reminding  us 
that  we  cannot  have  everything  we  want.  As 
death  ends  all  for  the  individual,  much  attention 
has  been  devoted  to  proclaiming  the  selfishness 
of  the  desire  for  a  future  Hfe.  In  what  respect 
it  is  more  selfish  to  desire  to  live  hereafter  than 
it  is  to  desire  to  live  to-morrow  has  never  been 
clearly  pointed  out.  To  fill  up  the  gap  left  by 
the  vanishing  of  the  immortal  hope  a  somewhat 
blind  enthusiasm  for  progress  has  been  invoked. 
The  meaning  or  value  of  a  progress  whose  sub- 
jects are  perpetually  perishing  is  somewhat 
doubtful ;  but  this  fact  is  covered  up  by  invok- 
ing the  fiction  "Humanity"  earnestly  and  re- 
peatedly. This  device,  however,  is  losing  its 
efiicacy,  and  the  cant  of  progress  is  receding. 
From  a  purely  inductive  standpoint,  the  actual 
man  is  a  poor  affair  at  best ;  and  it  is  doubtful 
if  he  will  ever  amount  to  much.  We  know  more 
and  appear  better  than  past  generations,  but  it 


2G0  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

is  not  clear  that  character  is  much  superior.  The 
83sthetics  of  life  progress  and  material  comfort 
increases;  but  these  things  do  not  necessarily 
involve  a  corresponding  moral  progress.  And 
anyhow  the  notion  of  indefinite  progress  for  hu- 
manity upon  the  earth  is  distinctly  forbidden  by 
the  conditions  of  physical  existence,  Both  prog- 
ress and  posterity  bid  fair  to  come  to  an  end. 
And  then  for  the  race,  as  now  for  the  individual, 
the  whole  meaningless  stir  of  existence  will  have 
sunk  back  into  silence  and  left  no  trace  or  sign. 
And  this  is  the  end,  this  the  outcome  of  the 
"  high  intuition,"  this  the  result  of  the  "  grand 
progress  which  is  bearing  Humanity  onward  to 
a  higher  intelhgence  and  a  nobler  character," 
In  such  a  view  there  is  no  heahng  and  no  inspi- 
ration. It  is  in  unstable  equilibrium  and  must 
either  return  towards  theism,  or  pass  on  to  pes- 
simism and  despair. 

The  contention  of  this  chapter  was  not  that 
God  exists,  but  rather  that  theistic  faith  is  such 
an  imphcation  of  our  moral  nature  and  practi- 
cal hfe  that  atheism  must  tend  to  wreck  both 
life  and  conscience.  That  contention  has  been 
estabhshed. 


CONCLUSION. 

In  the  Introduction  it  was  pointed  out  that 
thought  demands  some  things,  forbids  some 
things,  and  permits  some  things.  The  first 
class  must  be  accepted,  for  it  consists  of  the 
laws  and  categories  of  reason  and  their  imph- 
cations.  The  second  class  must  be  rejected, 
as  it  violates  the  nature  of  reason.  The  third 
class  belongs  to  the  great  realm  of  probability 
and  practical  life.  In  this  realm  we  reach  con- 
clusions, not  by  logical  demonstration,  but  by  a 
weighing  of  probabihties,  or  by  a  consideration 
of  practical  needs,  or  by  a  taking  for  granted 
in  the  interest  of  ideal  tendencies.  In  this 
realm  belief,  or  assent,  involves  an  element  of 
volition.  Logic  leaves  us  in  uncertainty,  and 
the  will  comes  in  to  overturn  the  speculative 
equihbrium  and  precipitate  the  conclusion. 

We  have  abundantly  seen  that  theistic  faith 
has  its  root  in  all  of  these  realms,  and  cannot 
dispense  with  any  of  them.     Each  contributes 


2G2  PniLOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

;  sometliing  of  value.  The  speculative  intellect 
'  necessarily  stops  short  of  the  religious  idea  of 
'  God,  but  it  gives  us  some  fundamental  ele- 
ments of  the  conception.  It  is,  too,  of  the 
highest  service  in  outhning  the  general  form 
which  the  theistic  conception  must  take  in  or- 
der to  be  consistent  vdth  itself  and  the  laws 
of  thought.  Here  speculation  performs  the 
invaluable  negative  service  of  warding  off  a 
multitude  of  misconceptions,  especially  of  a 
pantheistic  type,  which  have  been  morally  as 
pernicious  in  history  as  they  are  speculatively 
absurd.  But  a  mind  with  only  cognitive  inter- 
ests would  find  no  occasion  to  consider  more 
than  the  metaphysical  attributes  of  God.  The 
demand  to  consider  God  as  having  ethical  and 
I  aesthetic  attributes  arises  not  from  the  pure  in- 
tellect, but  from  the  moral  and  aesthetic  nature. 
Here  the  understanding  has  only  the  negative 
function  of  maintaining  consistency  and  pre- 
venting collision  with  the  laws  of  thought. 
The  positive  content  of  these  attributes  cannot 
be  learned  from  logic,  and  the  faith  in  their 
objective  reahty  must  at  last  rest  on  our  im- 
mediate conviction  that  the  universe  is  no  more 
the  abode  of  the  true  than  it  is  of  the  beauti- 


COXCLUSIOX.  263 

ful  and  the  good.  Indeed,  the  true  itseK,  ex- 
cept as  truth  of  fact,  is  a  purely  ideal  element, 
and  derives  all  its  significance  from  its  con- 
nection with  the  beautiful  and  the  good.  For 
truth  of  fact  has  only  a  utihtarian  value  apart 
from  the  nature  of  the  fact  that  is  true.  If 
the  universe  were  only  a  set  of  facts — such  as. 
Water  boils  at  100°  C. — it  Would  have  nothing 
in  it  to  awaken  wonder,  enthusiasm,  and  rever- 
ence ;  and  "  cosmic  emotion "  would  be  quite 
as  much  out  of  place  as  religious  sentiment. 

Logically  considered,  our  entire  mental  life 
rests  uj)on  a  fallacy  of  the  form  known  as  the 
illicit  process ;  in  other  words,  our  conclusions 
are  too  large  for  the  premises.  A  set  of  ideals 
arises  in  the  mind  under  the  stimulus  of  ex- 
perience, but  not  as  transcripts  of  experience. 
These  ideals  impUcitly  determine  our  mental 
procedure,  and  they  do  it  aU  the  more  surely 
because  we  are  generally  unconscious  of  them. 
Our  so-called  proofs  consist,  not  in  deducing 
them  from  experience,  but  in  illustrating  them 
by  experience.  The  facts  which  make  against 
the  ideal  are  set  aside  as  problems  not  yet  un- 
derstood. In  this  way  we  maintain  our  con- 
ception of  a  rational  universe,  or  of  a  God  of 


264  PHiLOSornY  of  theism. 

perfect  wisdom  and  goodness.  We  illustrate 
by  picked  facts,  and  this  passes  for  proof.  Of 
course  it  is  not  proof,  but  only  an  illustration 
of  pre-existing  conceptions. 

Logic,  then,  is  in  its  full  right  in  pointing  out 
the  non-demonstrative  character  of  these  argu- 
ments, but  it  is  miserably  narrow  when  it  fails 
to  see  that  these  undemonstrated  ideals  are  still 
the  real  foundation  of  our  mental  life.  With- 
out implicit  faith  in  them  no  step  can  be  taken 
in  any  field.  The  mind  as  a  whole,  then,  is  in 
I  its  full  right  when,  so  long  as  these  ideals  are 
'not  positively  disproved,  it  accepts  them  on  its 
own  warrant  and  works  them  out  into  the  rich 
and  ever-growing  conquests  of  our  modern  life. 
By  the  side  of  this  great  faith  and  its  great  re- 
sults the  formal  objections  of  formal  logic  sink 
almost  into  a  despicable  impertinence. 

Of  all  these  ideals  that  rule  our  life  theism 
'is  the  sum  and  source.  The  cognitive  ideal  of 
'the  universe,  as  a  manifestation  of  the  Supreme 
Keason,  leads  to  theism.  The  moral  ideal  of 
the  universe,  as  a  manifestation  of  the  Supreme 
Kighteousness,  leads  to  theism.  The  practical 
ideal  of  a  "far-off  divine  event  to  which  the 
whole  creation  moves"   leads  to  theism.     In 


CONCLUSION.  265 

short,  while  theism  is  demonstrated  by  noth- 
ing, it  is  imphcit  in  everything.  It  cannot  be 
proved  without  begging  the  question,  or  denied 
"without  ending  in  absurdity. 

Poor  atheism,  on  the  other  hand,  first  puts 
out  its  eyes  by  its  primal  unfaith  in  the  truth  of 
our  nature  and  of  the  system  of  things,  and  then 
proceeds  to  make  a  great  many  flourishes  about 
"reason,"  "science,"  "progress,"  and  the  like, 
in  melancholy  ignorance  of  the  fact  that  it  has 
made  all  these  impossible.  If  consistent  think- 
ing were  still  possible  one  could  not  help  feehng 
affronted  by  a  theory  which  violates  the  condi- 
tions of  all  thinking  and  theorizing.  It  is  an 
outlaw  by  its  ovni  act,  yet  insolently  demands 
the  protection  of  the  laws  it  seeks  to  overthrow. 
Supposing  logical  thought  possible,  there  seems 
to  be  no  escape  from  regarding  atheism  as  a 
pathological  compound  of  ignorance  and  inso- 
lence. On  the  one  hand,  there  is  a  complete 
ignorance  of  all  the  imphcations  of  vahd  know- 
ing, and  on  the  other  a  ludicrous  identification 
of  itseK  with  science.  Its  theory  of  knowledge 
is  picked  up  ready-made  among  the  crudities  of 
spontaneous  thought,  and  when  the  seK-destruc- 
tive  imphcations  of  atheism  are  pointed  out,  in- 


2CG  PIIILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

stead  of  justifying  itseK  from  its  own  premises, 
it  falls  back  on  thoughtless  common-sense,  which 
forthwith  rejects  the  implications.  Of  course 
the  question  is  not  whether  the  implications  be 
true  or  false,  but  whether  they  be  imphcations. 
This  point  is  happily  ignored,  and  the  defence 
is  complete.  It  only  remains  to  pick  some  flaws 
in  theistic  argument,  and  to  skirmish  a  little  with 
"  the  vastness  of  the  Possible,"  and  atheism  may 
be  regarded  as  estabUshed.  To  be  sure,  there  is 
no  mental  health  or  insight  fmnished  by  the 
doctrine.  It  must  proclaim  our  entire  nature 
misleading.  The  universe  which  has  evolved  the 
human  mind  as  the  *'  correspondence  of  inner  re- 
lations to  outer  relations"  has  produced  a  strange 
non-correspondence  here.  The  aU-illuminating 
formula.  It  is  because  it  must  be,  sheds  only 
a  feeble  hght.  The  conception  of  bhnd  power 
working  for  apparent  ends,  of  non-inteUigence 
producing  inteUigence,  of  unconsciousness  pro- 
ducing consciousness,  of  necessity  producing 
ideas  of  freedom  and  duty — this  conception  is 
not  a  transparent  one.  But  these  considerations 
avail  nothing.  The  nightmare  of  the  "Possi- 
ble" is  upon  the  speculator  and  prevents  the 
proper  working  of  inteUigence.    Under  the  speU, 


CONCLUSIOX.  267 

the  "  Probable  "  and  the  "  Rational "  are  enth^ely 
lost  sight  of.  The  state  is  pathologic,  and  be- 
longs to  the  mental  pathologist  rather  than  the 
philosopher. 

Considering  atheistic  procedure  as  a  whole,  an 
ill-conditioned  mind  might  lose  patience  with  it ; 
bnt  there  is  no  occasion  for  warmth,  for  accord- 
ing to  the  theory  itself,  logical  thought  is  not 
possible.  Thoughts  come  and  go,  not  according 
to  any  inherent  rationahty,  bnt  as  produced  by 
necessity.  This  probably  contains  the  explana- 
tion of  some  of  the  extraordinary  logic  of  athe- 
istic treatises.  Any  hiatus  between  premises 
and  conclusion  is  due  to  necessity.  Any  strange 
backwardness  in  drawing  a  manifest  conclusion 
has  the  same  cause.  All  lapses  into  sentiment 
just  when  logic  is  called  for  are  equally  necessa- 
ry. Even  the  mistakes  of  theism  and  the  hard- 
ness and  uncircumcision  of  the  critical  heart 
have  an  equally  sohd  foundation.  A  great  au- 
thority, speaking  of  the  advanced  thinker,  says, 
"He,  like  every  other  man,  may  properly  con- 
sider himself  as  one  of  the  myriad  agencies 
through  whom  works  the  Unknown  Cause ;  and 
when  the  Unknown  Cause  produces  in  him  a 
certain  behef  he  is  thereby  authorized  to  profess 


268  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THEISM. 

and  act  out  that  belief."  With  this  conclusion 
the  limits  of  mental  self-respect  are  transcended, 
and  the  theory  breaks  up  in  a  melancholy  farce. 
The  theist  may  take  some  comfort,  however,  in 
remembering  that  his  faith  is  no  home-made 
fancy  of  his  own,  but  a  genuine  product  of  the 
Unknown  Cause,  and  he  is  thereby  authorized 
to  profess  and  act  it  out. 

Two  critical  words  in  conclusion.  First,  it 
will  be  a  distinct  advance  when  we  reach  the 
hisight  that  a  theory  is  responsible  for  its  imph- 
cations  and  that  the  critical  analysis  of  a  theory 
is  not  an  attack  upon  its  holders.  Secondly,  it 
will  be  a  still  greater  advance  when  the  theory 
of  knowledge  is  sufficiently  developed  to  show 
that  not  every  theory  of  things  is  compatible 
'^^'ith  the  vahdity  of  knowledge.  At  present,  in 
the  uninstructed  goodness  of  our  hearts,  we 
show  the  largest  hospitality  towards  all  theories 
without  ever  dreaming  of  inquiring  into  their 
bearings  upon  the  problem  of  knowledge.  If 
any  critic  points  out  that  a  given  theory  de- 
stroys reason  and  thus  violates  the  conditions 
of  all  thinking,  such  is  our  good-nature  that  we 
conclude  the  consequences  of  the  theory  must 
be  aberrations  of  the  critic.    The  self-destructive 


CONCLUSION.  269 

theory  is  thus  enabled  to  reserve  all  its  strength 
for  attack,  and  falls  back  on  common-sense  to 
defend  it  fi-om  itself.     This  solemn  folly  will  / 
continue  until  it  is  recognized  that  the  problem 
of  knowledge  is  a  real  one,  and  one  which  can- ; 
not  be  finally  settled  by  the  crude  assumptions  > 
of  spontaneous  thought.     Least  of  all  can  we 
hope  to  advance  philosophy  by  the  method  cur- 
rent in  many  quarters,  the  method  of  specula- 
tive suicide. 


THE   END. 


METAPHYSICS. 

Metaphysics.  A  Study  in  First  Principles.  By  Borden  P. 
BowxE,  Professor  of  Philosophy  in  Boston  University, 
and  Author  of  "Studies  in  Theism."     8vo,  Cloth,  $2  50. 

Will  mark  an  era  in  the  discussion  between  materialists  and  intuitionalists, 
and  between  sceptics  and  theistic  believers.  .  .  .  The  Professor's  vivacious  style, 
his  keen  sarcasm  and  effective  wit,  greatly  enliven  these  solid  pages  of  pure  con- 
nected thought  and  iron  logic.  ...  To  read  this  thoughtful  volume  will  be  a 
wholesome  intellectual  discipline,  as  well  as  a  strong  confirmation  of  faith  in  re- 
vealed religion  as  the  true  philosophy  of  the  universe  and  of  man. — ZioiCs  Her- 
ald, Boston. 

The  work  is  a  very  thoughtful,  carefully  studied,  and  able  production,  and  is 
a  wholesome  antidote  to  much  of  the  so-called  scientific  speculations  of  the  day. 
— Boston  Post. 

Few  books  of  the  kind  are  so  readable.  The  author  is  not  on  the  watch 
against  dulness.  Dulness  is  so  repellent  to  his  nature  that  he  has  little  occasion 
to  guard  against  it.  .  .  .  The  author  handles  his  themes  as  one  who  feels  at 
home.  The  treatise,  it  may  be  said  at  the  outset,  is  thoroughly  theistic.  We 
know  of  no  work  of  the  same  compass  where  the  postulates  and  arguments  of 
scientific  materialism  are  subjected  to  a  more  searching  and  destructive  criticism. 
.  .  .  We  have  only  to  add  that  the  work  of  Professor  Bowne  is  marked  by  a 
striking  freshness  and  ability,  a  comprehensive  mastery  of  the  history  of  philos- 
ophy from  the  beginnings  of  speculation,  penetrating  knowledge  of  recent  dis- 
cussions in  the  department,  and  an  uncommon  power  of  presenting  abstruse 
trains  of  thought  in  a  perspicuous  and  lively  form.  It  will  take  a  high  rank  in 
the  philosophical  literature  of  the  time. — iV.  Y.  Trihme. 

A  learned  and  elaborate  treatise  on  that  most  alluring  and  least  satisfying  of 
all  human  inquiries.  .  .  .  We  are  free  to  express  the  opinion  that  the  work  of  Pro- 
fessor Bowne  has  real  value  both  as  a  polemic  for  the  present  and  as  a  criticism 
for  the  past  in  the  history  of  speculation.  lie  has  fed  his  mind  on  the  ripest 
fruits  of  philosophy,  and  is,  at  the  same  time,  able  to  assimilate  his  acquisitions 
by  a  digestive  power  of  his  own.  The  conclusions  which  he  reaches  will  be  spe- 
cially helpful  to  all  who  find  themselves  caught  in  the  drift  of  materialism  with- 
out being  able  to  regain  their  footing  on  the  old  foundations  of  theism. — iV.  Y, 
Herald. 

Ue  appreciates  the  limitations  of  his  theme,  and  restricts  himself  within  them, 
while  his  work  has  real  value  from  the  breaking  loose  from  old  ties  and  restric- 
tions which  modern  investigation  has  shown  to  be  weak  and  whimsical  in  many 
respects.  When  he  applies  his  fresh,  strong  style  to  an  assault  upon  these  an- 
cient "whimseys"  he  can  be  not  only  interesting,  but  really  entertaining. — 
Brooklyn  Dally  Times,  N.  Y. 


Published  by  HARPER  &  BROTHERS,  New  York. 

C^~  IlAKrEK  &  Bkothkrs  will  send  the  above  work  by  viail,  postage  prepaid,  to  any  part 
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PSYCIIOLOGrY. 

Introduction  to  Psychological  Theory.  By  Professor  Corden 
P.  BowNE,  Professor  in  Boston  University,  and  Author  of 
"Studies  in  Theism."     8vo,  Cloth,  $1  75. 

Professor  Bowiie  writes  with  vigor  anil  ability,  and  in  a  manner  that  will 
awaken  tliought.  .  .  .  Tlie  arrangement  of  the  book  for  progressive  study  is  gen- 
erally admirable.  lie  begins  witli  a  discussion  of  the  subject  of  the  mental 
life,  then  passes  to  tlie  impressions  which  that  suljject  receives  from  without, 
and  with  which  the  mental  life  begins,  and  then  considers  the  complex  action  and 
reaction  upon  these  impressions  in  which  tlie  developed  mental  life  consists. — 
Saturdaij  Evening  Gazette,  Boston. 

In  dealing  with  the  deeper  problems  relating  to  the  human  mind,  the  work  of 
Professor  Bowne  lias  an  unmistakable  superiority  over  any  other  work  of  Amer- 
ican or  EngUsh  authorship.  Its  lucid  and  compact  style,  its  orderly  arrange- 
ment, and  its  keenness  and  vigor  of  thought,  make  it  well-nigh  a  model  in  its 
line  of  writings.  No  one  wlio  is  interested  to  know  the  results  of  the  best  think- 
ing of  our  age  upon  the  princi[)al  topics  of  psychology  can  afford  to  neglect  this 
book. — Prof.  II.  C.  Sheldon,  in  Ziou's  Herald,  Boston. 

The  method  is  original,  and  wliile  embodying  what  is  best  in  mental  science, 
leads  to  new  and  important  principles.  It  is  so  independent  and  far-reaching, 
and  withal  so  scholarly,  that  one  turns  to  its  results  as  for  the  first  time  ...  fresh 
pages  in  the  study  of  the  mind.  And  one  really  may  find  on  almost  every  page 
some  valuable  suggestion  or  application.  It  is  a  notable  example  of  abstract 
analysis  and  reasoning. — Boston  Globe. 

A  masterly  and  lucid  treatise.  .  .  .  Professor  Bowno  has  already  achieved  a 
reputation  as  an  acute  thinker  and  profound  logician  by  his  previous  work, 
"  Metaphysics,"  and  new  lustre  will  be  given  to  his  name  by  his  latest  contri- 
bution to  mental  science. — Newark  Advertiser. 

Dr.  Bowne  has  the  art  of  clear  statement,  and  succeeds  in  dissipating  the  fog 
that  ordinarily  surrounds  his  subject.  .  .  .  His  book  is  throughout  a  vigorous  and 
apparently  unanswerable  protest  against  the  theory  of  the  materialist. — Brook- 
lyn Uidon. 

This  is  not  a  dogmatic  treatise  of  empirical  psychology,  much  less  a  digest  of 
physiological  psychology,  and  the  fanciful  theories  that  cluster  round  that  shad- 
owy border-land  of  research,  but  a  series  of  essays  in  pure  psychology,  the  basis 
of  the  whole  performance  being  facts,  not  theories.  It  is  this  latter  point — Pro- 
fessor Bowne's  unswerving  respect  for  facts — that  commands  confidence  from 
the  very  start,  and  makes  one  willing  to  accept  his  guidance  througli  the  portals 
of  philosophy  and  truth.  .  .  .  The  value  of  the  performance  lies  in  the  fact  that 
it  clears  the  ground,  removes  ancient  and  modern  nonsense,  and  enables  one  to 
get  at  the  real  question.     Such  a  book  is  enormously  useful. — Beacon,  Boston. 


Published  by  HARPER  &  BROTHERS,  New  York. 

IIarpee  &  Brothers  will  send  the  above  work  by  mail,  postage  prepaid,  to  any  part 
of  the  United  States  or  Canada,  on  receipt  0/  the  price. 


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